RE: Cain a& Abel Question

From: Christopher Harrington (charringtonat_private)
Date: Thu May 22 2003 - 10:16:09 PDT

  • Next message: Cushing, David: "RE: Cain a& Abel Question"

    That's an interesting vector. You would have some notification of the Root
    Cert being added on the client workstation though. There is no way to turn
    off the MS CAPI warning that pops up when you add a certificate to the
    root container. The user would have to accept the bogus cert.
    
    --Chris
    
    
    -----Original Message-----
    From: Eliot Mansfield [mailto:Eliotmat_private]
    Sent: Thursday, May 22, 2003 4:41 AM
    To: pen-testat_private
    Subject: RE: Cain a& Abel Question
    
    
    Persumably a cunning attack vector would be to compromise a private
    network, generate a self signed certificate and use windows 2000 group
    policy to deliver your untrusted root ca as a trusted ca into everyones
    browser. Then C&A and Doug Songs tools would work without warning??
    
    Eliot Mansfield
    
    
    
    -----Original Message-----
    From: Cushing, David [mailto:David.Cushingat_private]
    Sent: 21 May 2003 19:15
    To: pjacobat_private; pen-testat_private
    Subject: RE: Cain a& Abel Question
    
    
    Pete,
    
    What you are seeing is the result of a "man in the middle" style attack
    rather than a decoding of your SSL connection to the bank.
    
    C&A is intercepting and forwarding your traffic due to the ARP poisoning.
    Your browser negotiates an SSL connection with C&A.  C&A negotiates
    another SSL connection to the bank.  Then C&A is able to see all traffic
    in plaintext as it passes it along.
    
    Browser <--ssl--> C&A (plaintext) <--ssl--> Bank
    
    The program is not able to generate a proper certificate to hand your
    browser, though.  It is self signed and will not be trusted by your
    browser.  An alert should have popped up when you opened the page.  Did
    it?
    
    Cain info: http://www.oxid.it/cain_faq.html
    MiM info: http://www.sans.org/rr/threats/man_in_the_middle.php
    --
    David
    
    > -----Original Message-----
    > I was reading thru the list and decided to give Cain & Abel a try...
    > it is a really powerful tool, I do have a question, I was running it
    > using the ARP poisoning from one of my test machines to my internet
    > gateway.. (Cisco 3600 series) I logged into my On-line banking
    > account, which is an SSL connection, and Cain & Abel picked up my
    > username and passsword as "Clear text"... I guess I am confused about
    > this... when I goto the site, it is an SSL site,it appears that the
    > entire session is SSL, and Cain & Abel is not doing any sort of
    > "Cracking" and
    > if the software "Cain & Abel" is doing
    > some sort of sniffing, wouldn't it be encrypted via SSL?
    
    
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