Re: [TSG] Re: [logs] intrusion detection and log analysis [was: book advice]

From: Crispin Cowan (crispin@private)
Date: Fri Nov 07 2003 - 13:00:58 PST

  • Next message: Mikael Olsson: "Re: [TSG] Re: [logs] intrusion detection and log analysis [was: bookadvice]"

    Bennett Todd wrote:
    
    >>there are a couple of IDS vendors that claim to do this -- they
    >>tend to call themselves anomaly detection systems rather than
    >>intrusion detection systems -- and i've yet to be convinced about
    >>any of them. the only one i can think of is lancope, but rodney
    >>probably knows better than i do. the statistical issues are huge,
    >>because you've got to be able to characterize normal traffic in
    >>real time with huge numbers of packets.
    >>    
    >>
    >I've seen one that really convinced me: Mazu Networks
    ><URL:http://www.mazunetworks.com/>. Their tool is a lot more than an
    >anomaly-detecting IDS, but that subset of its functionality is
    >pretty impressive, at least on paper. They're dear enough that I've
    >never seen one in operation.
    >
    An interesting company to cite. Mazu's main claim to fame (IIRC) is DDoS 
    defense. DoS attacks are distinct from penetration attacks in that you 
    pretty much cannot stop a pure DoS attack with access controls if your 
    goal is to offer a public service, e.g. a web site. You *must* resort to 
    content inspection (either NIDS or NIPS) to block DoS attacks, 
    attempting to discern the subtle difference between legitimate requests 
    and DoS traffic.
    
    I predict that in a year or two, DDoS attacks will reach sufficient 
    sophistication that they will become indistinguishable highly 
    diversified natural traffic. This will cripple the Mazu approach. What 
    will be left is:
    
        * traceback: follow the packets back to the source, discover the
          zombies, and have them shut down.
        * egress filtering: get most or all of the larger ISPs to do at
          least coarse-grained egress filtering, to limit the spoofability
          of source IP addresses. With spoofed source IP addresses
          constrained, the diversity of source addresses from hundreds of
          zombies is constrained, restoring at least a nominal ability of
          devices like Mazu to detect DDoS traffic.
    
    Crispin
    
    -- 
    Crispin Cowan, Ph.D.           http://immunix.com/~crispin/
    Chief Scientist, Immunix       http://immunix.com
                http://www.immunix.com/shop/
    
    
    _______________________________________________
    LogAnalysis mailing list
    LogAnalysis@private
    http://lists.shmoo.com/mailman/listinfo/loganalysis
    



    This archive was generated by hypermail 2b30 : Fri Nov 07 2003 - 16:04:22 PST