FC: ICANN CEO proposes radical changes, more government involvement

From: Declan McCullagh (declanat_private)
Date: Mon Feb 25 2002 - 00:01:04 PST

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    This is a complicated proposal and will take the community a while
    to digest. But some portions stand out, like having one-third of
    the 15 board members selected by national governments. So much for
    ICANN's veneer of independence.
    Threads from icannwatch:
       24 February 2002
                  ICANN President Recommends a Roadmap for Reform
        Marina del Rey, California USA (24 February 2002) At the ICANN Board
        of Directors retreat held over the weekend of 23 February, President
          Stuart Lynn proposed a sweeping series of structural reforms for
       ICANN. These reforms, designed to lead ICANN towards attainment of its
        core mission, were carefully discussed by the Board. Board directors
         encouraged Lynn to post the proposed reforms for public review and
       "The current structure of ICANN was widely recognized as an experiment
        when created three years ago," noted Board Chairman Vint Cerf. "The
        rapid expansion of and increasing global dependence on the Internet
        have made it clear that a new structure is essential if ICANN is to
                               fulfill its mission."
           ICANN was formed three years ago as an entirely private global
        organization designed to assume responsibility for the DNS root from
        the United States government and to coordinate technical policy for
          the Internet's naming and address allocation systems. In the new
       proposals, the basic mission remains intact. What changes is the means
                             of achieving that mission.
          "What has become clear to me and others is that a purely private
        organization will not work," said Lynn. "The Internet has become too
        important to national economic and social progress. Governments, as
          the representatives of their populations, must participate more
        directly in ICANN's debates and policymaking functions. We must find
           the right form of global public-private partnership - one that
        combines the agility and strength of a private organization with the
            authority of governments to represent the public interest."
       Noting that current organizational inertia and obsession with process
        over substance has impeded agility, Lynn laid out a roadmap designed
       to instill confidence in key stakeholders and to ensure that ICANN can
         be more effective. This roadmap entails restructuring the Board of
          Directors into a Board of Trustees composed in part of trustees
        nominated by those governments who participate in the ICANN process;
         in part by the chairs of proposed new "policy councils" that would
        replace the existing supporting organizations and that would provide
         expert advice; and in part by trustees proposed by a broadly-based
              nominating committee and appointed by the Board itself.
         The roadmap is designed to bring all critical stakeholders to the
        table, something that has been difficult to achieve with the present
        structure and has slowed ICANN's progress and its ability to fulfill
        its responsibilities. It is also designed to establish a broad-based
       funding mechanism sufficient to support the critical mission of ICANN.
          "We need to build a stronger organization, supported by our key
       stakeholders, led by the best team that can be assembled, and properly
       funded," Lynn told the Board at its retreat. "We must be structured to
        function effectively in this fast-paced global Internet environment"
        "A key requirement is to keep the best of the present ICANN," added
        Cerf, "in ensuring transparency, openness, and participation, while
       creating an ICANN that can act responsibly and quickly. That will mean
         rejecting practices that have emphasized process over achievement.
            Above all, ICANN must be - and be seen to be - effective and
          supportive of technical innovation and of a reliable Internet."
        A paper written by Lynn that explains the reasons for change and the
                roadmap for reform is posted on the ICANN web site.
                  President's Report: ICANN - The Case for Reform
                                 24 February 2002 
                             To the Internet Community:
       I have now been President of ICANN for just about a year. During that
        time, I have talked to more people than I can count about ICANN, its
       accomplishments and its deficiencies, and its future. I have also had
        the obligation to oversee the actual day-to-day operations of ICANN,
       and to make the hard decisions about what to do and how to do it in an
        environment of an incomplete structure and inadequate funding. I now
         feel comfortable enough with my state of knowledge that I want to
       share my views with the Board and the community. Attached to this note
       is a copy of the report I presented to the ICANN Board of Directors at
              its retreat in Washington, D.C. on February 23-24, 2002.
          ICANN's assigned mission - to create an effective private sector
          policy development process capable of administrative and policy
        management of the Internet's naming and address allocation systems -
       was incredibly ambitious. Nothing like this had ever been done before.
       ICANN was to serve as an alternative to the traditional, pre-Internet
        model of a multinational governmental treaty organization. The hope
       was that a private-sector body would be like the Internet itself: more
         efficient - more nimble - more able to react promptly to a rapidly
        changing environment and, at the same time, more open to meaningful
          participation by more stakeholders, developing policies through
       bottom-up consensus. It was also expected that such an entity could be
          established, and become functional, faster than a multinational
                                 governmental body.
       It is now more than three years since the creation of ICANN, and there
          are some real accomplishments: the introduction of a competitive
       registrar market, the Uniform Dispute Resolution Policy, the creation
       of seven new global Top Level Domains. But despite this progress, all
        the original expectations of ICANN have not been realized. ICANN is
         still not fully organized, and it is certainly not yet capable of
         shouldering the entire responsibility of global DNS management and
          coordination. ICANN has also not shown that it can be effective,
         nimble, and quick to react to problems. ICANN is overburdened with
       process, and at the same time underfunded and understaffed. For these
       and other more fundamental reasons, ICANN in its current form has not
          become the effective steward of the global Internet's naming and
       address allocation systems as conceived by its founders. Perhaps even
       more importantly, the passage of time has not increased the confidence
               that it can meet its original expectations and hopes.
        I have come to the conclusion that the original concept of a purely
       private sector body, based on consensus and consent, has been shown to
           be impractical. The fact that many of those critical to global
            coordination are still not willing to participate fully and
       effectively in the ICANN process is strong evidence of this fact. But
       I also am convinced that, for a resource as changeable and dynamic as
       the Internet, a traditional governmental approach as an alternative to
        ICANN remains a bad idea. The Internet needs effective, lightweight,
         and sensible global coordination in a few limited areas, allowing
          ample room for the innovation and change that makes this unique
                          resource so useful and valuable.
                     ICANN Needs Significant Structural Reform
       I have concluded that ICANN needs reform: deep, meaningful, structural
         reform, based on a clearheaded understanding of the successes and
       failures of the last three years. If ICANN is to succeed, this reform
          must replace ICANN's unstable institutional foundations with an
       effective public-private partnership, rooted in the private sector but
         with the active backing and participation of national governments.
           In short, ICANN is at a crossroads. The process of relocating
       functions from the US Government to ICANN is stalled. For a variety of
       reasons described in this document, I believe that ICANN's ability to
       make further progress is blocked by its structural weaknesses. To put
           it bluntly: On its present course, ICANN cannot accomplish its
          assigned mission. A new path - a new and reformed structure - is
       It is reasonable in this context to wonder whether we would be better
          off replacing ICANN with something entirely different. I do not
       believe that there are any better alternatives than a reformed ICANN.
       If the ICANN experiment of private-sector self-management cannot work,
        the default alternative will certainly be some form of multinational
        governmental organization. In my view, this remains an unattractive
         option, for all the same reasons that were so forcefully advanced
       three years ago. The United Nations, the World Trade Organization, and
           the International Telecommunications Union are all complex and
         sometimes effective organizations within their respective realms;
         however, each model has deep and evident shortcomings which in the
          Internet environment would render it a worse alternative than a
                                  reformed ICANN.
                         A Reformed ICANN Can Be Successful
        Based on the experience of the last three years and my own focus on
       ICANN over the last year, I am convinced that a reformed ICANN can be
            successful - if we re-focus on our core mission, reform our
          institutional foundations to fit that mission, and eliminate the
                   distractions of peripheral issues and agendas.
       To be clear: ICANN's mission is effective management and coordination
          of those few, higher-level elements of the Internet's naming and
           address allocation systems that require or benefit from global
       management and coordination, while abstaining from actions that might
           interfere with the creativity and innovation that has made the
        Internet such a dynamic resource. ICANN's mission is stewardship and
           operational stability, not the defense of its existence or the
                          preservation of the status quo.
        Having said that, it is essential to state unambiguously what falls
        outside of ICANN's scope. The core ICANN mission includes no mandate
          to innovate new institutions of global democracy, nor to achieve
        mathematically equal representation of all affected individuals and
       organizations, nor to regulated content, nor to solve the problems of
               the digital divide, nor to embody some idealized (and
           never-before-realized) model of process or procedure. However
          important those ideals may be, they are for other, better-suited
       organizations to address. Unfortunately, we have allowed the advocates
       for these and other non-core objectives to divert ICANN from what must
       be its tight focus on its core mission. These diversions have been and
       will continue to be a significant impediment to accomplishing ICANN's
           core mission, unless we undertake a powerful reform of ICANN's
        structure and operations, and a committed refocus on its limited but
                                 important mission.
                          Core Values Should Be Preserved
        Central to the ICANN experiment - and integral to its successes thus
         far - have been core values of openness and broad participation. I
         believe strongly in those values, and aim to strengthen them in a
          reformed ICANN. ICANN can and should do much better in achieving
        transparency, enabling meaningful participation, and reaching out to
                   involve the global diversity of the Internet.
                   A New Public-Private Partnership Is Necessary
           I am now convinced that the original desire to avoid a totally
        governmental takeover of the IANA functions led to an overreaction -
        the choice of a totally private model. With three years' experience,
         it is clear that model is simply not workable. It is not workable
        because it leaves ICANN isolated from the real-world institutions -
           governments - whose backing and support are essential for any
        effective global coordinating body to accomplish its assigned tasks.
         ICANN currently has an advisory committee to channel governmental
       input, but that mechanism has not effectively integrated the views or
              the influence of governments; we must find a better way.
          Though many in the traditional Internet community react strongly
        against the very mention of governments, it is simply unrealistic to
        believe that global coordination of the DNS can succeed without more
        active involvement of governments. Indeed, it has been for decades a
       bedrock principle of the Internet that technical managers should stick
        to what they know and do best, and leave to other organizations what
        they in turn do best. Governments play a unique role in representing
          the broad public interests of their populations. So far, ICANN's
        existing structures have not engaged the attention, commitment, and
                  support of governments to the necessary degree.
        What is needed at this stage if ICANN is to carry out its mission is
         neither a totally private nor a totally governmental solution, but
       rather a well-balanced public-private partnership. Stable functioning
           of the Internet's naming and address allocation systems is too
            important to national economies and other national goals for
       governments to be left on the sidelines. Experience has shown that the
           influence, authority, and close cooperation of governments is
        essential to accomplish ICANN's mission. Because of the significant
          advantages represented by a strong private-sector organization,
         however, we should seek a robust and effective middle ground - the
        right public-private partnership - that will incorporate the best of
                               both extreme options.
         The attached Report lays out in more detail the reasons why ICANN
       cannot achieve its mission on its present course, and why deep reform
       is necessary. It further makes a series of proposals for reform that,
        I believe, will allow ICANN and the Internet community to accomplish
             its original mission. In summary, those proposals include:
                         A. Reformation of the ICANN Board
         1. 15 member Board of Trustees
         a) 10 At Large Trustees
         (1) Five nominated by governments and confirmed by Board of
         (2) Five nominated by open Nominating Committee process and
         confirmed by Board of Trustees
         b) Five Ex Officio Trustees
         (1) Chairs (or designees) of three Policy Councils and Technical
         Advisory Committee (see below)
         (2) CEO
         2. Designee of Internet Architecture Board and Chair of
         Governmental Advisory Committee serve as non-voting liaisons to
         Board of Trustees
          B. Reform of the ICANN Policy Development Structure and Process
         1. Three Policy Councils Providing Advice to Board of Trustees
         a) Address and Numbering Policy Council
         b) Generic TLD Names Policy Council
         c) Geographic TLD Names Policy Council
         d) Managed by Steering Committees composed of about half ex officio
         representatives of categories of relevant entities (registries,
         registrars, etc.) and half of persons nominated by Nominating
         Committee and confirmed by Board of Trustees
         e) Nominating Committee composed of non-voting Chair (selected by
         CEO after wide consultation), three members of Board of Trustees
         whose terms are not expiring, and four other persons appointed by
         Board of Trustees after consultation with and suggestions from
         2. Two Standing Advisory Committees
         a) Technical Advisory Committee
         (1) Composed of ex officio members (designee of IAB, RIRs, root
         name server operators and name registries/registrars) and three
         other persons nominated by Nominating Committee and confirmed by
         Board of Trustees
         b) Governmental Advisory Committee
         3. Two Additional Standing Committees
         a) Security Committee (appointed by Board of Trustees)
         b) Root Server System Operations Committee (root server operators
         and other invited persons by the Committee)
         4. Participation in Councils by Self-Organized Forums (Individuals
         and/or Entities with Common Interests), including potentially an At
         Large organization for individuals
                         C. Transparency and Accountability
         1. Ombudsman
         a) Person of unassailable credentials responsible for managing
         public comment and other public participation
         b) Responsible for receiving and processing petitions for
         reconsideration, and other complaints and disputes; access to all
         necessary information to evaluate same
         c) Responsible for making recommendations to Board of Trustees with
         respect to complaints and disputes, and requests for
         reconsideration; all such recommendations to be published on ICANN
         d) Provided with support staff and other resources necessary to
         carry out responsibilities effectively
         2. Manager of Public Participation
         a) Responsible for managing the public comment and participation
         process for ICANN on all substantive matters. Will solicit, receive
         and report to the Board on all public input on matters put out for
         public comment.
         b) Responsible for managing all ICANN public forums, public e-mail
         list, etc. Provided necessary electronic access to publicize
         findings and recommendations, all of which will be available to the
         c) Provided with support staff and other resources necessary to
         carry out responsibilities effectively
                                     D. Funding
         1. Funding (for staff, general operations and additional
         requirements including root server operator compensation) must be
         significantly increased, and sources of funding broadened
         2. Funding to come from both governmental and private participants
         3. Funding to include both contributions for core functions and
         fees for services
          I offer this analysis and these recommendations with the hope of
       stimulating public discussion and debate. As explained in more detail
       in the attached report, I believe that ICANN must undergo significant
        reform if it is to be successful in its mission, and that this must
          happen quickly. I look forward to your comments and suggestions.
                                   M. Stuart Lynn
                  President's Report: ICANN - The Case for Reform
                                  23 February 2002
          ICANN is a bold experiment in the management of a unique global
       resource. Through sensible management of the DNS, the goal is to help
        maintain the Internet as a stable and effective mechanism for global
        commerce, communication, education, medicine and beyond. Because it
          was designed as a purely private sector body, and as such has no
          coercive tools or legislative powers, ICANN was to execute this
       mission solely through the voluntary development of consensus policies
        and the creation of bilateral agreements with relevant stakeholders.
       Notwithstanding the obvious challenges inherent in this approach, the
        hope was that ICANN could accomplish the necessary coordination and
          management tasks more quickly and more efficiently than the only
       apparent alternative - a multinational governmental body of some kind.
          We now have three years of experience in attempting to foster a
           transition from control by a single government over a somewhat
          informal system to a more formal system of global private sector
       coordination. This effort aims to bring together governments, Internet
       pioneers, the technical Internet community, infrastructure operators,
       and business and social organizations from around the world - all in a
        single entity, born in controversy and with no guaranteed source of
       funding. Moreover, ICANN was expected to begin to function even as it
          struggled to organize and secure funding. Many of the hoped-for
        participants were deeply suspicious of other important stakeholders,
         thus making a fully cooperative effort difficult. And all this was
          happening in the middle of an incredibly rapid expansion of the
        Internet from a largely scientific and research medium to a critical
         global communications medium integral to the commercial and social
             lives of hundreds of millions of the world's inhabitants.
        Many people, institutions, and governments have worked very hard to
         make ICANN succeed, and there have been some real accomplishments.
           Several private businesses stepped up to loan ICANN absolutely
         critical start-up funding (those loans have now all been repaid).
          ICANN developed and launched a system of competitive registrars,
        implemented a Uniform Dispute Resolution Policy to deal efficiently
        with domain name disputes, and introduced seven new global TLDs. On
       the operational side, ICANN has performed the IANA address allocation
          and protocol numbering functions efficiently, and taken over the
               direct operation of one of the DNS root name servers.
        In addition, a number of governments have provided critical support.
         The United States Government assisted ICANN in obtaining contracts
       with NSI/VeriSign, a critical stakeholder as the operator of the .com,
       .net and .org registries. The Australian government played a key role
       in providing funding to staff and support to the Governmental Advisory
        Committee, and in helping to move its ccTLD administration into the
         very first contractual arrangement with ICANN. The governments of
       Japan, Canada and others (including the European Commission) have also
         played key roles, and a number of governments have helped to host
                                  ICANN meetings.
        Despite all this, a candid assessment of ICANN's performance to date
            would have to conclude that it has fallen short of hopes and
           expectations. Despite a remarkably open policy process, needed
       participation has been lacking. Key participants that are essential if
             ICANN is to carry out its mission of global coordination -
          particularly most of the root name server operators, the address
          registries, and the majority of ccTLD registries - have not yet
         entered into agreements with ICANN (although we may be close to an
         agreement with the address registries and certain of the root name
           server operators). ICANN has struggled from the beginning with
         inadequate funding derived from too narrow a base. And it has been
        burdened - overburdened in my view - with too much focus on process
           and representation, and not enough focus on achieving its core
         mission. Even the global business community, which has now come to
       depend on the continued stability of the Internet for a large portion
           of their operations, has not - with some notable and stalwart
       exceptions - broadly participated in the ICANN process. I believe this
        is in major part because ICANN is viewed by many key stakeholders as
         more of a debating society than as an effective operational body.
       Thus, ICANN as it now stands is, at best, an incomplete experiment. In
           fact, it is clear to me that, without the steady and committed
        participation of all the major operational bodies of the Internet -
       including essentially all registries and registrars, significant ISPs
        and backbone providers, and the major users of the Internet - in the
       development of necessary policies, coupled with an agreement to abide
       by those policies once developed, this particular private sector model
                      will not be able to fulfill its mission.
          In particular, ICANN has gone about as far as it can go without
           significant additional participation and backing from national
            governments. Absent a substantial increase in the efforts of
       governments to support and encourage the continued development of the
        private sector approach, I do not believe that ICANN will be able to
        complete the transition from US Government control to global private
        sector management of the DNS and related functions of the Internet.
        For the reasons set forth below, I believe that there is little time
            to make the necessary reforms. We must act now, or the ICANN
                   experiment will soon come to a grinding halt.
                         WHY THE CURRENT COURSE WON'T WORK
            ICANN's major problems can be broadly categorized into three
       categories: too little participation by critical stakeholders (across
        the full range of infrastructure operators, major users and national
         governments); too much focus on process; and too little funding to
                             provide quality services.
          1. Too Little Participation by Critical Entities. The essential
        participants in an effective ICANN are, in no particular order: (a)
       the various infrastructure providers of the Internet, broadly defined;
       (b) major users; (c) the relevant technical community and (d) national
       There are many others interested in DNS management, including at least
       some portion of the broader Internet community, and it is important to
       ensure that all those with legitimate interest in ICANN have input to
       its processes and its decisions. But it is these participants that are
         absolutely essential for ICANN to carry out global management and
        coordination effectively. And their participation must be more than
       token. They must be actively involved; those that are part of the name
       and address operating infrastructure must be willing to agree to abide
        by the results of the ICANN policymaking process; and they must fund
         the process at levels adequate for ICANN to function effectively.
             It is worth describing in some detail why certain of these
                            participants are essential.
         ccTLDs: An ICANN process without the full participation of the 243
         ccTLDs cannot accomplish its core objectives of privatization and
         internationalization. More specifically, ICANN would be unable to
         deliver on two of its core assigned responsibilities: (i) assuring
          global DNS interoperability and stability; and (ii) delegating -
        through a framework of responsible agreements - non-technical policy
          matters to politically accountable local organizations, wherever
       feasible. Each of these objectives is embedded in the White Paper, and
        each has defined the ICANN internationalization efforts to date. Let
                               me elaborate on each.
        First, global interoperability and stability. Without stable, formal
       relationships with the ccTLDs, the ICANN process would not be able to
       assure the preservation of interoperability with the vast majority of
        the entries in the DNS root zone file. While the majority of ccTLDs
          act responsibly, without binding and enforceable assurances that
       appropriate policies and standards will be followed there is no global
         guarantee that applicable standards will be maintained by all, at
       least no guarantee that would be credible to most major stakeholders.
        From the perspective of global interoperability, then, it is simply
        unthinkable that a large fraction of the TLDs in the root zone file
        should be permitted to operate independently of the global community
       and of policies established by the global community. In each case, it
       is essential that these critical entities formally agree not to break
       the DNS, and to abide by standard global operational practices arrived
                           at through the ICANN process.
             Second, delegation of non-technical policy issues to local
       communities. A second key objective that could not be achieved without
            formal ccTLD agreements is the distribution (delegation) of
        politicized policy questions to locally accountable entities such as
       governments, or local self-regulatory organizations (such as Canada's
       CIRA for the .ca TLD or auDA in Australia), as provided for in the GAC
       Principles. By backing the GAC Principles for ccTLD management, the US
         and other governments have given strong support to the proposition
           that the global Internet community (through the ICANN process)
         maintains a responsibility for the formulation of global name and
           address policies (those affecting global interoperability and
             stability), while locally accountable institutions assume
          responsibilities for all other policy areas (including pricing,
                 registration policies, dispute resolution, etc.).
       For ICANN to limit itself to its global coordination function, it must
         extricate itself from highly politicized local policy matters that
       arise most prevalently with ccTLDs. In nearly all redelegation cases,
           disputes over the administration of a local ccTLD turn on the
         determination of the will of the local Internet community - which,
        together with technical competence, constitute the criteria by which
       redelegation decisions are to be made, according to longstanding IANA
       policy. Consistent with the core ICANN mission, those responsibilities
          can only be devolved to local Internet communities if there are
       available meaningful and accountable alternatives to ICANN. For these
       alternatives to qualify as fully accountable necessarily requires some
        involvement and supervision by the local government or of a publicly
               accountable body that is recognized by the government.
         Without formal agreements, the global Internet community, working
        through ICANN, has today only one tool - albeit an impractical one -
       to ensure compliance with global policies by those (almost all) ccTLD
       administrators that do not have a binding agreement with ICANN: ICANN
       could, in theory, recommend that a particular ccTLD be redelegated to
        a cooperating administrator, and if the US Government accepted that
           recommendation, non-cooperating ccTLD administrators would be
        replaced. But this course of action runs counter to the basic ICANN
         mission, since it could be very disruptive, at least in the short
       term. What would solve the problem in many jurisdictions would be for
            national governments to use their good offices to assure the
          cooperation of their ccTLD administrators. As we have seen with
        Australia and Japan, national governments can take actions to create
       the proper environment for appropriate ICANN/ccTLD agreements. Without
        similar actions by other governments, for the most part this problem
        will not be solved. Thus, an ICANN with more active encouragement by
       national governments (as originally conceived) would be more likely to
        achieve the necessary agreements with ccTLDs that are critical to a
                                 successful ICANN.
          Root Name Server Operators: The root name server operators are a
       different story. These are not funded by ICANN but today are supported
        by the public-minded generosity of their sponsoring institutions and
        by the personal commitments of the individuals involved. Three root
       name servers are operated by US Government agencies; several more are
        operated at US locations, most by government contractors of various
        sorts (such as VeriSign). Three are outside the US, one each in the
       UK, Sweden and Japan. Today, the 13 root name server operators are the
            critical source of the single stable and authoritative root.
          It is essential that the root name server operators be full and
        complete participants in the ICANN process. That logically requires
        stable and appropriate agreements between ICANN and the institutions
        and individuals that operate the root name servers. After more than
        two years of discussions, we have reached a general consensus among
       the various root name server operators and ICANN on a form of MOU. But
                      the progress has been agonizingly slow.
       Why? First, organizational inertia doubtless accounts for part of the
       inability to conclude agreements. The root name server operators with
           whom ICANN works are highly skilled technologists and network
        operations experts. They have voluntarily devoted countless hours to
        the Internet with little or no reward other than the satisfaction of
         their achievements. However, very often they are not the decision
            makers within their organizations who can commit to external
       agreements. Although the operators themselves may be comfortable with
       the MOUs, some of the decision makers may just be coming aware of what
                  their organizations are being asked to agree to.
        Second, some organizations that sponsor a root name server operator
       have little motivation to sign formal agreements, even in the form of
       the MOU that is now contemplated. What do they gain in return, except
       perhaps unwanted visibility and the attendant possibility of nuisance
        litigation? They receive no funding for their efforts, so why should
       they take on any contractual commitments, however loose? Nevertheless,
          we have, I believe, reached consensus with the root name server
         operators that MOUs will increase the perception - and perception
        ultimately becomes reality - of stability of this critical resource.
        There now appears to be an understanding that these agreements are a
         necessary component of ICANN's progress towards a more formalized
            structure for administration of the name and address system.
        Of course, there is still an issue about what kind of agreements are
       appropriate. What we have been working on is an agreement that merely
        documents the existing situation. Over the longer run, however, more
        formal documents will be needed, given the critical nature of these
       components of the DNS. In addition, we must move to a system where the
         root server operators are compensated for their critical services.
          Thus, for a fully effective ICANN, capable of accomplishing its
       mission, we will ultimately need a more definitive and binding set of
           arrangements with the current and any future root name server
       operators, and that will require significantly greater funding than is
                           presently available to ICANN.
        Address Registries: The address registries are similar to the ccTLDs
         in the sense that there is only a small, but important, element of
           global coordination required in this area. Most address policy
         decisions can be made at the regional (RIR) level, but ultimately
        there is a small aspect of absolutely necessary global coordination.
       We are close to agreements with the RIRs, but those agreements (which
         have been heavily negotiated over the last two years) are arguably
        incomplete in two respects: (a) they allow the address registries to
       opt out of ICANN policies with which they do not agree, by taking the
         ultimate step of terminating the agreements, and (b) they include
       special limitations on the proportion of ICANN's funding requirements
       that the address registries will provide under those agreements. While
        these are not fatal flaws by any means, given the cooperative nature
       of the RIRs - and are not the most critical issue facing ICANN - they
        are another illustration of the difficulty in gaining the necessary
        voluntary and complete cooperation of all the critical participants
                    needed for ICANN to accomplish its mission.
         Major Users, ISPs and Backbone Providers: The vast majority of the
        business community (outside of the registries and registrars who are
           most directly affected by ICANN's policies) has chosen not to
         participate in the ICANN process. There have been, of course, some
        notable exceptions among a few corporations and trade organizations,
             but these are a minority. ICANN is very grateful to those
          organizations that provided the funding that was so critical to
       ICANN's early survival, but outside of those registries and registrars
           who are contractually committed, broad participation by those
        commercial entities that most depend on a reliable Internet has not
                                 been forthcoming.
           During the past few years, the Internet industry and its trade
       associations have faced enormous challenges, including a recessionary
       economy that has left many companies struggling for survival. So it is
       understandable that the very industries that have invested hundreds of
       billions of dollars in the infrastructure of the global Internet (not
          to mention the broader global business community that relies so
           heavily on the Internet for commercial activities) has devoted
         shockingly little time to participating in ICANN - shocking, given
           that failures in the name and address allocation systems could
          inevitably have serious adverse effects on their businesses and,
         through them, on every person and entity relying on the Internet.
         As a result, the ICANN policymaking process is impoverished by the
        absence of most of the entities with the greatest direct interest in
       DNS stability and those whom its decisions will most directly impact,
       and by the consequent overrepresentation of advocates for one special
         interest or another. While this lack of participation by those who
       critically depend on the successful fulfillment of ICANN's mission may
       be explainable, it puts enormous pressure on what is supposed to be a
        consensus development body to come up with responsible policies when
                           major stakeholders are silent.
       This is also true for other private sector institutions, ranging from
       academia to NGOs. There has been some isolated participation by a few
         from these communities, but this participation has focused far too
          much on process and procedure, impeding ICANN's ability to reach
        timely decisions on important substantive issues. The simple fact is
       that a private sector process cannot effectively function if major and
            important elements of the private sector do not participate
                           productively in that process.
       National Governments: Perhaps the above points are self-evident. What
           may not be quite so obvious is my conclusion, based on all our
        experience to date, that active national government participation in
                         ICANN is critical to its success.
        Indeed, in the final analysis, national governments are perhaps the
            most irreplaceable supporters of ICANN, in the sense that -
          notwithstanding the efforts or desires of other stakeholders the
       backing of governments is necessary if private sector coordination of
           the Internet's naming and address allocation systems is to be
       feasible. If governments choose to take direct responsibility for the
       management of the name and address systems of the Internet, they have
        the power to do so. And even if they do not make that choice, given
       the importance of the global resource that ICANN has been established
       to coordinate, it is unrealistic to think that governments will simply
          sit by and allow ICANN's processes to work without their careful
                               attention and review.
           Today, the Governmental Advisory Committee is the only formal
          mechanism for governmental input into ICANN. Despite significant
       effort by many of its members, it has been only a minimally acceptable
          vehicle, partly because of a lack of adequate commitments by the
       world's governments and partly because of the Internet community's own
        ambivalent attitudes (reflected in the attitude of ICANN, which is a
          composite of that community) towards government involvement. In
          addition, while all governments are invited to participate, the
          existence of the GAC has not generated the scope of governmental
        participation and commitment that is necessary for ICANN's long-term
       I recognize that proposing an increased role for governments in ICANN
       is a significant departure from the original conception of ICANN as a
            purely private sector body, but I am convinced an increased
        governmental role is essential if ICANN is to carry out its mission.
       Appropriate national government participation would contribute greatly
       to the success of ICANN in at least two ways. First, it could provide
       the public interest accountability that all agree should be a part of
         any global ICANN-like organization. Second, it would increase the
          likelihood that governments would more effectively encourage the
       participation of their national citizens and entities that is critical
                                for ICANN's success.
        If one thing is clear from the past three years, it is that a purely
        private entity that must depend on the voluntary cooperation of many
           other entities is not likely to be able to coordinate anything
         globally without significant governmental support. Indeed, each of
          ICANN's accomplishments to date have all depended, in one way or
        another, on government support, particularly from the United States.
           With respect to the legacy registry/registrar provider for the
       com/net/org TLDs, NSI (now VeriSign), US government help was critical
           to obtaining ICANN's first registry agreements. All the other
        agreements that ICANN has achieved have depended, ultimately, on the
          willingness of the US government to make it clear (to its direct
        contractors and all others) that it was not receptive to changes in
         the authoritative root zone file that were not managed through the
        ICANN process. Especially as to those registries that see ICANN as a
          threat to their independence, and are unwilling (despite all the
       rational arguments and history to the contrary) to accept voluntarily
          the existence and authority of a global coordinating entity, the
       influence of national governments can be critical to the creation of a
                    complete, well-balanced and effective ICANN.
        National government participation, in my view, is also essential to
            end the Sisyphean effort of searching for a workable public
       accountability mechanism for ICANN. Three years of effort have proven
        that a global online election of ICANN Board members by an entirely
         unknown and self-selected membership is not a workable solution to
          this problem. While virtually everyone seems to agree that ICANN
       should have Board-level representation of the broad public interest of
       the global Internet community, there has been no consensus around the
           best method of achieving that representation. The problems are
         manifold, and not unique to ICANN. The world lacks a global voting
       pool, or even a consistent way to verify human identity; the notion of
        a special-purpose, no-cost, self-selected "membership" arising from
       thin air has quite reasonably generated strong fears of capture, fraud
         and abuse. Purely electronic online voting has been proposed in a
       number of different circumstances throughout the world, and continues
       to find more skeptics than supporters among the experts. It is simply
             unrealistic to expect ICANN - thinly-staffed, underfunded,
          technically-oriented ICANN - to be able to achieve what no other
          global institution has: a global electorate expressing its will
                    through stable representative institutions.
       For three years, this issue has dominated the ICANN agenda, occupied a
        considerable portion of very limited resources, and despite all this
       effort has still not produced a acceptable plan. Indeed, I would argue
        that even if we had found a workable process, this approach was not
       likely to be the most effective way to provide the accountability that
          all agree is necessary. At best, a global election process is a
          gamble; as we have seen, it is entirely possible that irrelevant
       factors other than the stability and security of the DNS may motivate
                a very large segment of any conceivable electorate.
        Although governments vary around the world, for better or worse they
         are the most evolved and best legitimated representatives of their
       populations - that is, of the public interest. As such, their greater
       participation in general, and in particular their collective selection
       of outstanding non-governmental individuals to fill a certain portion
           of ICANN Trustee seats, could better fill the need for public
       accountability without the serious practical and resource problems of
        global elections in which only a relatively few self-selected voters
                             are likely to participate.
            As this recitation demonstrates, ICANN must have the active
            participation of those critical to ICANN's effectiveness in
             accomplishing its assigned responsibilities. Without that
             participation, it makes little difference whether ICANN is
         transparent, whether it has appropriate appeal and reconsideration
       procedures, whether ordinary users have a voice, or whether the Board
       meetings are public or private. If the ICANN effort is to succeed, we
          must refocus on what is necessary before worrying about what is
        desirable. The active participation of those groups identified above
        is essential to ICANN's success - and as I have suggested, even its
         2. Too Much Process. ICANN was born with a particular and intense
         focus on process and representation. Undue focus on process to the
        exclusion of substance and effectiveness is the second major problem
                                   facing ICANN.
       In many ways, ICANN's creation was a political exercise, working from
       the outside in: what structure is required to secure the participation
       of this group or that group? The result was an entity in which most of
            the groups seen to be essential at the time were willing to
        participate, but not necessarily in a way or within a structure that
          was designed to be effective. The driving notion at the time of
         ICANN's creation was consensus; it is clear to me that the driving
         notion today, with the renewed focus precipitated by the events of
       9/11, must be effectiveness. Like any institution with responsibility
           for key infrastructure, ICANN must be able to act when needed.
        This is not to say that process, participation or representation are
       irrelevant or undesirable. They are highly relevant, but they must be
         viewed as means to achieve ICANN's goals, not ends in themselves.
        ICANN's primary focus must be effectiveness, in the broad meaning of
         that term, in carrying out its mission. If ICANN is not effective,
        what advantage does it have over a purely governmental solution? And
        process - while necessary to appropriately identify and accommodate
         differences across a wide variety of views and motivations - must
             surely also be shaped so that it does not seriously impede
        effectiveness and progress. Process that prevents effectiveness is a
        The intense focus on process at the time of ICANN's creation was in
        part driven by a reasonable desire among some to shield the Internet
        from hasty, unsophisticated or foolish decisions by ICANN, a new and
       untested institution. However, that impulse, coupled with a widespread
         failure to understand ICANN's inherently limited scope and lack of
       coercive authority, caused the creation of ever-more procedural loops
         and layers at the expense of overall Internet-speed effectiveness.
         There were even attempts to cause ICANN to implement the thousands
        upon thousands of pages of administrative and regulatory procedures
           that apply to US government agencies - a move that is totally
             inconsistent with the reason for creating a private sector
                          organization in the first place.
          This focus on process was also produced by what in hindsight was
           oversensitivity to the possible involvement of governments and
          governmental bodies in ICANN. The fact is that the Internet, and
         therefore management and coordination of the naming and addressing
        functions of the Internet, are critically important to governments,
            because they are critically important to their citizens and
       businesses. It is na´ve to assume that governments will not be heavily
       interested and involved in global policymaking for these areas. In the
       current ICANN structure, however, government involvement is limited to
         the advisory function of the Governmental Advisory Committee. The
        disconnect between this theoretical limitation, and the actual power
          and influence of governmental bodies on the management of such a
       critical global resource, has been increasingly evident in the tension
              between the GAC and other parts of the ICANN structure.
         This deliberately limited role of governments in ICANN inevitably
         fueled demands for other and different accountability structures.
        Since ICANN would eventually "control" an important global resource,
         the argument went, it must be accountable to those affected by its
       decisions. These include, at least abstractly and in the view of some,
         every person and entity in the world. Thus, we have seen calls for
       global elections by all interested individuals, and demands for Board
          representation and other indicia of status by various groups and
                                 affected entities.
          One of the reasons why ICANN has not yet generated the necessary
           support and involvement of critical stakeholders is that many
          participants in the ICANN process have devoted very significant
        attention to various non-core issues that should not, in my opinion,
        receive such overwhelming priority. The effect of these distractions
          has been ICANN's appearing to many as a collection of squabbling
       interests, tied up in an elaborately complicated organizational chart.
       The single largest distraction from what should have been the central
           ICANN focus has been the many competing notions of an At Large
        Some - understandably but very mistakenly in my view - perceive this
        as a necessary effort to generate legitimacy for a non-governmental
       organization like ICANN. They believe that because ICANN is not itself
        a governmental organization, it should build its own government-like
        institutional foundations on a global scale. The argument goes that,
        since ICANN makes decisions that can be construed as public policy,
        the public needs a voice, and that can best come through world-wide
           online elections. Perhaps, but when it comes right down to it,
        governments or bodies appointed with government involvement can, it
          seems to me, certainly stake a better claim to truly reflect the
       public interest than a few thousands of self-selected voters scattered
                                 around the world.
        I am now persuaded, after considerable reflection, that this concept
           was flawed from the beginning. The notion is noble but deeply
        unrealistic, and likely to generate more harm than good. We now have
       three years of very hard effort by a wide variety of people to arrive
        at some workable consensus solution - and there still is none. If a
         blue-ribbon committee - headed ably by a former Prime Minister of
        Sweden and United Nations Representative to Bosnia, and populated by
       highly respected and hardworking members - cannot generate a community
        consensus on this subject, it is likely there is no consensus to be
         A very significant portion of the total resources devoted to ICANN
        over the last three years has been spent trying to solve the tension
           between the desire for more government-like representation and
       accountability, on the one hand, and a workable, effective and stable
       ICANN on the other. It is now time to recognize that effectiveness in
       the management and coordination of name and addressing policies is the
         primary objective of ICANN, and that process and representational
         values must be served in ways that are compatible with the primary
           objective. To do otherwise is self-defeating; if ICANN is not
          effective, it will fail, and all the process and organizational
       structure in the world will not save it. A multi-national governmental
       substitute for ICANN will not be likely to provide the kind of process
                     that some believe is essential for ICANN.
       For all these reasons, I have come to the conclusion that the concept
       of At Large membership elections from a self-selected pool of unknown
         voters is not just flawed, but fatally flawed, and that continued
        devotion of ICANN's very finite energy and resources down this path
          will very likely prevent the creation of an effective and viable
       institution. We must find another, more effective path for appropriate
        input into the ICANN process by the general user community that will
       accomplish the key purpose underlying the At Large concept - to ensure
       that the broad public interest is effectively reflected and protected
                    in the ICANN consensus development process.
        I cannot emphasize this point strongly enough: I believe strongly in
        ICANN's core values of openness and participation. An ICANN that is
       insulated from input and involvement by individuals across the global
        diversity of the Internet would be a failed ICANN. Though some will
        doubtless try to characterize it otherwise, my conclusion about the
        unworkability of At Large membership elections is NOT a criticism of
          the concept of participation by individuals. On the contrary, I
       believe that a reform of ICANN must result in greater openness, wider
         diversity, and clearer, more meaningful avenues for individual and
                           organizational participation.
        The endless disputes over the feasibility and desirability of online
        elections represent a significant example of how much of the finite
        amount of ICANN energy available from a largely volunteer cadre has
       been drained on topics that are almost orthogonal to its key mission,
        but it is not the only one. The reconsideration process is another,
         where precious staff and Board time have been devoted to what are
         often clearly frivolous requests. The incipient Independent Review
        Panel has all the hallmarks of adding to this waste. For sure, ICANN
          requires an appropriate attention to process, and there must be
          adequate procedures to channel and protect the integrity of that
          process, particularly across as diverse a community as the ICANN
          process seeks to attract. But in my judgment, the current ICANN
                      attention to process has gone overboard.
          It is time to get our priorities straight, and to reform ICANN's
       structure and procedures so that they all assist, rather than impede,
                        the achievement of its core mission.
       3. Too Little Funding. Finally, the third major problem is inadequate
       funding. ICANN began its existence with no guaranteed funding from any
         source - governments or private entities. Indeed, it survived its
         initial days only because of loans from public-spirited businesses
       (and the great good fortune that it was launched during the boom, not
        the bust, part of the global business cycle). It survives today on a
         heavily negotiated revenue stream generated from a small number of
         very interested intermediaries - who also have major influence in
       establishing the ICANN budget. Perhaps it is not surprising that ICANN
                 has been seriously underfunded from its creation.
             I believe ICANN is underfunded for the following reasons:
         * There is a significant shortfall each year even within current
           budgets, because - without agreements in place - ccTLDs do not
           bear their appropriate share of the burden. There has been a
           $400-500,000 shortfall each year, a number that seems likely to
           increase absent a dramatic change in ccTLD attitudes. In addition,
           the RIRs, in the absence of any agreements with ICANN, have yet to
           contribute (although those funds have been put in escrow awaiting
           the completion of the necessary agreements).
         * ICANN has accommodated that shortfall only through not hiring to
           authorized levels, and at the expense of building reserves. The
           former means that work is not done effectively; the ICANN process
           is dangerously understaffed, and has always been understaffed. The
           latter is extremely risky financially, as it would be for any
           organization, allowing for no unexpected expenditures including,
           for example, litigation expenses. Experience has taught us that,
           although it cannot be planned for precisely, litigation in this
           area is inevitable, and this is likely to increase as the
           complexity of ICANN's tasks increases.
         * Even more importantly, existing budgets would be completely
           inadequate even if fully funded. ICANN has little or no backup of
           key individuals, making the organization extremely vulnerable to
           the loss of those key people. This could lead to serious
           instabilities in certain circumstances. Beyond that, there are too
           few staff to do a proper job - even while many current staff are
           already working unsustainable long hours. A corollary is that
           clearly there are too few staff to shoulder additional
           responsibilities, such as security, contract monitoring and
           compliance, contracting out for network monitoring services,
           coordinating IDN policy, etc. And ICANN has no funds to pay for
           unanticipated expenses, to engage in the kind of public
           communication process that an organization like ICANN should
           undertake, or to undertake the costs of root server operations -
           just to list a few of the tasks that many believe an effective
           ICANN would undertake.
       To be effective, ICANN has to have enough of the right kinds of people
        (and support services) to do the tasks required. Because it has not
          had sufficient active participation from critical entities, and
       because the conceptual goal has been to fund ICANN at only the minimal
       level necessary, it has not had the funds to hire the right number of
       people with the right talents. The inevitable result is that services
         cannot aspire to desirable levels and much is postponed or undone.
            This is not to denigrate the efforts of what I regard as an
        outstanding ICANN staff - they are all overworked and underhelped -
       the service and support they do provide is enormously impressive under
        the circumstances. But ICANN today cannot do everything it should do
                               or in a timely manner.
        Perhaps even more importantly, the ICANN process as presently funded
       will never be able to fulfill its intended coordination and consensus
          building tasks, its IANA and other technical tasks, its security
          responsibilities, its legal coordination and contract monitoring
         tasks, and its management tasks. Furthermore, costs are increasing
        even to pursue its current activities. Overall, the ICANN process is
       understaffed by at least 10-12 fulltime employees, and possibly more -
        depending on what it is expected to accomplish. A fully funded ICANN
          probably requires an operating budget of 300-500% of its current
        budget level, plus funding for significant one-time expenditures if
           funding of root name server operators and the establishment of
                         appropriate reserves are included.
       This level of needed funding requires a very different kind of funding
        structure from the one that exists today. My conclusion is that the
        funding sources of ICANN must be broadened, and overall funding must
       significantly increase. Today, ICANN depends entirely for its funding
          on the cooperation of those entities who generate revenues from
          servicing the names and address space, who essentially serve as
         intermediaries between ICANN and the name registrants that are the
       ultimate source of those funds. This is a limited number of entities,
        and thus leaves ICANN overly vulnerable. In addition, it means that
        the other participants that are critical for ICANN's success do not
         have an immediate or direct stake in the ICANN budget. All of the
       participants in the ICANN process that have the ability to pay a share
           of ICANN funding should do so. With "skin in the game," these
        participants will feel a more immediate and direct connection to the
            success of the ICANN process. And this includes governments.
                                MISSION IMPOSSIBLE?
        Without participation by necessary stakeholders, without the proper
         focus on progress and effectiveness over process, and without the
        funding necessary to carry out its mission effectively, it is simply
           unrealistic to assume that ICANN will be able to complete the
        transition to fully independent private sector administration of the
          DNS and related policy issues. One might then reasonably ask "So
                 what?" Why not just continue with the status quo?
           For this to be a feasible alternative, the status quo must be
         sustainable, reflecting as it does an incomplete transition. In my
                    opinion, the status quo is not sustainable.
       First of all, for the reasons described above, ICANN does not have the
            necessary resources even to continue at the current level of
         operations. This is especially true if those inadequate resources
       continue to be diverted to matters (like At Large elections) that are
          really not central to ICANN's mission. Today's funding model is
                         neither adequate nor sustainable.
        Second, the current role of the US Government is not consistent with
            long-term global stability. ICANN has attracted considerable
       international participation to date, but this gratifying response has
            been founded on a belief that it would shortly result in the
            transition of the DNS away from US Government control to an
        international policy process, represented by ICANN. ICANN itself has
           been successfully internationalized; there are now only six US
       citizens on ICANN's 19-member board. That board (and many in the ICANN
       community) is increasingly restive with continued dependency on unique
        US government involvement, and if that is seen as an indefinite fact
           of life, international participation in ICANN will inevitably
            diminish. Thus, without a realistic prospect of a successful
        transition - and that prospect, in my view, is not realistic with an
          ICANN as it is currently structured and operates - international
       support for ICANN will fade. If ICANN comes to be seen (as is starting
       to happen in some quarters) as simply a tool of the US Government, it
       will no longer have any hope of accomplishing its original mission. At
        that point, at least some (and I believe many) of the current ICANN
         participants (Board, staff and volunteers) may well choose not to
       continue in what is, after all, a highly draining and thankless task.
        Third, and potentially most critical, a weak ICANN makes some of the
       Internet's essential infrastructure needlessly vulnerable to external
            threats - fragmentation of the name space, alternate roots,
         non-interoperable internationalized domain names, anticompetitive
       exercises of market power, and even security threats. Use of alternate
        roots now occurs within tolerable bounds because the community as a
         whole understands the necessity of a single unique name space, and
         therefore a single root, and because it prefers to work within the
          ICANN process. A permanently weak ICANN would likely change that
       situation, and would certainly encourage even more aggressive efforts
         by entrepreneurs, powerful commercial interests, and perhaps some
         governments to put self-centered, short-term advantage over global
       cooperation, universal interconnectivity, and long-term stability. The
        introduction of internationalized characters into the DNS is a very
          difficult issue and in itself could lead to fragmentation of the
       Internet with alternate, centrally-controlled roots being established
        in furtherance of real or trumped up nationalistic concerns. As was
        clearly shown at ICANN's Security Meeting last November, the DNS is
       today very robust and resilient. Security is taken very seriously, but
       ICANN's ability to implement needed improvements (for example, at the
       root name server level) is jeopardized by lack of funding and lack of
       full participation by critical partners. All of these are examples of
         the kinds of threats that a weak ICANN will find very difficult to
        Simply put, an ineffective ICANN virtually invites the fragmentation
          of the Internet by those with parochial commercial, cultural, or
        political interests into zones that cannot reliably communicate with
         each other - an outcome that would be profoundly negative for the
        Internet and would seriously retard its continued growth as a global
        medium to support critical commercial and social goals, and a medium
                         for communication and expression.
                            THE NECESSARY REFORM AGENDA
       This is a bleak picture, but I believe it is realistic. I do not have
          any historical baggage; I was not there at the creation. I have
              nothing to protect from the beginning. But I do have the
        responsibility for trying to manage ICANN, and I am accountable for
        its actions during my tenure. I am also responsible for making sure
         that the Board and all ICANN stakeholders have a clear picture of
            ICANN's successes and failures, and of its future prospects.
            Today, its legitimate future prospects are, in my judgment,
           non-existent, unless we engage in meaningful reform of ICANN's
          structure and operations. Either we need a renewed commitment to
       ICANN's original mission, accompanied by a clear focus on the specific
        steps that need to be taken to put ICANN in a position to accomplish
         that mission, or we need to consider whether ICANN should seek to
           withdraw in favor of a different global coordination approach.
       Just because it is a bleak picture, however, does not mean that there
       is nothing we can do to make ICANN work. ICANN's original mission was
        and is both worthwhile and intelligent and, if it can be carried out
           effectively, would redound to the benefit of the entire global
         Internet community. We must, however, step up to the reality that
         major reform is necessary to make that happen. The problems I have
         outlined cannot be solved by tinkering with one aspect of ICANN or
       another, trying to eat the elephant one bite at a time. They require a
                                  fresh approach.
         The reforms I propose will require new thinking and a new mindset.
             They will not appeal to those whose thinking is limited to
         self-interest in a narrow sense. They will be embraced, I hope, by
        those who see their self-interest within the broader context of what
       is good for the community as a whole. In what I propose, many will see
        themselves as both "winners" and in some limited sense as "losers."
       But the overall mission and an effective ICANN will be a clear winner.
       What is needed today is to reform ICANN, and to do so from the inside
       out, beginning with the core mission and crafting a structure that can
           be effective to achieve it, not just one that has the broadest
         With that as the goal, what is essential to ICANN's effectiveness?
        First, it is intended to manage a global resource, so it must have a
         structure that is consistent with that objective. That means ICANN
       must have an effective, geographically diverse international managing
         body. As has been noted by many members of the community, ICANN's
        mission is a public trust. It should therefore be managed by a Board
                                    of Trustees.
          1. The Board of Trustees. ICANN needs an international Board of
       Trustees composed of serious, competent people. The ICANN mission is a
        serious responsibility, substituting for international governmental
        management of a critical global resource. It requires high-quality,
          dedicated people who are widely perceived by key stakeholders as
         competent to guide this public trust. To date, it has been assumed
        that we could find enough such people, beholden to the public trust
        and not to special interests, to volunteer for this mission, and in
         large part ICANN has been fortunate that this has so far been the
           case. But it is risky to assume this will always be the case,
          especially given the vagaries of election processes that can be
                           captured by special interests.
       Thus, we have to have more affirmative ways of seeking out the kind of
         Trustees that are needed. I would propose that 10 of a total of 15
        Trustees should be selected At Large. A certain portion of these At
        Large Trustees (I would recommend five of the 10) should be selected
       in some way by national governments, in their capacity as stewards of
         the public interest. This would accomplish two objectives: (1) it
          would serve the goal of public accountability, and (2) it would
            heighten the level of interest and participation by national
          governments in ICANN. Governmentally-selected Trustees would be
         expected to bring on the Board of Trustees the perspective of the
        broad public interest, and are more likely to be effective advocates
            for it, and less likely to be narrow partisans of particular
               interests. Compared with other methods of supplying a
       publicly-accountable presence on the Board, this solution conceptually
       would also be orders of magnitude simpler as an administrative matter,
                           and considerably less costly.
         I suggest that the five governmentally-selected At Large Trustees
         should represent the ICANN five geographic regions. The details of
       that selection process should be left to the governments, although it
          could be imagined that these selections could be made either by
        regional governmental organizations or, alternatively, by the ICANN
        Governmental Advisory Committee. To avoid conflicts of interest and
        anxieties about primary loyalties, I also propose to retain ICANN's
        current rule disqualifying governmental employees with policymaking
        responsibilities. In other words, I would have governments choose a
           set of non-governmental Trustees to represent the broad public
       interest. As representatives of the five ICANN geographic regions, the
              At Large Trustees would advance the goals of both public
                      accountability and geographic diversity.
         The remaining five At Large Trustees should be selected through an
       open and consultative Nominating Committee process. The NomCom should
       be composed of both Trustee and non-Trustee members. Its task would be
       to identify highly qualified, respected and knowledgeable leaders with
        the essential skill sets and experience, and of diverse geographical
          and functional backgrounds, who are not necessarily or primarily
                  representatives of interest groups or entities.
         Because the ICANN structure should feature direct input to Trustee
        deliberations from those most knowledgeable about the technical and
       policy issues that will come before them, I suggest that the remaining
       five Board of Trustee seats should be filled ex officio. These five Ex
          Officio Trustees should include the CEO, the three Chairs of the
          Policy Councils described below, and the Chair of the Technical
       Advisory Committee. In addition, the Chair of the Government Advisory
        Committee and a person designated by the Internet Architecture Board
       should each be a non-voting ex officio member of the Board, to ensure
                   close coordination with those critical bodies.
        The current Board, I believe, is somewhat larger than desirable, and
       thus I would reduce the new Board of Trustees to 15 people. Since the
        current terms of the four remaining original directors expire later
       this year, at the same time as the current At Large directors, the new
        Board of Trustees could be smaller than the current Board simply by
       not filling four seats. Terms should be staggered to ensure that only
        1/3 of the Board terms expire in any given year. However, continuity
          is very desirable, and I would propose that At Large Trustees be
        allowed to serve up to two consecutive three-year terms, subject to
         renomination and reappointment at the end of the first three-year
       Obviously, this proposed Board of Trustees, while still representative
        of the ICANN stakeholder communities, is largely not the product of
        elections. This is because the principal objective is to produce an
       effective Board of Trustees, not to allocate seats to interest groups
            or constituencies, or to replicate online the vast array of
       governmental institutions needed to assure fair elections. Of course,
       it will be critical that all portions of the community feel that their
        interests are understood and given due consideration by the Board of
          Trustees, but that does not mean that the selection process must
       inevitably be electoral, in the sense of governmental elections based
          on universal suffrage. As my suggestions for the Policy Councils
           described below make clear, a reformed ICANN must be a broadly
        participatory body, and it must be organized to facilitate bottom-up
       discussions and ideas. But it must also be something that actually is
          workable, so those discussions and ideas can be translated into
       actions when needed. To me, this means that the selection of Trustees
            should be based on individual credentials and skills and the
       willingness and ability to contribute, and not on personal popularity,
           interest group agendas, or the ability to recruit a small but
                    sufficient number of self-selecting voters.
       2. Staffing and Funding. Even a very active, engaged Board will not be
       intimately involved in day to day activities. And there are many such
        activities, ranging from the IANA functions to technical services to
          contract administration to public information and education, in
           addition to policy development and general administration. An
       effective ICANN, like any other business entity, would first catalogue
          the tasks that are necessary or desirable, calculate the cost of
        hiring the people and providing the resources necessary to carrying
         out those tasks in a timely and effective way, and then generate a
         funding structure that provides the necessary funds to meet those
        needs. In other words, funding should be driven by needs, not by the
       desires of individual participants. While there is certainly merit in
          generating input from all affected entities, it is unworkable to
        provide everyone subject to ICANN policy processes with an effective
           veto on the funding necessary to carry out the ICANN mission.
       The current funding process is yet another derivative from the notion
        that, as a purely private entity, ICANN should depend on the consent
          of those subject to its policy control. This had its conceptual
         deficiencies at the time ICANN was first created, and practice has
         proved those concerns valid. Clearly, not all those who should be
        involved in the ICANN process have had an interest in fully funding
                                 ICANN operations.
       Thus, the Board of Trustees and ICANN staff should be responsible for
       producing the budget, with a fully transparent process for input from
          the ICANN community. The accountability that was the goal of the
         original process can be provided by an open budget development and
       explanation process, and by the participation of the At Large Trustees
                                in those decisions.
        In order to both broaden the funding base, and generate the level of
          funds needed, ICANN should combine core funding (generated from
       governments and those entities that enter into agreements with ICANN)
       and fee-based funding (generated from those other entities that either
       participate in the ICANN policy development process or utilize various
                                  ICANN services).
       3. Policy Development Structure. It is unnecessary for all Trustees to
       be intimately knowledgeable about the technical aspects of the issues
        they will address. After all, they are not writing code or creating
        protocols, but rather are charged with making policy and management
        decisions. They do, however, need to have access to, and input from,
                     technically qualified people and entities.
       The current ICANN concept is based on the notion of "bottom-up" policy
         development, with the Supporting Organizations responsible for the
             development of policy and the Board theoretically just the
        implementing device for those policies. In hindsight, the notion of
         truly "bottom-up" consensus decision-making simply has not proven
         workable, partly because the process is too exposed to capture by
           special interests and partly because ICANN relies entirely on
       volunteers to do all the work. Furthermore, those who are affected by
       policy decisions should have a clear role in generating the record on
         which those policy decisions are based and in providing thoughtful
                          advice to the Board of Trustees.
          This analysis leads me to suggest the replacement of the current
         Supporting Organizations with several Policy Councils. These would
        include an Address and Numbering Policy Council, a Generic TLD Names
        Policy Council, and a Geographic TLD Names Policy Council. In order
          for them to be most effective, each of these Councils should be
           supported by the appropriate staff, and should be managed by a
              Steering Committee made up of some ex officio seats (for
        representatives of various categories of entities) and some persons
       nominated through the NomCom process described above, and confirmed by
           the Board of Trustees. In addition, the Governmental Advisory
       Committee would continue, and a new Technical Advisory Committee would
        be created. The current Root Server System Advisory Committee would
        continue as the Root Name Server Operations Committee. Finally, the
       newly formed Security Committee would continue to have responsibility
                 for advice and coordination in its critical area.
           In the interest of creating both a broader base of funding and
        encouraging full and active participation by critical stakeholders,
         full participation in the Policy Councils and Advisory Committees
       should be linked where appropriate to participation in ICANN funding.
       For example, only those registries and registrars that have agreements
       with ICANN should be eligible for full membership in a Policy Council,
        including having representatives sit on the Steering Committees. It
          may also be appropriate for similar conditions to apply to other
        participants in the Policy Councils as well. In addition, we should
        explicitly and permanently abandon the notion that every individual
        with an interest in DNS policy has some "right" to equally weighted
            participation in ICANN, no matter what the impact on ICANN's
       effectiveness. This conclusion is driven by a focus on the core ICANN
        mission of effective management of global name and address policies.
         The general public should have a right to an effective notice and
       comment process, to give input before major decisions are made, and to
         observe the policy-making process, but we have seen that unlimited
       "rights" to full and equal participation by every individual who finds
         this area interesting are not consistent with an effective ICANN.
       Thus, while membership in the Policy Councils should be tilted toward
       expert talent and directly affected stakeholders, each Council should
         be open in some fashion to the participation and contributions of
                     interested individuals and organizations.
           To achieve that, I propose a reformulation of the constituency
            concept. In order to help generate participation, facilitate
        meaningful deliberation, and structure input, the currently existing
         DNSO constituencies would be invited to reconfigure themselves and
         continue as self-organized, cross-Council Forums within ICANN. The
       Forums could then participate in each of the Councils, offering input,
       developing and evaluating proposals, and advocating on behalf of their
          members, as they see fit. For example, the ISP Forum would be a
       channel for its members to formulate and give input about gTLD, ccTLD,
        and addressing policy issues, and would be a venue for input to the
        Nominating Committee. The Forums would be expected to re-orient away
        from debates over procedure and toward deliberations on substantive
       DNS policy matters. As it currently the case, some Forums would be by
            definition limited to members defined by the existence of a
       contractual relationship with ICANN (i.e., the gTLD registries, ccTLD
       registries, and gTLD registrars), while others would be more open and
           defined by function (i.e., ISPs, business, non-commercial, and
       intellectual property constituencies). New Forums could be created as
          well; by eliminating the current concept of mathematically equal
        representation for each Forum on the Names Council, ICANN could more
       readily develop and implement well-defined criteria for recognition of
        new self-organized Forums (for example, we might imagine Forums for
        university and academic networks, individuals, small business users,
           backbone providers, etc.) without encountering resistance from
               existing Forums due to a feared dilution of influence.
        Let me say a few words about how I think the concept of an At Large
         organization fits into this reformed ICANN structure. The At Large
         Study Committee's Final Report contains a range of well-developed
       suggestions and good thinking about how an At Large organization could
            be structured to help ICANN increase meaningful substantive
       participation from individual Internet users around the world. Working
       from the current ICANN terminology, the ALSC labelled this an At Large
       Supporting Organization. I fully agree with the ALSC that ICANN would
          benefit greatly from an At Large organization that could conduct
       outreach, foster deliberation, and attract new ideas and voices to the
         ICANN process. I believe that a reformed ICANN should include this
         kind of At Large entity, designed to connect individuals in a very
       open and direct way to the ICANN process. In further dialogue with the
        ALSC and the community, I hope to explore how their concept of an At
               Large organization can best fit into a reformed ICANN.
         4. Transparency and Process. As already mentioned, ICANN is today
         being strangled by process. Process has been allowed to become the
       predominant value in ICANN decision-making. The DNS management system
       that Jon Postel operated so effectively in the past had no definitive
            obligation to particular processes, and it certainly was not
         transparent - but it worked! We cannot recreate Jon Postel or his
       processes, and indeed they would probably not work well today. But to
        achieve a reformed ICANN, we do need to start from the inside out -
       with the goal of effectiveness - rather than from the outside in. Once
         we identify a workable structure, process and transparency can be
            achieved in a manner compatible with that primary objective.
       This does not suggest a secretive and opaque organization. In fact, an
        effective ICANN must be very transparent, and certainly will need to
        have available open processes to ensure that all relevant inputs are
           considered and that policy decisions in fact contribute to the
           objective of a stable and effective DNS. Central to the ICANN
        experiment - and integral to its successes thus far - have been core
         values of openness and broad participation. I believe strongly in
        those values, and aim to strengthen them in a reformed ICANN. ICANN
         can and should do much better in achieving transparency, enabling
          meaningful participation, and reaching out to involve the global
         diversity of the Internet. Likewise, I believe strongly that ICANN
       needs an intelligent framework of meaningful checks and balances, but
         I believe we can do much better than the existing ICANN structure.
         There are certain key principles that I suggest are critical to a
         reformed (and successful) ICANN: (1) the Board of Trustees must be
          able to make policy decisions, not simply ratify or reject those
       proposed by subordinate bodies; (2) the Trustees must have the ability
            to deliberate in private; and (3) with a properly funded and
             independent Ombudsman in place, there is neither a need or
          justification for some independent review mechanism process that
           creates a "super-Board" for some purposes. This implies that:
         A. The Policy Councils should clearly be identified as advisory
         bodies, and their advice to the Board of Trustees should be given
         strong weight based on its persuasive merits, but not presumptive
         validity. Experience shows that the DNSO, the only Supporting
         Organization with more than four members, has been only marginally
         effective in generating policy decisions, or even in giving policy
         advice. In part, this results from a lack of full-time staff, which
         places the entire burden of policy development on the hardworking
         volunteers who must try to advance policy proposals through the
         DNSO's complex and noisy crowd of working groups, constituencies,
         and the Names Council. In a reformed ICANN, the Policy Councils
         should be appropriately staffed. But in part the characteristic
         gridlock in the DNSO is a function of the inevitable difficulty of
         consensus development among parties with self-interested but
         conflicting goals. This difficulty has been aggravated by the
         notion of presumptive validity, which has freed the Supporting
         Organizations from the discipline of having to develop persuasively
         supported recommendations. I do not subscribe to the proposition
         that a lack of consensus means that there should be no action; this
         may be the case on any given issue, but it certainly is not a
         universal truth. To be effective, the ICANN Board of Trustees has
         to be clearly empowered to make decisions even if there is no clear
         consensus, to the extent they see it necessary to carry out the
         ICANN mission.
         This does not mean that the ICANN Board of Trustees should be able
         simply to ignore advice from its Policy Councils. For starters, the
         composition of the Board of Trustees, with its Ex Officio Trustees
         including the Chairs (or their designees) of each Policy Council,
         suggests that is not very likely in any event. The Board of
         Trustees should be required to carefully consider any
         recommendations from its Policy Councils, and to clearly set forth
         its reasons in the event it chooses to not accept those
         recommendations. The Board of Trustees should be required to give
         timely advance public notice of all matters it considers, and to
         publish in a timely manner full and complete minutes of its
         meetings. In other words, the Board of Trustees should act
         appropriately to a body entrusted with a global responsibility -
         openly and transparently, but also effectively.
         B. The very expensive and time-consuming quarterly meetings held at
         locations around the globe are neither necessary nor desirable. The
         current Board has already reduced the number of such meetings to
         three for this year, and I believe that there should only be two
         such meetings each year. Of course, the Board of Trustees, to be
         effective, must meet more often than two or even four times a year,
         as the ICANN Board currently does, with most meetings telephonic.
         In addition, the Trustees must be able to discuss matters in
         private, as the current Board does today - by telephone, by
         personal discussions, by email and otherwise. In fact, the only
         Board meetings that are public today are the quarterly meetings,
         and the picture of the ICANN Board up on a dais in a public
         auditorium contributes nothing to the goal of effective management
         of DNS policy.
         These geographically scattered Board meetings have had some value
         to the local Internet community, frequently increasing its profile
         in the broader community in a beneficial way, and thus I would not
         eliminate them entirely, although it would be nice to find ways to
         accomplish that end without the substantial cost of the entire
         traveling road show. The direct costs to ICANN of these meetings
         are significant; the indirect costs to all the participants are
         enormous; and it is not clear that the benefits balance off the
         costs. On balance, I would do these twice a year. They may well
         need to be structured differently, having a flavor of ICANN
         conferences, rather than ICANN meetings, perhaps with predominant
         themes (similar to last year's successful security theme at the
         November meeting). Outreach can also be strengthened by groups of
         Trustees and staff participating in more regional meetings or
         holding mini-ICANN briefings and input sessions around the world.
         It seems perfectly reasonable to specify that a group of ICANN
         Trustees will hold at least one open session in each geographic
         region each year, ideally at an existing major Internet meeting or
         C. Finally, the current panoply of artificial accountability
         mechanisms should be replaced with a Manager of Public
         Participation (to ensure effective mechanisms for public awareness
         and comments on ICANN matters) and an Ombudsman function that is
         fully staffed and funded to respond to complaints and requests for
         reconsideration. This function would replace the current
         reconsideration process and the still to be created Independent
         Review Panel.
         There should be a reconsideration process, but I believe that all
         final decisions must rest with the ICANN Board of Trustees. A
         reconsideration process is certainly appropriate for staff
         decisions; after all, in a properly funded and staffed ICANN, the
         staff will carry out all day-to-day operations, and thus it is
         appropriate that there be some formal mechanism for those affected
         by staff actions to ask the Board of Trustees to review those
         specific actions. In addition, there seems no objection, and some
         potential benefit, to allow affected parties to ask the Board of
         Trustees to reconsider a particular Board decision. After all, the
         reconsideration request can speak directly to the rationale for the
         action as articulated by the Board of Trustees, and it is certainly
         possible that a second look may produce a different decision.
         The Ombudsman process can allow for a fast track process to short
         circuit any reconsideration requests that are clearly frivolous.
         Conversely, an Ombudsman could request a stay of further activity
         relevant to any reconsideration request where there may be merit
         and continuing activity could cause irreparable or serious harm if
         the request were upheld.
         There is no justification, however, and no necessity, for any
         process that would allow some other body, such as the nascent
         Independent Review Panel, made up of non-Trustees, to override a
         Board of Trustees decision. There is no assurance that body would
         always act appropriately, and thus it is likely we would eventually
         hear calls to review the IRP decisions in some way. The Board of
         Trustees will obviously be subject to relevant legal constraints,
         but apart from that, for ICANN to function effectively there should
         be a clear and final decisional authority. That should be the Board
         of Trustees.
       For all the reasons described above, if we stay on our current course
        the ICANN experiment is likely to fail. But properly reformed, I am
                             convinced it can succeed.
         The ICANN process depends on volunteers to do its work, and those
        volunteers are driven by a goal - an effective private sector policy
        development body that coordinates an important global resource. Once
       it becomes clear that this goal is unattainable, those volunteers will
        lose their incentive and disappear. Funding is adequate only for the
        most limited efforts in spite of extraordinary staff dedication, and
        many important issues are delayed or inadequately pursued. Many have
        criticized the quality and quantity of ICANN's output (at times with
         some justification, at times unfairly) but in truth it is a small
        miracle that there have been no truly major disasters. Much has been
         accomplished with few resources, but there is much left undone or
              delayed for lack of people to work on all the problems.
            There are many difficult and troublesome issues that require
       attention, in addition to those described above, including data escrow
        practices, name transfer policies, and new TLD evaluation. These are
          not getting done adequately or at all, or are being done behind
           schedule, because there simply are too few human and financial
       resources trying to accomplish too much. We do not have the resources
       to enter into the optimal arrangements with root server operators, and
        to absorb the capital and operating costs of those operations. There
       could be no At Large elections without outside major funding, because
         there is no internal funding for that job, and even with external
         funding there would be a serious drain on ICANN's thinly-stretched
         staff resources. Many of those with the strongest commitment to a
       private sector and international approach have become - or give strong
         indications of becoming - less and less involved as they perceive
              progress increasingly strangled by the coils of process.
           As the lack of an achievable and worthwhile goal becomes more
         apparent, people will simply stop trying, and the ICANN experiment
       will collapse. There will be no incentive for new sources of energy to
        emerge, since there will be no point to it. Equally importantly, the
           governments of the world will conclude (as some may already be
       thinking) that the private sector effort has failed and thus will seek
         another, more heavy-handed solution. And the private sector, that
         depends so much on the stable operation of this critical resource,
         will swallow hard and accept a completely governmental solution if
       that is the only solution available to guarantee the stable operation
                                  of the Internet.
       Therefore, those of us who believe in a predominantly private solution
       must reform ICANN into a true public-private partnership if we want it
         to succeed. We must do this if we are to succeed in capturing the
       agility and strength of private sector management with the ability of
       governments to represent the public interest. This is a real change in
        the form of the original ICANN concept, but not in the substance of
          its mission. It is grounded in the reality of our three years of
         actual experience. The original ICANN was conceived by many as an
        experiment based on theory and hope; the new, reformed ICANN must be
       an effective mechanism for global coordination based on practical and
               workable approaches informed by real life experience.
         Attached to this report is my suggestion as to how ICANN could be
        reformed to become a truly effective public-private partnership that
       can carry out its global coordination responsibilities. I welcome the
                       dialogue that I hope it will generate.
                                   M. Stuart Lynn
                          A PROPOSAL FOR REFORM OF ICANN 
         The following summarizes how ICANN could be reformed to both be an
          effective global coordination body and meet legitimate goals of
           transparency and accountability. This outline assumes that the
        necessary reforms require more of a public-private partnership than
       was originally envisioned three years ago, that public accountability
          needs to be assured in a more practical way than in the current
        structure, and that there needs to be a broader and stronger funding
                              base than exists today.
        This outline sets forth one approach to solving these problems, and
        reforming ICANN into a more efficient, more effective entity, while
       retaining appropriate public input and accountability. It is intended
          to begin a dialogue within the ICANN community about the changes
         required if ICANN is ever to accomplish its mission. It is offered
       with the caveat that we do not have time for an extended debate; ICANN
       will, in my opinion, either be reformed or irrelevant within the next
                                  several months.
                                    I. STRUCTURE
         A. 15 member Board of Trustees
         1. Ten At Large Trustees
         a. Five (one from each ICANN geographic region) nominated by
         governments (process to be determined) and confirmed by the Board
         of Trustees
         b. Five nominated by open nominating process and confirmed by the
         Board of Trustees
         (i) Nominating Committee made up of: (a) non-voting Chair,
         appointed by ICANN CEO after wide consultation; (b) three Trustees
         whose terms are not expiring; and (c) four other persons selected
         by the Board of Trustees, after wide consultation.
         (ii) Nominations process open to all suggestions and inputs, widely
         publicized, with adequate time to do thorough work. The Nominating
         Committee is expected to consult with a broad range of the ICANN
         communities for input to its deliberations.
         (iii) To assure open communications and substantive input from all
         major stakeholders, there will be at least the following non-voting
         liaisons to the Nominating Committee: designees or representatives
         of IAB, IP address registries, domain name registries and
         registrars, root name server operators, and the immediately
         preceding chair of the Nominating Committee.
         (iv) Nominating Committee makes nominations based on well-defined
         criteria, clearly stated in advance for each position: outstanding
         professional accomplishment, technical understanding, record of
         leadership, reputation for good judgment, record of public service,
         independence and willingness to commit time and effort; all with
         due regard for geographic diversity and differentiated experience
         (v) When making nominations to a particular Council, the Nominating
         Committee will consult widely with the most affected stakeholder
         communities. For example, in making nominations for the Address and
         Numbering Steering Group, the Nominating Committee will consult
         with the IAB, RIR Boards and staff, and ISPs.
         2. Five Ex Officio Trustees
         a. CEO
         b. Chairs (or designees) of Policy Councils (Address and Numbering
         Policy Council, Generic TLD Names Policy Council, Geographic TLD
         Names Policy Council) and Technical Advisory Committee
         3. Designee of the Internet Architecture Board and Chair of
         Governmental Advisory Committee serve as non-voting liaisons to
         Board of Trustees
         4. All Trustees (except ex officio) to serve staggered three-year
         terms; maximum service two terms
         B. Three Policy Councils and Two Standing Advisory Committees
         [The Policy Councils would be responsible for discussion about, and
         development of proposals concerning, issues falling within their
         area of expertise. Each Council would have a Steering Group, but
         would be open to and encourage participation by interested
         stakeholders, directly and through organized Forums (see D below).
         The Advisory Committees would provide advice to the ICANN Board of
         Trustees from their particular perspective. The Policy Councils and
         Advisory Committees would each have dedicated staff and access to
         the ICANN resources necessary to allow them to function
         effectively. In addition to publication on the ICANN website,
         Council recommendations would be circulated to each of the other
         Policy Councils, the Technical and Governmental Advisory
         Committees, the Security Committee and the Ombudsman (who would be
         responsible for soliciting, receiving and organizing public
         comments related to each such recommendation) for their review and
         reaction prior to action by the Board of Trustees. Council
         recommendations would be entitled to great weight before the Board
         of Trustees, and the Board would be required to explain any
         decision not to accept the recommendation of a Council, but the
         Board of Trustees would have the discretion to accept or reject all
         or any part of a Council recommendation with an appropriate
         1. Address and Numbering Policy Council
         a. Open to organizations that utilize ICANN to perform protocol
         number assignment and/or allocation of IP addresses, and other
         organizations interested in issues relating to those issues
         b. Managed by Steering Group of seven members appointed by the
         Board of Trustees - four ex officio [designee of the IETF Chair and
         designees of RIRs that have formal agreements with ICANN], and
         three other persons nominated through NomCom process and confirmed
         by the Board. Upon recognition of a new RIR, it would be entitled
         to name an ex officio member of the Steering Group, which will
         increase in size to accommodate that addition. At any time where
         the Steering Group consists of an even number of people, the Chair
         will vote only to break ties.
         c. Consider funding mechanism for those Council participants (not
         including IETF) that do not have agreements with ICANN, perhaps
         tiered to size and ability to pay
         d. Chair elected by Steering Group, and holds ex officio seat on
         ICANN Board of Trustees
         [The ANPC would essentially combine the functions of the current
         PSO and ASO into a single body, with appropriate staff support and
         a single Steering Group. The ANPC would have responsibility for
         advising the Board on the very limited range of policy issues
         relating to IP address allocation, and any policy or operational
         issues that areise in connection with ICANN's performance of the
         IANA protocol numbering functions.]
         2. Generic TLD Names Policy Council
         a. Made up of organizations interested in name policy issues
         related to gTLDs
         b. Managed by Steering Group of eleven members appointed by the
         Board of Trustees - six ex officio [one representative of gTLD
         registries and one representative of gTLD registrars (each chosen
         by those respective entities that have agreements with ICANN); one
         representative of large commercial users, one representative of
         small commercial users, one representative of non-commercial users,
         and one representative of individual users (each chosen by those
         entities in each category that are full participants in the Policy
         Council or through NomCom process)], and five other persons
         nominated through NomCom process and confirmed by Board)
         c. Consider funding mechanism for those Council participants that
         do not have agreements with ICANN, perhaps tiered to size and
         ability to pay. Consider whether ex officio user representatives
         should be chosen from among those participating in ICANN funding.
         d. Chair elected by Steering Group, and holds ex officio seat on
         ICANN Board of Trustees
         [The GNPC would replace the current DNSO, again with appropriate
         staff and with a Steering Group partly representing stakeholder
         groups and partially selected by the Board of Trustees.]
         3. Geographic TLD Names Policy Council
         a. Made up of ccTLD organizations and other organizations
         interested in policy issues related to this topic
         b. Managed by Steering Group of nine members appointed by the Board
         of Trustees - five ex officio [one representative of ccTLD
         registries from each ICANN region, chosen from among those that
         have existing agreements with ICANN], and four other persons
         nominated through NomCom process and confirmed by Board
         c. Consider funding mechanism for those participants that do not
         have agreements with ICANN, perhaps tiered to recognize size and
         ability to pay.
         d. Chair elected by Steering Group, and holds ex officio seat on
         ICANN Board of Trustees
         [The ccNPC would be a new entity, intended to provide both policy
         advice to the Board of Trustees where needed and to serve as a
         service and policy advisory body to the 243 ccTLDs. It would have
         appropriate staff support, and a Steering Group made up of both
         ccTLD representatives and other persons with relevant knowledge or
         experience that could contribute to these objectives.]
         4. Governmental Advisory Committee
         a. Made up of representatives of national governments,
         multinational treaty organizations and distinct economies that
         contribute to ICANN funding
         b. Funding mechanism tiered to recognize size and ability to pay,
         but only those contributing to ICANN (plus developing countries
         whose contribution is waived because of inability to pay) could be
         full voting participants; non-contributors could have observer
         c. Responsible for providing advice to ICANN Board concerning
         issues of governmental concern; input provided by Chair's
         participation on ICANN Board of Trustees, and by Annual Report of
         GAC to ICANN Board setting forth areas or issues that GAC suggests
         require priority attention by ICANN
         d. Chair elected by voting members, and holds ex officio seat on
         ICANN Board of Trustees
         [The GAC should continue to be a forum for governments to discuss
         DNS policy issues, but should have appropriate staff support, and
         full membership should require a funding contribution per some
         tiered schedule (requiring little or no contribution from less
         developed nations). The GAC Chair would serve as an ex officio
         liaison to the ICANN Board of Trustees.]
         5. Technical Advisory Committee
         a. Made up of individuals with direct experience with or
         responsibility for technical issues relating to ICANN's activities
         b. Committee would consist of seven members, four ex officio [one
         designee of IAB, one designee of RIRs, one designee of root name
         server operators and one designee from among the domain name
         registries/registrars] and three other persons selected through the
         NomCom process (which could be drawn from representatives of
         various other groups, such ETSI, ITU, W3C, etc).
         c. The TAC will advise the ICANN Board and staff on technical and
         operational issues relating to ICANN's activities. Unlike the
         Policy Councils, the TAC's role will be purely advisory, without
         the obligation to develop global policies. It will offer technical
         and operational advice when asked, but will not be expected to
         undertake independent policy development on its own initiative.
         d. Chair elected by Committee, and holds ex officio seat on ICANN
         Board of Trustees
         [The TAC will advise the ICANN Board and staff on the technical
         aspects of ICANN's operational responsibilities. For example, the
         TAC would be the body to provide advice on testing the use of
         shared addresses for the root name servers, or for testing the
         ability to deploy internationalized TLDs in the root zone file.]
         C. Security Committee
         1. Made up of no more than 20 persons appointed by the Board of
         Trustees with appropriate background experience and expertise,
         including an ex officio participant from the GAC
         2. Initial Chair appointed by Board; subsequent Chairs elected by
         3. Responsible for coordinating ICANN activities related to all
         aspects of security of the Internet's naming, numbering, and
         address allocation systems
         D. Root Name Server Operations Committee
         1. Continuation of current Root Server System Advisory Committee,
         consisting of each root name server operator plus experts invited
         by the Committee
         2. Chair appointed by Board of Trustees. Chair (or his/her
         designee) sits ex officio on the Technical Advisory Committee and
         Security Committee.
         3. Responsible for coordinating ICANN activities related to the
         operation, functioning, and evolution of the DNS root name server
         E. Forums
         [In order to help generate participation, facilitate meaningful
         deliberation, and structure input, I propose a reformulation of the
         existing constituency concept. The currently existing DNSO
         constituencies would be invited to continue as self-organized,
         cross-Council Forums within ICANN. The Forums could then
         participate in each of the Councils, offering input, developing and
         evaluating proposals, and advocating on behalf of their members, as
         they see fit. For example, the ISP Forum would be a channel for its
         members to formulate and give input about gTLD, ccTLD, and
         addressing policy issues, and would be a venue for input to the
         Nominating Committee. The Forums would be expected to re-orient
         away from debates over procedure and toward deliberations on
         substantive DNS policy matters. As it currently the case, some
         Forums would by definition be limited to members defined by the
         existence of a contractual relationship with ICANN (e.g., the gTLD
         registries, ccTLD registries, and gTLD registrars), while others
         would be more open and defined by function (e.g., the ISPs,
         business, non-commercial, and intellectual property
         New Forums could be created as well. For example, an At Large
         organization based on regional entities, as proposed by the At
         Large Study Committee, could be organized for individuals. By
         eliminating the current concept of mathematically equal
         representation for each constituency on the DNSO Names Council,
         ICANN could more readily develop and implement well-defined minimal
         criteria for recognition of new self-organized Forums (for example,
         we might imagine Forums for universities and academic networks,
         individuals, small business users, backbone providers, etc.)
         without encountering resistance from existing Forums due to a
         feared dilution of influence. This would significantly reduce the
         barriers to participation in policy discussions and deliberations
         by groups with common interests and objectives.]
                                    II. FUNDING
          [This structure is designed to broaden and regularize the ICANN
        funding structure. It differentiates between core funding - funding
       for those tasks that are integral to the ICANN mission and benefit the
         global Internet user community generally - and fee-based funding -
          reimbursement for the fully allocated costs of providing various
          services to entities that do not participate in the core funding
        process. Funding could be bundled into agreements (so that entities
       with which ICANN had an agreement would pay a single annual amount to
       cover both core funding support and all service requirements) or could
       be collected in various ways from entities that do not have agreements
       with ICANN. For example, since it would conflict with ICANN's mission
        to refuse IANA or other necessary services, those ccTLDs that choose
        not to enter into agreements with ICANN should pay a service fee for
        IANA and any other services they utilize that includes an allocation
           for overhead and a share of the core funding requirements. In
          addition, consideration should be given to creating some form of
       participation fee for those entities that do not have agreements with
        ICANN but do fully participate in the policy development process by
               those entities (e.g., large commercial users, etc.).]
         A. Funding Requirements: Funding requirements are divided into two
         1. Core Funding Requirements: covers "public good" costs, including
         funding the root name server operators on a contracted basis, and
         all associated overhead costs. This includes funding for
         * Management and Administration
         * Office of the Ombudsman
         * Outreach and Public Information
         * Support for Board of Trustees
         * Staff support for Board, Policy Councils and Standing Committees
         * Policy Development
         * Planning
         * Conferences
         * Funding for Root Name Server Operators
         2. Service Funding Requirements: includes funding for IANA
         services, gTLD licensing, contract monitoring, compliance; derived
         from fees for services
         B. Recovery
         1. Core Funding is recovered from all entities with which ICANN has
         agreements (registries and registrars), from governments (see
         section on GAC), and possibly from others that participate in
         Policy Councils (except the IETF). Core funding costs are allocated
         according to some appropriate metric, such as GDP for participating
         governments and revenues for other entities
         a. Funding is tiered (similar to current mode of allocating fair
         shares to ccTLDs)
         2. Service Fee Funding is recovered through charging fees for
         services. These may either be bundled (into agreements for those
         with agreements with ICANN) or unbundled (i.e., charged on a fee
         for service basis).
         3. Budget is developed by President/CEO with input from Policy
         Councils and Advisory Committees, and approval by Board of
         C. Summary of Principles
         1. Bundled Fees
         a. Services to entities with whom ICANN has a signed agreement
         should be bundled into the agreement; i.e., funding commitments
         under agreements would include all ICANN services
         2. Unbundled Fees
         a. Fee schedules would be created for all services offered to those
         entities that do not have agreements with ICANN that cover the
         costs associated with delivery of those services, including an
         appropriate share of overhead allocation.
         3. Tiering Concept
         a. Where feasible, tiering concepts should be used in establishing
         core funding levels, service fees, etc (similar to what is
         currently used for ccTLDs). An appropriate metric for
         proportionality should be used.
         b. Services to TLDs in the lowest layer should be free to the
         extent practicable
         4. Pass-Through Funding
         a. ICANN's practice should be to contract out for services where
         this makes sense, such as for root name server operations.
         5. Protocol Numbering Services
         a. No fees will be charged to the IETF for the IANA protocol
         numbering functions.
         D. Levels of Funding
         [The following estimates are based on broad assumptions about
         efficient and effective operation. While they rest to some extent
         on experience, the only certainty from that is that the current
         funding structure is woefully inadequate to provide for the
         services and other responsibilities contemplated for ICANN. Thus,
         these estimates should be considered to be order of magnitude, not
         precise estimates.]
         1. "Public Good" and Overhead (~US$8-10 million)
         2. Funding of Root Name Server Operations At Current Levels (~US$10
         3. Funding to Support IANA services and other service functions
         (~US$2-3 million)
         4. Funding for establishment of reserves, built up over three years
         (~ US$10 million)
                           III. TRANSPARENCY AND PROCESS
         A. Ombudsman
         1. Person of unassailable credentials appointed by Board of
         2. Responsible for receiving and processing complaints, requests
         for reconsideration or objections to ICANN staff action, and to
         bring any recommendations directly to the Board. Able to solicit
         all necessary information and data needed to evaluate and make
         recommendations relating to any complaints, disputes, and requests
         for reconsideration.
         3. Provided with support staff and other resources necessary to
         carry out responsibilities effectively
         4. Direct access to the Board to communicate findings and
         recommendations when required; authority to post reports on ICANN
         website as appropriate.
         B. Manager of Public Participation
         1. Would collect and report to the Board and the community on any
         public comments or complaints received dealing with matters put out
         for public comment or actions taken by the Board of Trustees, staff
         or subsidiary bodies.
         2. Responsible for managing all ICANN public forums, public e-mail
         lists, etc. Provided necessary electronic access to publicize
         findings and recommendations, all of which will be available to the
         3. Provided with support staff and other resources necessary to
         carry out responsibilities effectively
         C. Continued Obligation to Be Transparent with Respect to all
         Actions and Decisions
         1. Notice and comment obligations for all Board decisions, proposed
         policy advice and other actions by Policy Steering Committees, and
         other relevant events
         2. Requirement for prompt posting of minutes of all meetings of
         Board and Steering Groups
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