On Tue, 15 Nov 2005, David Safford wrote: > device driver, based on a trusted boot. Since the kernel master > key is unsealed by the hardware TPM only as a result of a valid > trusted boot, and the key is never visible outside the kernel, > the EVM HMAC attribute cannot be forged in an offline attack. More comments to follow, but I think this claim is confusing. If a kernel contains a vulnerability which allows userland to arbitrarily access kernel memory, the HMAC could be forged later. A "trusted" boot here only means that the kernel was not tampered with after installation, not that you can trust the kernel. Verified boot is probably a better term. - James -- James Morris <jmorris@private>
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