RE: [logs] Logging in the DMZ (fwd)

From: Tina Bird (tbird@precision-guesswork.com)
Date: Mon Feb 09 2004 - 16:07:19 PST

  • Next message: Raffael Marty: "Re: [logs] Logging in the DMZ (fwd)"

    ---------- Forwarded message ----------
    Date: Mon, 9 Feb 2004 16:06:56 -0800 (PST)
    From: Tina Bird <tbird@precision-guesswork.com>
    To: bmcdowell@private
    Subject: RE: [logs] Logging in the DMZ
    
    
    On Mon, 9 Feb 2004 bmcdowell@private wrote:
    
    > What bugs me the most about option #1 is someone exploiting the hole in the firewall for something other than my database server.  The risk of this is somewhat low, but if successfully leveraged it would mean circumventing the internal firewall, which would be bad...
    >
    one of the advantages to UDP syslog is that you can implement a stealth
    logging system, that captures syslog data by collecting broadcast traffic.
    if you want to really minimize visibility to systems in your DMZ, that
    might be something to look at.
    
    here's a broad overview:
    
    http://www.linuxjournal.com/modules.php?op=modload&name=NS-lj-issues/issue92&file=5476s2
    
    basically, you pick a "fake" IP address for the apparent address of the
    DMZ logserver.  all boxes in the DMZ get a static ARP entry for a fake MAC
    addr to go with the fake IP address.  then you put an interface with no IP
    address in promiscuous mode and collect anything destined for UDP/514 on
    the apparent loghost.
    
    you can use tcpdump or snort or whatever you like to reassemble the syslog
    data out of the packets.  i think JP vossen has info on how to use snort
    for this on his web site, but i'm having trouble tracking it down
    anywhere...
    
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