[logs] Re: Log integrity handling on central logsystem

From: Daniel Cid (danielcid@private)
Date: Wed Aug 23 2006 - 08:10:09 PDT


Hi Patrick,

When dealing with centralized log management, I always
like to store the logs locally on the box that
generated it and to send them to an external log
server as closed to real time as possible (for storage
and analysis). If your log server is *compromised, you
still have the logs on the real system. If the system
is compromised, you have the logs in the log server.
If both get compromised, you have more problems... :)

*The log server should be hardened.

**rest of the reply inline.

--- Patrick Debois <Patrick.Debois@private> escreveu:


> -Would you rely on taking checksums of the logs and
> storing them on
> another system?

I like to create a "chain" of checksums, where
basically at each day (or every hour) I generate
a checksum of the currently log and also a checksum
of it plus the previous day.
So your checksum is something like that:

log-dayX.sum
dayX md5 = XXX
dayX sha1 = YYY
(dayX + dayX-1.md5) = XXX
(dayX + dayX-1.sha1)= YYY

It does not garantee the integrity of the currently
log, but protects you against modification of old logs
(since it will require a change to all the checksums
after it).


> -How do you protect yourself from the fact that the
> central logging is
> compromised with a still growing logfile?
> Would you consider signing each log line? Signing
> within a text file is
> fairly easy, but what about content stored in a
> database?

If your log server is compromised and the logs can be
deleted, the attacker can do the same with the hashes.
The checksum of each line is going to be almost the
size of the log line itself (md5 does not count
anymore). So if you can protect the hashes, you can
protect the logs (no need to hash all of them)...

You can do some form of chaining of hashes, where
each log line is hashed with the checksum of the
previous one. However, if the monitored system is
compromised, the attacker can just stop the log daemon
or your log generation tool (or modify the logs in the
fly).


**IMHO, You are worried about the log server, but this
should be the hardest link to break. If you are using
syslog to send the messages (which most people do) you
have much more problems (no integrity, no
privacy,etc). 



> My customer is currently looking at Splunk. It seems
> a great way to go
> through the logfiles, but I'm not sure that we can
> fullfill his
> dataintegrity requirements with it. But then again
> it does not stand in
> the way of another solution doing it probable.
> 
> Patrick


Hope it helps..

--
Daniel B. Cid
dcid ( at ) ossec.net


	



	
		
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