All: Thanks for the heads-up. We saw these signatures in our fw logs last evening. Some of the offending IPs: 198.245.191.72 218.2.151.38 162.105.232.52 205.244.63.84 Ron Baklarz CISSP, GSEC Chief Information Security Officer The American Red Cross 8111 Gatehouse Road Falls Church, VA 22042 Phone: 703-206-7279 Pager: 877-594-3354 -----Original Message----- From: Jay D. Dyson [mailto:jdysonat_private] Sent: Tuesday, June 11, 2002 8:07 PM To: Sweth Chandramouli Cc: Log Analysis; Incidents List Subject: Re: [logs] nimda web server logs -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 On Tue, 11 Jun 2002, Sweth Chandramouli wrote: > > Here's what I'm seeing -- anyone have any information on this variant? > > /msadc/..%255c../..%255c../..%255c../winnt/system32/cmd.exe?/c+dir+c:\\*.cif /s/b > > /a.asp/..%c1%1c../..%c1%1c../winnt/repair/sam > > /a.asp/..%c1%9c../..%c1%9c../winnt/repair/sam > > > > This is definitely not Nimda, although it attempts to exploit the same > > directory traversal vulnerability in IIS as Nimda > > Perhaps this should be thrown over to the incidents list? I concur. Incidents folks, here's a summary of the present discussion from the Log Analysis list. 1. Tina Bird requested a list of Nimda variant attack strings (which I provided). Upon review, she determined that the style of attacks she was seeing (enumerated at the top of this message) were not among the known Nimda variants. 2. Michael Katz made the observation that the directory traversal technique is the same as Nimda, though the attacks don't appear as a Nimda variant. Mr. Katz further suggested that the attacks may have been manually executed. 3. Sweth Chandramouli commented on the '.cif' request thus: "This is the one that scares me; it's attempting to run a recursive directory search on your C drive to find your Internet Explorer component information file--the file that, for example, Windows Update uses to determine what patches you have installed. Presumably, if that request succeeded, it would then download the CIF to find out what version of IE you have, etc., and try only those exploits of relevance." 4. Both Sweth and myself noted that the traversal to /winnt/ repair/sam had some large ramifications if the file access attempt wasn't hung up with some sort of Microsoft access sharing violation. (The attacker would basically have a load of goodies to feed l0phtcrack.) Anyone else seeing this pop up in their logs? Any honeypots collecting data of this sort? It's a new one on me. - -Jay ( ( _______ )) )) .--"There's always time for a good cup of coffee"--. >====<--. C|~~|C|~~| (>------ Jay D. Dyson -- jdysonat_private ------<) | = |-' `--' `--' `-- I'll be diplomatic...when I run out of ammo. --' `------' -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v1.0.7 (TreacherOS) Comment: See http://www.treachery.net/~jdyson/ for current keys. iD8DBQE9BpC5GI2IHblM+8ERAukTAJ4yysPYcDmnBzSkMvMA8+w+PaoGtACfetJk hE4GalTiNp/d0VcmfOhyUqE= =oCYX -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- This list is provided by the SecurityFocus ARIS analyzer service. For more information on this free incident handling, management and tracking system please see: http://aris.securityfocus.com ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- This list is provided by the SecurityFocus ARIS analyzer service. For more information on this free incident handling, management and tracking system please see: http://aris.securityfocus.com
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