FC: Police dept needs warrant to monitor officer's pager, court says

From: Declan McCullagh (declanat_private)
Date: Mon May 14 2001 - 06:45:13 PDT

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    [This seems to be an interesting case, but of limited practical
    significance. What police departments, at least in the sixth circuit,
    will do now is simply obtain a warrant, or, as this court points out,
    "give notice to officers that random monitoring of their
    department-issued pagers was possible." --Declan]
    
    ---
    
    http://pacer.ca6.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/getopn.pl?OPINION=01a0157p.06
       
                ELECTRONIC CITATION: 2001 FED App. 0157P (6th Cir.)
       
                               File Name: 01a0157p.06
       
                           UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
       
                               FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
       
                                 _________________
       
                                    David Adams,
                                          
                                     Plaintiff-Appellant,
                                          
                                              v.
                                          
        City of Battle Creek, a municipal corporation; Jeffrey P. Kruithoff,
                                   an individual,
                                          
                                    Defendants-Appellees,
                                    No. 99-1543
                                          
                    Appeal from the United States District Court
       
               for the Western District of Michigan at Grand Rapids.
       
                  No. 98-00233--David W. McKeague, District Judge.
       
                               Argued: August 8, 2000
       
                          Decided and Filed: May 11, 2001
       
               Before: MERRITT, KRUPANSKY, and BOGGS, Circuit Judges.
       
                                 _________________
       
                                      COUNSEL
       
       ARGUED: Marshall W. Grate, ROBERTS, BETZ & BLOSS, Grand Rapids,
       Michigan, for Appellant. John Patrick White, VARNUM, RIDDERING,
       SCHMIDT & HOWLETT, Grand Rapids, Michigan, for Appellees. ON BRIEF:
       Marshall W. Grate, ROBERTS, BETZ & BLOSS, Grand Rapids, Michigan, for
       Appellant. John Patrick White, VARNUM, RIDDERING, SCHMIDT & HOWLETT,
       Grand Rapids, Michigan, Clyde J. Robinson, OFFICE OF THE CITY
       ATTORNEY, Battle Creek, Michigan, for Appellees.
       
            MERRITT, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which BOGGS,
       J., joined. KRUPANSKY, J. (pp. 11-22), delivered a separate opinion
       concurring in part and dissenting in part.
       
                                 _________________
       
                                      OPINION
       
                                 _________________
       
            MERRITT, Circuit Judge. With certain exceptions, the federal
       wiretap act criminalizes and creates civil liability for intentionally
       intercepting electronic communications without a judicial warrant.
       This case was brought under the federal wiretapping act, known as the
       Electronic Communications Privacy Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2522. It
       raises the question of whether the police department may tap a police
       officer's pager without a warrant or notice to the officer. The police
       department, through use of a duplicate or "clone" pager, tapped
       without a warrant the plaintiff's pager provided by the department
       because it erroneously thought he was assisting drug dealers. The case
       turns on what is meant when the Act uses the phrase "in the ordinary
       course of business" to create two exceptions to the prohibition
       against wiretapping.
       
            In the present case it is both clear and conceded that the
       definition of "intercept" in the Act includes pagers within the
       language "acquisition of the contents of any . . . electronic . . .
       device."(1) Then, in the definition section for "electronic device,"
       the statute creates two "in-the-ordinary-course-of-business"
       exceptions to wiretap liability. The scope and meaning of these two
       exceptions are up for interpretation in this appeal. The two
       exceptions are not altogether clear:
       
              (5) "electronic, mechanical, or other device" means any device
         or apparatus which can be used to intercept a wire, oral, or
         electronic communication other than -
         
         (a) any telephone or telegraph instrument, equipment or facility,
         or any component thereof, (i) furnished to the subscriber or user
         by a provider of wire or electronic communication service in the
         ordinary course of its business and being used by the subscriber or
         user in the ordinary course of its business or furnished by such
         subscriber or user for connection to the facilities of such service
         and used in the ordinary course of its business; or (ii) being used
         by a provider or wire or electronic communication service in the
         ordinary course of business, or by an investigative or law
         enforcement officer in the ordinary course of his duties.
         
       18 U.S.C. § 2510(5) (emphasis added).
       
            The first problem is what the underlined phrase "other than"
       (normally an adverbial phrase, see Webster's Third Int'l Dict. (1958))
       is supposed to modify. Does it modify the immediately preceding action
       "to intercept [an] . . . electronic device," or does it act as an
       adjective, modifying "device or apparatus" or does it modify some
       other action or thought not expressed in clear language? The second
       problem is: does the use of "in-the-ordinary-course-of-business"
       language, as an exception, imply, and therefore mean, that the tapping
       of the communication is so routine, customary or well accepted that
       the parties to the tapped communication would, should or did know of
       the tap. We will deal with these two issues of interpretation below.
       
            1. The Meaning of the Phrase "Other Than." - There is no
       discussion in the case law of what the phrase "other than" in the
       statutory definition of "electronic, mechanical or other device" is to
       modify. Its dictionary label as an adverbial phrase would indicate
       that it is to modify the immediately preceding verb phrase "to
       intercept a wire, oral, or electronic communication." This does not
       make sense when read with the language that follows it.
       
            If "other than" modifies "used to intercept . . . electronic
       communication,"the scope of the "other than" exception would be as
       broad as the statute itself. This means, therefore, that "other than"
       must modify the nouns "device or apparatus." The language immediately
       following "other than" is "any telephone or telegraph, or any
       component thereof," all of which are also nouns. A better word choice
       than the "other than" phrase probably would have been "excluding"
       because subparts (a) and (b) to § 2510 (5) are exclusions to the main
       definition. In any event, the cases discussing these exceptions apply
       "other than" this way, and it is the only way that makes sense.
       
            2. Exceptions to Liability. - We conclude that the exceptions do
       not apply to this case. Both the "ordinary course of business"
       exception, or "business use" exception as it is also called, as well
       as the law enforcement exception, require that the interception of a
       communication be undertaken by employers or law enforcement agencies
       in the ordinary course of their businesses using equipment provided by
       a communications carrier as part of the communications network. For
       this exception to apply, we must find, first, that the equipment used
       to make the interception be "furnished to the subscriber or user by a
       provider of wire or electronic communication service in the ordinary
       course of its business and being used by the subscriber or user in the
       ordinary course of its business . . ." § 2510(5)(a)(i). Although
       plaintiff raises the issue of whether a clone pager fits within the
       definition prescribed in the exception, it is clear that the clone
       pager, a piece of electronic communication equipment, was provided to
       the City by MobileComm, a Bell South company, in the ordinary course
       of its business as a provider of wire and electronic communication
       services. We find, as did the district court, that the first part of
       the exception is met.
       
            The second part of the exception requires that the clone pager be
       used in "the ordinary course" of the police department's business.
       "Ordinary course of business" is not defined in the statute, but it
       generally requires that the use be (1) for a legitimate business
       purpose, (2) routine and (3) with notice. There is some disagreement
       in the case law about whether "covert" monitoring can ever be in the
       "ordinary course of business." Although we do not find that the
       statute requires actual consent for the exception to apply, we do hold
       that monitoring in the ordinary course of business requires notice to
       the person or persons being monitored. Because it is undisputed here
       that plaintiff was not given any notice that his pager was being
       monitored, the exceptions cannot apply.
       
            Most courts interpreting these exceptions have held that advance
       notice in some form is necessary. "What is ordinary is apt to be
       known; it imports implicit notice." Amati v. City of Woodstock, 176
       F.3d 952, 955 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 120 S. Ct. 445 (1999). In
       Bohach v. City of Reno, 932 F. Supp. 1232 (D. Nev. 1996), police
       officers claimed that the police department's retrieval of stored
       messages generated by their pagers was a violation of the Act. The
       court held that the officers had no reasonable expectation of privacy
       when the police department warned pager users in advance that their
       messages would be logged on the network. In Sanders v. Robert Bosch
       Corp., 38 F.3d 736, 740-42 (4th Cir. 1994), the Fourth Circuit held
       that recording all telephone conversations on certain lines after bomb
       threats were received by the company was not in the ordinary course of
       business where the employees did not receive notice of the recording.
       
            Defendants here did not routinely monitor officers' pagers or
       give notice to officers that random monitoring of their
       department-issued pagers was possible. We disagree with defendants to
       the extent that they contend that plaintiff impliedly consented to the
       interception of his pages by the clone pager simply because he
       accepted and used a department-issued pager. The general policy of the
       department that department-issued equipment, which includes the pager,
       was not to be "converted to personal use" cannot provide the necessary
       notice to officers to find consent to surreptitious interception of
       their messages by clone pagers. The so-called policy prohibiting
       personal use cannot form an after-the-fact justification for
       intercepting plaintiff's pager where the policy had not been enforced
       and the department conceded it was aware that pagers were used by many
       members of the force for personal use.
       
            We do not find any need under the facts presented here to analyze
       the "business use" and "law enforcement" exceptions separately.
       Congress most likely carved out an exception for law enforcement
       officials to make clear that the routine and almost universal
       recording of phone lines by police departments and prisons, as well as
       other law enforcement institutions, is exempt from the statute. See
       First v. Stark Cnty. Bd. of Comm'rs, No. 99-3547, 2000 WL 1478389 (6th
       Cir. Oct. 4, 2000). Such a system routinely and indiscriminately
       records all phone activity in and out of the police department. This
       practice is well known in the industry and in the general public, and
       the courts have ruled that even prisoners are entitled to some form of
       notice that such conversations may be monitored or recorded. United
       States v. Paul, 614 F.2d 115 (6th Cir. 1980); see also, e.g., United
       States v. Van Poyck, 77 F.3d 285 (9th Cir. 1996) (detention center);
       United States v. Daniels, 902 F.2d 1238, 1245 (7th Cir. 1990); United
       States v. Amen, 831 F.2d 373, 378 (2d Cir. 1987); Campiti v. Walonis,
       611 F.2d 387 (1st Cir. 1979)(monitoring of specific inmate call,
       without regulation or notice, and not routinely done, violates
       statute).
       
            3. Municipal Liability Under the Privacy Act. - Plaintiff seeks
       to hold the City liable under the wiretapping act, as well as Jeffrey
       Kruithoff, a police department employee. Defendants raise the question
       of whether the City is a "person" for purposes of the Act. The statute
       defines "person" as "any employee, or agent of the United States or
       any State or political subdivision thereof, and any individual,
       partnership, association, joint stock company, trust or corporation."
       18 U.S.C. § 2510(6).
       
            Most courts addressing the issue have held that the 1986
       amendments indicate that a governmental entity may be liable in a
       civil suit under the Act. Organizacion JD Ltda.. v. United States
       Dep't of Justice, 18 F.3d 91, 94-95 (2d Cir. 1994); Conner v. Tate,
       No. Civ. A. 1:00-CV-1723TW, ___ F. Supp. 2d ___, 2001 WL 128449, at
       **2-3 (N.D. Ga. Feb. 9, 2001); Dorris v. Absher, 959 F. Supp. 813,
       819-20 (M.D. Tenn. 1997) (municipal liability exists), aff'd in part
       on other grounds and rev'd in part, 179 F.3d 420 (6th Cir. 1999)
       (claims against county were settled prior to appeal and therefore not
       addressed on appeal); PBA Local No. 38 v. Woodbridge Police Dep't, 832
       F. Supp. 808, 822-23 (D.N.J. 1993).
       
            Only the Seventh Circuit has ruled to the contrary. Amati v. City
       of Woodstock, 176 F.3d 952, 956 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 120 S. Ct.
       445 (1999). It based its cursory decision to exempt governmental
       entities from liability under the Act solely on the plain language of
       the definition of "person" in the statute, which does not expressly
       include governmental entities; but it did not deal with the meaning of
       the word "entity." Finding no ambiguity, it refused to look to the
       legislative history. But we look to the legislative history in order
       to give meaning to the word "entity," which was added to the
       definition in 1987.
       
            The provision of the Act providing for civil liability, section
       2520,(2) was amended in 1987 and made part of the 1986 Privacy Act.
       The amendment added the words "or entity" to those who may be held
       liable under the Act. The addition of the words "entity" can only mean
       a governmental entity because prior to the 1986 amendments, the
       definition of "person" already included business entities. In order
       for the term not to be superfluous, the term "entity" necessarily
       means governmental entities. As support for this view, we note that
       the amendment added the same language to the civil liability provision
       for interception of stored wire and electronic communications under 18
       U.S.C. § 2707(a). The Senate Committee Report summarizing § 2707, the
       parallel section for liability for intercepting stored communications,
       specifically states that the word "entity" includes governmental
       entities. S. Rep. No. 541, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 43 (1986), reprinted
       in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3555, 3597.
       
            Based on the amendments to the statute and the legislative
       history behind them, as well as the case law considering the issue, we
       hold that governmental entities may be liable under 18 U.S.C. § 2520.
       Finding that a municipality may be liable under the Act, we conclude
       that questions of material fact remain as to who was involved in
       authorizing the interception and how it arose. Summary judgment is not
       appropriate on this issue at present because the facts are
       undeveloped. We remand it to the district court for further
       development of this issue.
       
            4. The Fourth Amendment. - Plaintiff also claims that monitoring
       his pager through use of the clone pager constitutes an illegal
       "search and seizure" in violation of his Fourth Amendment rights,
       actionable through 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The defendants argued, and the
       district court agreed, that plaintiff had no right to privacy in his
       department-issued pager and that no Fourth Amendment violation
       occurred.
       
            Supreme Court precedent makes it clear that courts should avoid
       unnecessary adjudication of constitutional issues. Ashwander v.
       Tennessee Valley Authority, 297 U.S. 288, 347 (1936) (Brandeis, J.,
       concurring) ("The Court will not pass on a constitutional question,
       although properly presented by the record, if there is also present
       some other ground upon which the case may be disposed of."). Accord
       United States v. Vaughn, No. 97-3539, 1998 WL 774004, *3 (6th Cir.
       Oct. 13, 1998). Where a statutory or nonconstitutional basis exists
       for reaching a decision, as it does here, it is not necessary to reach
       the constitutional issue.
       
            One application of this doctrine is the principle of statutory
       construction that states that a comprehensive statute, like the
       federal wiretapping statute, designed to protect specific
       constitutional values may be read to provide the exclusive remedies in
       the field so long as the statute itself suffers no constitutional
       infirmity. Sutherland Statutory Construction § 499-500 (1984 ed.).
       See, e.g., Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 489-90 (1973) (although
       § 1983 by its terms was literally applicable to prisoners' actions,
       some actions lie under habeas corpus as "the more specific act"); Lee
       v. Hughes, 145 F.3d 1272, 1276-77 (11th Cir. 1998) (given
       comprehensive statutory scheme established by Civil Service Reform
       Act, federal officer was precluded from raising § 1983 claim); NAACP,
       Detroit Branch v. Detroit Police Officers Ass'n, 900 F.2d 903, 912-13
       (6th Cir. 1990) (plaintiff cannot bring claims under §§ 1981 and 1983
       that fall within Title VII's parameters). The Electronic
       Communications Privacy Act is part of detailed legislative scheme
       under Title III of the Omnibus Crime and Control Act of 1986. The
       legislation seeks to balance privacy rights and law enforcement needs,
       keeping in mind the protections of the Fourth Amendment against
       unreasonable search and seizure. Congress made the Act the primary
       vehicle by which to address violations of privacy interests in the
       communication field. Berry v. Funk, 146 F.3d 1003, 1013 (D.C. Cir.
       1998) (citing City of Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304, 314
       (1981)). No claim is made that the statute is unconstitutional or that
       it is less protective of privacy rights than the Fourth Amendment. The
       plaintiff makes no claim that Fourth Amendment rights, as they relate
       to wiretapping, are broader or more comprehensive than the federal
       statute. There is no difference between the conduct relevant to
       plaintiff's statutory claim and the conduct relevant to his
       constitutional claim. Because no argument is made that the substantive
       or remedial standards provided by the Fourth Amendment differ from the
       federal statute, we do not reach any question of interpretation under
       the Fourth Amendment. All such constitutional issues are pretermitted.
       
            5. Qualified Immunity for Kruithoff. - As an alternative to
       affirming summary judgment, Kruithoff urges us to affirm the district
       court as to him on the ground of qualified immunity for both the
       Privacy Act and Fourth Amendment claims. The district court did not
       rule on this defense because it found no liability and we generally do
       not address issues that were not addressed below. In addition, a
       factual dispute remains as to Kruithoff's role, if any, in authorizing
       the clone pager. Two witnesses testified that he authorized its use,
       but Kruithoff denies this. Qualified immunity is generally not
       appropriate where questions of fact remain. Johnson v. Jones, 515 U.S.
       304, 319-20 (1995).
       
                                     CONCLUSION
       
            For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the district court's grant
       of summary judgment to defendants, affirm the denial of plaintiff's
       partial motion for summary judgment and remand to the district court
       for further proceedings.
       
                   ______________________________________________
       
                       CONCURRING IN PART, DISSENTING IN PART
       
                   ______________________________________________
       
            KRUPANSKY, Circuit Judge, concurring in part and dissenting in
       part. The panel majority has reversed the district court's grant of
       summary judgment to the defendant-appellees, finding that the
       electronic monitoring at issue in this case did not fall within one of
       the statutory exclusions provided by the federal wiretapping laws. In
       so doing, the panel majority has disregarded the plain language of the
       controlling statute by imputing a notice requirement into the ordinary
       course of business and law enforcement tests of the federal
       wiretapping laws. Because I am persuaded that the officers of the City
       of Battle Creek Police Department monitored David Adams's use of his
       alphanumeric pager in the ordinary course of its business, see 18
       U.S.C. § 2510(5)(a)(i), and in the ordinary course of exercising their
       law enforcement duties, see 18 U.S.C. § 2510(5)(a)(ii), I respectfully
       dissent.
       
            Plaintiff-Appellant David Adams ("Adams") has served as a law
       enforcement officer(1) for Defendant-Appellee City of Battle Creek
       Police Department since 1986. In conjunction with his position as a
       law enforcement officer, Adams was assigned an alphanumeric pager.(2)
       Numerous allegations of complicity in drug activity have marked his
       tenure: (1) in 1989, his patrol partner was charged with drug
       trafficking; (2) a number of informants alleged that Adams had
       protected drug dealers; (3) Adams had appeared to maintain a close
       friendship with a local drug dealer. However, investigators had failed
       to surface substantial evidence of wrongdoing by Adams.
       
            In 1995, Sgt. Patrick Alspaugh ("Alspaugh"), head of the Special
       Investigations Unit,(3) became increasingly concerned that the
       department's drug investigations were being compromised by an inside
       source. On two separate occasions, acting on reliable intelligence(4)
       that drug transactions were ongoing at certain residences, police
       officers arrived at those locations to find that there were no drugs
       on the premises. On a third occasion, while attempting to search a
       residence, officers were fired upon by perpetrators attempting to flee
       upon the officers' arrival. Given the nature of the targets' ability
       to evade police investigation, Alspaugh reasoned that a member of the
       police department had been informing the targets of the investigation
       before the officers were able to arrive and conduct their search.
       
            Alspaugh had assigned Officer Kathy Klomparens ("Klomparens"), a
       member of the Special Investigations Unit, to these cases. Alspaugh
       subsequently learned that Adams and Klomparens had had frequent
       contacts outside of the workplace. Alspaugh also learned that Adams
       may have been a close confidant of one of the targets of the
       unsuccessful narcotics investigations. Recalling the earlier
       allegations against Adams, Alspaugh requested of Jeffrey Kruithoff
       ("Kruithoff"), then-Deputy Chief of Police, that Adams' official pager
       be cloned in order to determine if Klomparens was informing Adams of
       the status of the active investigations. The parties have disputed
       whether Kruithoff authorized the use of the cloned pager.(5)
       
            As Adams was paged by unidentified third parties, Alspaugh wrote
       down the numbers. He then attempted to determine if any of the numbers
       matched any of Klomparens's personal phone or pager numbers. Alspaugh
       intercepted one text message which informed Adams of the time and
       place of a police funeral. Because the cloned pager had not provided
       any incriminating information, Alspaugh destroyed the list after four
       or five days and discontinued monitoring the cloned pager. Alspaugh
       then contacted a member of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, who
       informed him that Alspaugh's surreptitious monitoring of Adams' pager
       may have been illegal. Alspaugh promptly returned the cloned pager to
       the telecommunications concern.
       
            In 1996, Michael Lind, an intelligence officer,(6) informed Adams
       of the surreptitious monitoring of his pager. Until that time, no
       member of the police department had informed Adams that he had been
       the target of an investigation into the possibility that he had been
       aiding drug traffickers in their attempts to evade police detection.
       
            On March 9, 1998, Adams filed the instant complaint,(7) alleging
       seven counts against defendants Kruithoff, Pope,(8) and the City of
       Battle Creek Police Department (collectively "defendants"): (1)
       defendants had violated the Wire and Electronic Communications
       Interception Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2510, et seq.;(9) (2) defendants had
       infringed upon Adams' Fourth Amendment rights against unreasonable
       searchs and seizures; (3) defendants had violated Michigan's
       wiretapping statute; (4) defendants had invaded Adams privacy in
       violation of Michigan law; (5) defendants had violated Michigan's
       civil rights act; (6) defendants had intentionally inflicted emotional
       distress in violation of Michigan law; (7) Kruithoff's affair with
       Adams' wife had resulted in a loss of consortium to Adams in violation
       of Michigan law.(10) The parties filed cross- motions for summary
       judgment. The lower court granted the defendants' motion and denied
       the plaintiff's motion. The district court held that the defendants'
       surreptitious monitoring fell within the business use exception
       contained in the wiretapping act:
       
              The sensitive nature of information relating to drug
         trafficking investigations is obvious; maintenance of its
         confidentiality essential to the success of the mission and safety
         of law enforcement officers. Suspicion that plaintiff may have been
         involved in leaking drug raid information to drug traffickers was
         understandably a matter of grave concern to Detective Sergeant
         Patrick Alspaugh, Supervisor of the Special Investigations Unit,
         whose concern prompted the cloning of plaintiff's pager. It was
         also a matter of much greater significance to the police
         department's "business" than an employee's improper use of a
         telephone for personal purposes. Moreover, the extent of the
         intrusion was minimal. The monitoring was based on particularized
         suspicion of wrongdoing, lasted only 10-14 days, and yielded, with
         the exception of one verbal message concerning a police memorial
         service, merely a listing of telephone numbers from which plaintiff
         was called. No monitoring of conversations took place. The recorded
         telephone numbers were found not to be incriminating and the
         monitoring was voluntarily discontinued.
         
              Under these circumstances, as to which there is no genuine
         issue of material fact, the Court holds the subject monitoring of
         plaintiff's pager, limited in duration and minimally intrusive, was
         justified by a valid business purpose.
         
       Adams v. City of Battle Creek, et al., No. 98cv233, slip op. at 8-9
       (W.D. Mich. April 28, 1999). The district court further held that
       Adams' Fourth Amendment rights were not violated by the defendants'
       surreptitious monitoring as he had no reasonable expectation of
       privacy in the use of his departmentally-provided pager.(11) This
       appeal timely followed.
       
            Summary judgment should "be rendered ... if the pleadings,
       depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file,
       together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine
       issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to
       a judgment as a matter of law." Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c);
       Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). "[S]ummary
       judgment will not lie if the dispute about a material fact is
       'genuine,' that is, if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury
       could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." See Anderson v.
       Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 252 (1986); Ezzo's Investments,
       Inc. v. Royal Beauty Supply, Inc., 243 F.3d 980, 985 (6th Cir. 2001).
       Courts presented with motions for summary judgment must consider the
       tendered evidence, and the reasonable inferences therefrom, in the
       light most favorable to the non-movant. See Matsushita Elec. Indus.
       Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 588 (1986); Redding v.
       St. Eward, 241 F.3d 530, 532 (6th Cir. 2001). The reviewing court
       conducts a de novo examination of a district court's order awarding
       summary judgment. See American Medical Security, Inc. v. Auto Club
       Ins. Ass'n of Mich., 238 F.3d. 743, 749 (6th Cir. 2001).
       
            Wiretapping or monitoring electronic communications has been
       illegalized and is subject to civil and criminal penalties. See 18
       U.S.C. § 2511(1)(a) ("Except as otherwise specifically provided in
       this chapter any person who-(a) intentionally intercepts, endeavors to
       intercept, or procures any other person to intercept or endeavor to
       intercept, any wire, oral, or electronic communication [is subject to
       penalties described in 18 U.S.C. § 2511(4)(a).]"). In defining the
       term "electronic, mechanical, or other device,"(12) Congress excluded
       certain types of non-consensual monitoring from the purview of the
       statute:
       
         "electronic, mechanical, or other device" means any device or
         apparatus which can be used to intercept a wire, oral, or
         electronic communication other than--
         
              (a)any telephone or telegraph instrument, equipment or
         facility, or any component thereof, (i) furnished to the subscriber
         or user by a provider of wire or electronic communication service
         in the ordinary course of its business and being used by the
         subscriber or user in the ordinary course of its business or
         furnished by such subscriber or user for connection to the
         facilities of such service and used in the ordinary course of its
         business;(13) or (ii) being used by a provider of wire or
         electronic communication service in the ordinary course of its
         business, or by an investigative or law enforcement officer in the
         ordinary course of his duties[.](14) 
         
       18 U.S.C. § 2510(5).(15)
       
            The panel majority has determined that those exceptions apply
       only when a legitimate purpose supports the monitoring, the monitoring
       is routine, and the monitoring officials have given actual notice to
       those being monitored.(16) While I agree that a legitimate
       justification is required, nevertheless, I do not find support in the
       statute or the associated case law for requiring in all circumstances
       advance notice or routine monitoring.
       
            Courts have required notice of the possibility of monitoring in
       cases where the quantum of the asserted business or law enforcement
       interest is low. See, e.g., Sanders v. Robert Bosch Corp., 38 F.3d
       736, 741-742 (4th Cir. 1994) ("In short, there is no business reason
       asserted for the decision not to notify all the Guardsmark employees
       of the use of the voice logger."). However, when confronted with more
       substantial justifications, courts have permitted businesses to
       monitor without advance notice. See, e.g., Briggs v. American Air
       Filter Co., Inc., 630 F.2d 414, 420 n.9 (5th Cir. 1980) ("Since the
       specific justification advanced here is so closely tied to a
       legitimate business purpose, we have no hesitation holding that there
       is nothing extraordinary about McClure's act of listening in. Were the
       business justification less compelling, the absence of any company
       policy or prior warnings concerning use of company telephones might be
       more significant."); Arias v. Mutual Central Alarm Service, Inc., 202
       F.2d 553, 559 (2d Cir. 2000) ("Whether notice is required depends on
       the nature of the asserted business justification, and here, where the
       recording is at least in part intended to deter criminal activity, the
       absence of notice may more effectively further this interest."); Berry
       v. Funk, 146 F.3d 1003, 1009 ("[If] covert monitoring is to take place
       it must itself be justified by a valid business purpose, or, perhaps,
       at least must be shown to be undertaken normally.").(17)
       
            Moreover, the panel majority has ignored an express provision of
       the Wiretapping Act in holding that actual notice is required: the
       Wiretapping Act does not prohibit electronic eavesdropping where one
       of the parties has consented to the monitoring. See 18 U.S.C. §
       2511(1)(c) ("It shall not be unlawful under this chapter for a person
       acting under color of law to intercept a wire, oral, or electronic
       communication, where such person is a party to the communication or
       one of the parties to the communication has given prior consent to
       such interception."). Courts have determined that such consent may be
       explicit or it may be implied from the surrounding facts. See, e.g.,
       United States v. Workman, 80 F.3d 688, 692-94 (2d Cir. 1996); United
       States v. Van Poyck, 77 F.3d 285, 292 (9th Cir. 1996). If the party
       has received advance notice of monitoring, then that party may
       ordinarily be said to have consented to the subsequent monitoring.
       Hence, by reading the business use and law enforcement exceptions to
       include actual notice, the panel majority has made those exceptions
       superfluous in light of the consent exception.(18) See Amati, 176 F.3d
       at 955 ("If there is actual notice, there will normally be implied
       consent. So if the 'ordinary course' exclusion required proof of
       notice, it would have no function in the statute because there is a
       separate statutory exclusion for cases in which one party to the
       communication has consented to the interception.") (citations
       omitted).
       
            Given the fact that the ordinary course exclusions require the
       reviewing court to engage in a reasonableness analysis as to the
       nature, scope, and justification of the monitoring, it is important to
       note the circumstances surrounding the instant monitoring. In order to
       maintain the integrity of their drug investigations,(19) the police
       department initiated surreptitious monitoring of Adams' departmental
       pager.(20) The monitoring was short-lived, effectuated no longer than
       required by its supporting purpose. The monitoring itself was hardly
       invasive as no personal messages were ever intercepted or recorded. In
       addition, because Adams had been informed that he was not to use
       departmental equipment for personal use, he had a limited expectation
       of privacy in the personal messages relayed by the pager. Moreover,
       Adams was aware that his equipment could be inspected at any time. It
       is true that Adams did not have specific notice that his pager could
       be monitored by the police department. However, in view of the
       seriousness of the justification proffered by the police department
       and the limited incursion on Adams' privacy interests, Alspaugh and
       Kruithoff were acting in the ordinary course of the department's
       business and of their law enforcement duties when they monitored
       Adams' pager by cloning it.(21)
       
            In enacting the Wiretapping Act, Congress did not intend to
       prohibit all wiretapping or electronic monitoring. Hence, it created
       two statutory exceptions to liability, both of which cover the
       monitoring sub judice. The law enforcement officers of the City of
       Battle Creek Police Department monitored Adam's departmental pager in
       order to safeguard the integrity of their investigations. A legitimate
       interest provided the impetus for the monitoring, which did not extend
       beyond that interest in its scope or length.(22) I would affirm the
       district court's judgment. I therefore respectfully dissent.(23)
       
       Footnotes
       
            1 Section 2510(4) says: "'intercept' means the aural or other
       acquisition of the contents of any wire, electronic, or oral
       communication through the use of any electronic, mechanical, or other
       device. . . ."
       
            2 18 U.S.C. § 2520 provides:
       
            Except as provided in 2511(2)(ii), any person whose wire, oral or
       electronic communication is intercepted, disclosed, or intentionally
       used in violation of this chapter may in a civil action recover from
       the person or entity which engaged in that violation such relief as
       may be appropriate.
       
            1 Until 1993, Adams served as a patrolman. In 1993, Adams was
       promoted to the position of detective.
       
            2 The police department had given Adams a copy of departmental
       policy which indicated "Department issued equipment, supplies and
       uniforms, will at no time be converted [to] personal use." The police
       department had notified Adams that "[it was] the policy of the Police
       Department to perform regular audits and inspections of all department
       issued equipment. These inspections ensure proper maintenance and use
       of all department equipment and supplies."
       
            3 The Special Investigations Unit of the City of Battle Creek
       Police Department is primarily responsible for narcotics
       investigations.
       
            4 The police department would station officers outside these
       residences. These officers would then monitor the residences in the
       hours preceding any given search.
       
            5 Kruithoff has claimed that then-Chief of Police Thomas Pope
       authorized the use of the cloned pager. As this matter has come before
       this court on an appeal of the district court's order granting
       defendants' motion for summary judgment, it will be assumed for the
       purposes of this opinion that Kruithoff authorized the use of the
       cloned pager.
       
            6 Lind had applied to law school in 1996 and had disclosed on his
       law school application that he may have criminally violated the
       federal wiretapping laws. Lind felt it necessary to apprise Adams of
       his possibly felonious conduct.
       
            7 In addition to learning of the monitoring, Adams discovered
       that Kruithoff had had an affair with Adams' wife in 1990. Adams has
       contended that this affair prompted the monitoring of Adams' cloned
       pager.
       
            8 All claims against Pope were voluntarily dismissed on February
       23, 1999.
       
            9 See 18 U.S.C. § 2511(a) ("Except as otherwise specifically
       provided in this chapter any person who-(a) intentionally intercepts,
       endeavors to intercept, or procures any other person to intercept or
       endeavor to intercept, any wire, oral, or electronic communication [is
       subject to penalties described in 18 U.S.C. § 2511(4)(a).]").
       
            10 This claim was voluntarily dismissed on September 8, 1998.
       
            11 The district court dismissed Adams' other claims without
       prejudice as the district court declined to exercise supplemental
       jurisdiction over them in the absence of any federal claims. See 28
       U.S.C. § 1367(c).
       
            12 "'[I]ntercept' means the aural or other acquisition of the
       contents of any wire, electronic, or oral communication through the
       use of any electronic, mechanical, or other device." 18 U.S.C. §
       2510(4).
       
            13 This provision is normally referred to as the "business use
       exception" or the "extension phone exception."
       
            14 This provision is normally referred to as the "law enforcement
       exception" or the "prison phone exception."
       
            15 Law enforcement is the "business" of the City of Battle Creek
       Police Department. But see Amati, 176 F.3d at 955 ("[The business use
       exception] is intended for situations in which a business or other
       entity, presumably one not involved in law enforcement (for otherwise
       this exclusion would duplicate the one for eavesdropping in the
       ordinary course of law enforcement), records calls to or from its
       premises in order to monitor performance by its employees."). The
       panel majority has imputed to the law enforcement section a solitary
       purpose-that of excluding from the act's coverage the law enforcement
       practice of monitoring inmate phone calls- without any evidence that
       Congress intended that the exception be so limited. The cases which it
       has cited in support of that proposition have merely ruled that the
       law enforcement exception applies to inmate phone calls. None of the
       cases have limited the purview of the law enforcement exception to
       those circumstances.
       
            16 While the law enforcement exception has no such requirement,
       the business use exception requires that the electronic monitoring
       device be provided in the course of the provider's business. I agree
       with the panel majority's determination that the cloned pager was
       provided to the police department in the course of the provider's,
       MobileComm's, business. Adams' arguments to the contrary are
       unavailing.
       
            17 The panel majority cites Amati v. City of Woodstock, 176 F.3d
       952 (7th Cir. 1999), and Sanders v. Robert Bosch Corp., 38 F.3d 736
       (4th Cir. 1994), as support for their mandate that notice is required.
       Neither case supports requiring notice as a sine qua non element of
       the ordinary course test. In fact, Amati expressly held otherwise:
       "The plaintiffs argue that wiretapping cannot be 'in the ordinary
       course of law enforcement' unless there is express notice to the
       people whose conversations are being listened to. The statute does not
       say this, and it cannot be right." Amati, 176 F.3d at 955. The Sanders
       court's analysis makes clear that the court was balancing the asserted
       business interest against the employee's interest in advance notice:
       
         Covert use of a surveillance device must be justified by a valid
         business purpose. Here, the justification advanced for the ongoing
         interception of telephone calls, i.e., the fear of bomb threats,
         does not in any way explain the fact that Bosch failed to inform
         any Guardsmark personnel, other than the supervisors, of the use of
         the voice logger. In short, there is no business reason asserted
         for the decision not to notify all the Guardsmark employees of the
         use of the voice logger."
         
       Sanders, 38 F.3d at 741-42 (footnotes omitted). The panel majority has
       also cited a district court case, Bohach v. City of Reno, 932 F. Supp.
       1232 (D. Nev. 1996), which did not deal with the exclusions at issue
       here, but instead focused on 18 U.S.C. § 2701 which permits internet
       service providers to store and retrieve electronic messages. See
       Bohach, 932 F. Supp. at 1236-1237.
       
            18 The panel majority places talismanic reliance on the notion
       that the monitoring must be routine. However, that would encourage
       businesses to record all phone calls when the asserted business
       justification required only limited monitoring. Such a result would be
       an unnecessary infringement on the privacy of any "innocent
       bystanders." See Briggs, 630 F.2d at 420 n.9 ("A general practice of
       surreptitious monitoring would be more intrusive on employees' privacy
       than monitoring limited to specific occasions.").
       
            19 The department has provided numerous reports of allegations of
       Adams' involvement in drug activity. The fact that none of these
       allegations have been proven is not dispositive. Rather, the issue is
       whether, given the seriousness of these allegations and the harm which
       could occur to narcotics investigators if these allegations were true,
       defendants acted in the ordinary course of their duties.
       
            20 Adams has contended that the true motive for the cloning of
       the pager was far more involved than the purpose proffered by the
       appellees. Adams has alleged that Kruithoff monitored his activity
       because he had had an affair with Adams' wife a few years earlier.
       Indeed, Kruithoff has admitted having an affair with Adams' wife. And,
       for the purpose of reviewing the instant motion for summary judgment,
       it is reasonable to infer that Kruithoff indeed authorized the use of
       the cloned pager. However, it is undisputed that Alspaugh, not
       Kruithoff, raised concerns about Adams' possible role in sabotaging
       the drug investigations. It is undisputed that Alspaugh, not
       Kruithoff, maintained control of the cloned pager. Moreover, it is
       undisputed that Alspaugh did not provide Kruithoff (or anyone else)
       with a copy of the list he created during the course of the
       monitoring.
       
            21 The circumstances in Briggs provide a commercial analog to
       those in this case: the employer had a particularized suspicion that
       an employee had been providing company secrets to the competition; the
       employee had been warned not to disclose the secrets; and the
       monitored phone call was between the competitior and the employee. The
       Briggs Court found that "it is within the ordinary course of business
       to listen in on an extension phone for at least so long as the call
       involves the type of information he fears is being disclosed." Briggs,
       630 F.2d at 420.
       
            22 Because I find that the implicated activity is within the
       exceptions provided by the act, I do not reach the issue as to whether
       the act contemplates holding police departments liable for the
       malfeasance of their employees. In addition, because I find that the
       district court properly awarded summary judgment in favor of the
       defendants, I would affirm the lower court's consequent denial of the
       plaintiff's motion for summary judgment.
       
            23 I concur in the majority's disposition of the Fourth Amendment
       claim and the qualified immunity issue.
    
    
    
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