Re: Penetration test report - your comments please?

From: simonis (simonisat_private)
Date: Wed May 30 2001 - 07:53:11 PDT

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    Curt Wilson wrote:
    > 
    > 
    > The www.<sitename.com> system is currently running at <ISP> and does not
    > have any type of firewall or other access control mechanism in place that I
    > am aware of. Therefore, this audit is only reflective of the current state
    > of the system. Network and host remote vulnerability conditions were tested
    > for, with the exclusion of Denial of Service (DOS) and brute-force attacks.
    > I was unable to penetrate into the operating system or database within the
    > allotted time, therefore it is likely that <sitename.com> is fairly secure
    > from all but the most determined attackers or those with pre-existing access.
    
    I wouldn't feel comfortable making this claim based on 3 hours of 
    testing, especially given the unusual constraints.  Were I an attacker
    I would try social engineering, and I would also try a bruteforce attack
    against the database.  Excluding these takes alot away from the overall
    value of a penetration test and really turns it into a simple, cursory 
    scan.
    
    
    > 
    > Basic recommendations: Disable any unnecessary services and web modules.
    
    I would expand on this.  Since you weren't allowed to do alot with the
    test, you should focus on the report as a place to add value.  Specify
    which services are known to be easily exploited, give some examples and
    some guidance on protecting services that are indeed necessary.
    
    > Apply all necessary patches on a timely basis. 
    
    This could be expanded to not only the application of patches, but also
    the necessity of a section in the security policy mandating their 
    application.
    
    I'd also be curious as to if they detected your scans.  Alot of people
    seem to be in the mind that a penetration test should only evaluate the
    security, or "hardness" of the target hosts and perhaps the
    effectiveness
    of the firewalls.  I also like to include the ability of the IDS systems 
    to detect my presence, and how the intrusion was handled.  Is there a
    written manual for incident response?  If so, were the procedures
    followed,
    and were they effective?  There's so much more benefit to be gained from 
    a pen-test than just simply "did the host respond to my romance".  
    
    Or maybe I just suffer from eternal scope creep  ;-)
    



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