Re: [logs] "Temperproof" logfiles?

From: Jason Haar (Jason.Haarat_private)
Date: Thu Apr 03 2003 - 20:48:34 PST

  • Next message: Kieran: "Re: [logs] "Temperproof" logfiles?"

    On Thu, Apr 03, 2003 at 04:04:43PM -0500, Blaise St-Laurent wrote:
    > the more i think about it though, the less i think that database + 
    > tamper resistance is going to be an syslog issue. If you want to sign 
    > or at least put a checksum against every line that goes into your db, 
    > the best way i could think of doing this is to write a trigger on 
    > insert that calculates the checksum based on the values you supply 
    > (time, server, msg etc..) and adds it to the appropriate column. I'm 
    
    I may be showing my ignorance here, but can someone explain to me how
    checksums *by themselves* actually "prove" the data hasn't been tampered
    with? 
    
    I mean, if I have a years worth of syslog data, md5 checksum the files, and
    burn them all off onto tape. A year later in court, I can confidently say
    that the syslog data *as it is on the tape* is as valid today as it was
    *when the tape was written* (as the checksum will hopefully match).
    
    I mean, as far as legal goes, surely all that this checksumming does it
    "prove" the data hasn't been altered *since it was written*. It doesn't say
    anything about me fiddling with it before I checksumed it...
    
    Surely in court, it's simply about proving your copy of the data hasn't been
    altered since it was written, and then it's *totally* a "reliability of the
    witness" type problem after that...?
    
    Similarly, if you have some nice proprietary "logging server" that can take
    input from syslog clients and it puts it into a checksummed database you
    can't fiddle with as you don't know how it works, then you can still input
    bogus data can't you... 
    
    I don't understand why this issue is always shown off as being a technical
    issue, when it court is usually ends up being a "people issue" (i.e. do they
    trust you)?
    
    -- 
    Cheers
    
    Jason Haar
    Information Security Manager, Trimble Navigation Ltd.
    Phone: +64 3 9635 377 Fax: +64 3 9635 417
    PGP Fingerprint: 7A2E 0407 C9A6 CAF6 2B9F 8422 C063 5EBB FE1D 66D1
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