FC: CDT defends regulatory approach to privacy; Cato author replies

From: Declan McCullagh (declanat_private)
Date: Tue Aug 14 2001 - 12:30:46 PDT

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    Last week, I forwarded Tom Bell's Cato Institute study to Politech:
       "Cato: Free speech means nixing both censorship and 'privacy' laws"
       http://www.politechbot.com/p-02373.html
    
    Attached below are:
    
    1. A response from Peter Swire, a privacy counselor at the White House 
    under Clinton and now at George Washington University, writing on behalf of 
    the Center for Democracy and Technology.
    
    2. A reply from Tom, who once worked at Cato and now is at the Chapman 
    School of Law.
    
    -Declan
    
    **********
    
    Date: Tue, 14 Aug 2001 10:10:32 -0400
    From: ariat_private
    Subject: Swire on Cato's Privacy Briefing
    
    We have received many questions about a Cato Institute Briefing Paper
    released last week entitled "Internet Privacy and Self Regulation: Lessons
    from the Porn Wars," by Tom W. Bell.  Mr. Bell makes several assertions
    about the policy positions of the Center for Democracy and Technology (CDT),
    and other civil liberties organizations.
    
    The following statement was prepared in response to the CATO paper by law
    Professor Peter Swire, a consulting expert on CDT's privacy work.
    
    [...]
    
    "Cato Privacy Paper Not Persuasive"
    
    Peter P. Swire
    
    	This document responds to a Cato Institute Briefing Paper released on
    August 9, 2001, written by Professor Tom W. Bell and entitled "Internet
    Privacy and Self-Regulation: Lessons from the Porn Wars."  Available at
    www.cato.org.  The Briefing Paper criticizes the American Civil Liberties
    Union, the Center for Democracy and Technology, and the Electronic
    Information Privacy Center for supporting Internet privacy legislation while
    opposing legislation that would restrict Internet speech considered "harmful
    to minors."
    
    	This paper represents the personal views of Peter Swire, currently
    Visiting Professor of Law at George Washington University and formerly the
    Clinton Administration's Chief Counselor for Privacy from 1999 until early
    2001.  This paper explains why the Cato paper is wrong on the facts, chiefly
    because self-help will not work for personal information once it is in the
    hands of outside parties.  The paper also explains why the Cato paper is
    wrong on the law.   The Cato paper would seem to make the doctor/patient and
    attorney/client privileges unconstitutional as violations of doctor and
    lawyer free-speech rights.  Any such analysis is subject to serious doubt
    indeed.
    
    	(1)  Why the Cato paper is wrong on the facts.
    
    	Professor Bell states:  "Digital self-help offers more hope of
    protecting Internet users' privacy than it does of effectively filtering out
    unwanted speech, and the availability of such self-help casts doubt on the
    constitutionality of legislation restricting speech by commercial entities
    about Internet users."  The ACLU, CDT, and EPIC have all supported use of
    self-help, also known as privacy-enhancing technologies, as an important
    component of protecting privacy on the Internet.  Although the groups have
    differed about the desirability of one such technology, known as the
    Platform for Privacy Preferences, it is after extensive experience with
    privacy-enhancing technologies that the groups have each concluded that
    Internet privacy legislation is needed.
    
    	Professor Bell lists a number of existing privacy-enhancing
    technologies, none of them used by a large portion of Internet users.  These
    technologies can indeed do specific useful tasks, such as rejecting cookies
    or preventing a web site from knowing the identity of an anonymous surfer.
    Professor Bell suggests that surfers should arm themselves with an arsenal
    of privacy-protecting software in order to fend off data collection by web
    sites.
    
    	Reasonable people may doubt whether ordinary surfers can, or will, out-
    fox the data collection efforts of sophisticated web sites.  Even if surfers
    use every weapon in their arsenal, however, the technologies cannot provide
    any help with a pervasive problem of Internet privacy -- what will happen to
    data once the web site knows it.  A web site may require your name to ship a
    product, sign you up to a subscription, register your software, or allow
    access to the site itself.  Anyone who wishes to participate in e-commerce
    or many other Internet activities will repeatedly have to provide his or her
    personal information simply to carry out that activity.  Without privacy
    rules in place, all of that identifying information can be shipped from the
    first site to any other, with no possibility of technological self-help by
    the individual.
    
    	The hard problem about privacy, then, is that technology does not work
    once the data is in the hands of outside parties such as a web site.  By
    contrast, self-help offers a more compelling answer for what a family
    downloads to its own computer.  The parent or other family member can set
    criteria for what is read on the computer.  The rest of the world can make
    its own choices about what to read on the Web, while self-help works
    effectively in the home.
    
    	(2) Why the Cato paper is wrong on the law.
    
    	Professor Bell briefly refers to a lack of controlling case law, but
    then concludes that Internet privacy legislation would "almost certainly"
    face the fairly strict standard that applies to commercial speech and "might
    well" face the strict scrutiny test that applies to political and other
    speech that is most protected under the First Amendment.  I believe these
    conclusions are wrong, and they fly in the face of the most authoritative
    court decisions to date as well as the principal scholarship on which
    Professor Bell relies.
    
    	The only case that Professor Bell mentions in his text is a Tenth
    Circuit decision, [1] issued over a sharp dissent, that discussed privacy
    and the First Amendment but never made any holding on the subject.  He
    relegates to a footnote a recent, unanimous D.C. Circuit decision that found
    no First Amendment obstacle to a privacy rule that barred sale of names and
    addresses for target marketing purposes. [2] He does not mention another
    recent federal decision that upheld the Gramm-Leach-Bliley financial privacy
    protections against a similar challenge.  [3] This kind of unconsented-to
    sale of personal information is precisely the sort of regulation that is at
    the heart of most proposed Internet privacy legislation.  To my knowledge,
    no judge has followed the dicta of the 10th Circuit and found any First
    Amendment basis for striking down data privacy protections.
    
    	The deeper problem with Professor Bell's analysis is that it proves far
    too much.  Professor Bell focuses on the First Amendment rights of those who
    receive the individual's personal information.  His analysis, though, would
    seem to apply generally to those who receive personal information from
    another.  For instance, is the doctor-patient privilege unconstitutional
    because it limits doctors' rights to speak about their patients?  Is the
    attorney-client privilege an unconstitutional burden on the attorney's right
    to blab client secrets?  No.  The First Amendment has existed comfortably
    for two centuries together with the power of the legislature to set
    appropriate limits on the disclosure of client information.  That is what is
    contemplated by Internet privacy legislation as well.  A web site could
    receive a customer's information, but not disclose that information to
    others except pursuant to the customer's choice.
    
    Indeed, the leading academic article on the First Amendment and privacy, on
    which Professor Bell principally relies, explains in detail why client
    information can constitutionally be protected by the sort of privacy laws
    supported by the ACLU, CDT, and EPIC.  Professor Eugene Volokh says that
    "contract law not to reveal information" is "eminently defensible under
    existing free speech doctrine."  Although Professor Volokh expresses
    concerns about other sorts of speech restrictions, he specifically states
    that the telecommunications privacy rules struck down on other grounds by
    the 10th Circuit "are constitutionally permissible." [4]
    
    In sum, the legal portion of Professor Bell's argument is contrary to the
    only federal court rulings on the subject, contrary to the leading academic
    article on which he claims to rely, and gives no basis for upholding the
    constitutionality of the doctor/patient and attorney/client privileges.
    
    Endnotes:
    
    1. U.S. West, Inc. v. FCC, 182 F.3d 1224 (10th Cir. 1999).
    2. Trans Union Corp. v. FTC, 245 F.3d 809 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
    3. Individual Reference Services Group, Inc. v. FTC, 145 F. Supp. 2d 6
    (D.D.C. 2001).
    4.   Eugene Volokh, "Freedom of Speech and Information Privacy: The
    Troubling Implications of a right to Stop People from Speaking about You,"
    52 Stanford L. Rev. 1049 (2000), at 1057 & 1060 n. 37.
    
    **********
    
    Date: Tue, 14 Aug 2001 12:07:13 -0700
    Subject: Re: Cato: Free speech means nixing both censorship and "privacy"
    	laws
    From: "Tom W. Bell" <tbellat_private>
    To: Declan McCullagh <declanat_private>
    
    Declan,
    
    Thanks for informing me of Peter Swire's comment on my recent Cato Institute
    paper.  I'm happy to offer a brief reply.
    
    
    I credit Professor Swire with a thoughtful and temperate comment on my
    recent paper, Internet Privacy and Self-Regulation: Lessons from the Porn
    Wars (Cato Institute, Policy Briefing # 65, 2001), available at
    <http://www.cato.org/pubs/briefs/bp-065es.html>.  As I observed in that
    paper, much of the law relating to Internet privacy remains unsettled,
    leaving a good deal of room for reasonable people to differ.  Nonetheless, I
    find Professor Swire's attempt to defend unconstitutional and unwise privacy
    regulations unconvincing.  In brief, he relies on facts that are not legally
    relevant and legal claims that are not supported by fact.
    
    
    (1) Why Professor Swire's Comment Relies on Irrelevant Facts
    
    Professor Swire complains that the privacy-protecting technologies I
    describe in my paper would do little to stop speech about consumers who
    willingly trade personal facts for Internet services.  He might as well
    complain that Lady Godiva suffered wanton looks.
    
    As my paper details, consumers already have easy and free access to
    technologies capable of completely hiding them from online spying.  That
    gives them the power to remain as private as they like or, more to the
    present point, to dollop out personal information solely on acceptable
    terms.  Granted, as Professor Swire observes, privacy-protecting tools
    cannot re-bottle the genie of personal information once a consumer chooses
    to set it free.  But those tools give consumers control over the release of
    their personal information, and thus power to demand enforceable contractual
    controls on the subsequent use of that information.
    
    Technology cannot do everything, but with regard to Internet privacy it can
    certainly do enough.  It can, moreover, do better than federal lawmakers.
    Perfection is *never* an option.  The relevant factual question is therefore
    this:  Can technology protect our privacy *more effectively* than
    politicians and regulators?  It can, as I detail in my paper.  And that it
    can renders the call for federal regulation of what commercial entities say
    about Internet consumers not just unwise but unconstitutional.
    
    
    (2) Why Professor Swire's Comment Misinterprets the Law
    
    Professor Swire's legal analysis relies on suspect interpretations of the
    relevant authorities and, at any rate, does nothing to defend the sorts of
    federal regulations that my paper targeted.
    
    Professor Swire claims, for instance, that "[T]he leading academic article
    on the First Amendment and privacy, on which Professor Bell principally
    relies, explains in detail why client information can constitutionally be
    protected by the sort of privacy laws supported by the ACLU, CDT, and EPIC."
    To the contrary, however, that paper merely argues that enforcing implied
    contracts to keep information private would not violate the First Amendment.
    See Eugene Volokh, "Freedom of Speech and Information Privacy: The Troubling
    Implications of a right to Stop People from Speaking about You," 52 Stanford
    L. Rev. 1049, 1057-63 (2000).  Professor Volokh thus calls (and rightly so)
    for protecting privacy through states' extant contract laws.  The ACLU, CDT,
    and EPIC have, in contrast, called for new federal regulations that would do
    far more than merely enforce contractual obligations between consumers and
    commercial entities.
    
    Does CDT really want to base its Internet privacy policy on Professor
    Volokh's theory?  Note that he would first demand a showing that Internet
    use comes with an implied promise of confidentiality.  It seems highly
    unlikely, to say the least, that we approach Internet browsing with the same
    assumption of confidentiality that we rightly assume applies to
    communications with our attorneys and doctors.  Note next that Professor
    Volokh would, consistent with standard principles of contract law, allow an
    express disclaimer of confidentiality to trump any supposedly implied
    obligation to keep information about Internet users secret.  I would be
    pleased--but greatly surprised--if CDT adopted that approach to Internet
    privacy.
    
    Note further that Professor Swire surely errs in attributing to Professor
    Volokh the view that "the telecommunications privacy rules struck down . . .
    by the 10th Circuit 'are constitutionally permissible.'"  To the contrary,
    Professor Volokh merely says that his theory "might suggest" that the 10th
    circuit case of U.S. West, Inc. v. FCC, 182 F.3d 1224 (10th Cir. 1999),
    "could be interpreted" to embrace an opposing view of the constitutional
    scope of privacy regulations.  If all those conditionals hold, granted,
    Professor Volokh would presumably argue that the court erred because "such
    rules [i.e., rules that merely enforce implied promises not explicitly
    disavowed by either party] are constitutionally permissible."  But contrary
    to Swire's reading, Volokh does not flatly say the 10th Circuit was
    wrong--or, more pointedly, that CDT and company are right to call for broad
    federal regulation of Internet privacy.
    
    Similar interpretive problems apply to Professor Swire's other invocations
    of legal authority.  As my paper observed, Trans Union Corp. v. FTC, 245
    F.3d 809 (D.C. Cir. 2001), "stands on shaky ground."  The Trans Union court
    stretched Dun & Bradstreet, Inc., 472 U.S. 749 (1985)--a case concerning
    injurious falsehoods--to find that target marketing lists merited reduced
    constitutional protection.  Notably, however, only three justices signed on
    to the portion of Dun & Bradstreet upon which Trans Union relied, and even
    they emphasized that they did not intend to "leave all credit reporting
    subject to reduced First Amendment protection." Id. at 762, n. 8.  The other
    authority cited by Professor Swire, Individual Reference Services Group,
    Inc. v. FTC, 145 F. Supp. 2d 6 (D.D.C. 2001), relies on Trans Union and thus
    shares its defects.  At any rate, though, neither of those cases speak
    directly to the issue at hand.  They did not concern the collection of
    information from Internet users and, thus, did not consider the legal impact
    of the privacy-protecting technologies discussed in my paper.
    
    
    (3) Conclusion
    
    Though I welcome Professor Swire's addition to our mutual and on-going
    attempt to discern the constitutional and prudential bounds of Internet
    privacy protection, his commentary ultimately fails to disprove the thesis
    of my recent paper:  The ready availability of technological self-help
    protections of Internet privacy makes regulation by state authorities not
    only constitutionally suspect but, from the more general point of view of
    policy, functionally inferior.
    
    -- 
    Tom W. Bell
    Associate Professor, Chapman School of Law
    tomwbellat_private
    http://www.tomwbell.com
    
    ********
    
    
    
    
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