Just a comment here. I don't think (IANAL) that the court is going to care about accuracy past about a minute. So why don't you setup a local NTP server. Get it to synch across the net regularly. Make sure it logs any major changes. Check it agains the time pips on the radio or whatever occaisonally. That way you know that all your servers are against the same time and that that time isn't going to be far off true time. Comments? Edward Devdas Bhagat <devdasat_private> on 05/12/2001 07:49:08 Please respond to Devdas Bhagat <devdasat_private> To: Log Analysis Mailing List <loganalysisat_private> cc: Subject: Re: [logs] Due Diligence for Admission in Court On 04/12/01 09:40 -0800, todd glassey wrote: > If you plan on submitting something to a court, you likely may need to have > the following setup: > > 0) Understanding what it is you are trying to do Important point, missed this one. <snip> > > 1) Some proof of the time data that was stamped on the document. > > This is a real issue since NTP across the open Internet is not reliable Ok, but you can setup your own local NTP server. If your local time stamps are consistent across multiple local systems, you have much less to worry about. For multiple locations, one local NTP server and local log server, plus a central log server and central NTP server. Reasonable attempts to maintain timestamp synchronization. <snip> > 2) Some level of operating integrity which means a regularly run IDS > process to verify the consistency of the system, like AIDE, SHADOW, or any > of the commercial ones (Tripwire, ISS, etc). Yes, logging and log checking would be a part of this process. > The bottom line is that you need to prove that your environment was behaving > properly and to do that you will need these Filesystem IDS tools. The IDS Actually, you need to prove that it had integrity before the compromise. Behaving properly, or not is a different term and will depend on what you want it to do. <snip> > 4) Some kind of Log Management regimen wherein the logs are regularly > timestamped, rotated, and made tamper-proof Again, see point two. You need to show integrity. Thats the only thing you need to prove. <snip> > 5) Some kind of active audit model that demonstrates that each one of > these constraints or subsystem requirements are met. > > This is likely between you and your auditors who ever they are and then your > data and process will likely be admissible just about anywhere. As long as a consistent audit model is maintained, and well documented. If the model is not documented, it will not be admissible. <snip> > > For example, you can log the SMTP sender, but since that is in the hands > > of the client, it cannot be verified, or trusted. > > Only true if Sendmail/mailx is used. Many of the other mailer agents have > addressed this and allow for extended handshaking. What the client supplies cannot be trusted. Only locally originated/locally verifiable data can be trusted. > > Even if you restrict only authorized clients writing to the datastream, > > you have no knowledge that the data itself is valid. > > You are not worried as to the integrity of the data only the constency of > the data once it entered your system. You have to worry about both. If you cannot trust the integrity of the data itself, you have problems with your tools, since they have to trust this data to act on it. GIGO. If your data is not consistent, it should immediately ring alarm bells. If the data is consistent, then its integrity has to be validated in some form, as far as possible. > > > > > - lack of time synchronization > > NTP, ideally following the new RFC. > > No No No - NTP is not reliable over the open Internet - period. See what I said above. Expect that errors will occur. Make reasonable attempts to keep the errors to a minimum. The operative word here is reasonable. I will not expect it reasonable that a typical home user needs to have the expertise needed to configure a firewall, but I would expect a much higher degree of competence from a professional administrator. <snip> Devdas Bhagat --------------------------------------------------------------------- To unsubscribe, e-mail: loganalysis-unsubscribeat_private For additional commands, e-mail: loganalysis-helpat_private ---------------------------------------------------------------- The information transmitted is intended only for the person or entity to which it is addressed and may contain confidential and/or privileged material. Any review, retransmission, dissemination or other use of, or taking of any action in reliance upon, this information by persons or entities other than the intended recipient is prohibited. If you received this in error, please contact the sender and delete the material from any computer. --------------------------------------------------------------------- To unsubscribe, e-mail: loganalysis-unsubscribeat_private For additional commands, e-mail: loganalysis-helpat_private
This archive was generated by hypermail 2b30 : Tue Dec 04 2001 - 15:31:43 PST