FC: Ashcroft on new investigation rules: FBI has been "frustrated"

From: Declan McCullagh (declanat_private)
Date: Fri May 31 2002 - 12:23:29 PDT

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    ---
    
    Remarks of Attorney General John Ashcroft
    (Note: The Attorney General Often Deviates from Prepared Remarks)
    
    Attorney General Guidelines
    May 30, 2002
    		 		
    	In its 94-year history, the Federal Bureau of Investigation has been many 
    things -- the defender of the nation from organized crime, the guardian of 
    our security from international espionage, and the tireless protector of 
    civil rights and civil liberties for all Americans.
    
    	On September 11, a stunned nation turned once again to the brave men and 
    women of the FBI, and they, once again, answered the call.  I spent the 
    hours, days, and most of the first weeks after the attack in the FBI's 
    Strategic Information and Operations Center with Director Mueller.  Even 
    today, eight months later, it is difficult to convey the professionalism, 
    dedication and quiet resolve I witnessed in those first, 24-hour days.  I 
    saw men and women work themselves beyond fatigue to prevent new terrorist 
    attacks.  I witnessed individuals put aside their personal lives, personal 
    agendas and personal safety to answer our nation's call.
    
    	From the first moments we spent together, launching the largest 
    investigation in history, we understood that the mission of American 
    justice and law enforcement had changed.  That day, in those early hours, 
    the prevention of terrorist acts became the central goal of the law 
    enforcement and national security mission of the FBI.  And from that time 
    forward, we in the leadership of the FBI and the Department of Justice 
    began a concerted effort to free the field agents - the brave men and women 
    on the front lines - from the bureaucratic, organizational, and operational 
    restrictions and structures that hindered them from doing their jobs 
    effectively.
    
    	As we have heard recently, FBI men and women in the field are frustrated 
    because many of our own internal restrictions have hampered our ability to 
    fight terrorism.  The current investigative guidelines have contributed to 
    that frustration.  In many instances, the guidelines bar FBI field agents 
    from taking the initiative to detect and prevent future terrorist acts 
    unless the FBI learns of possible criminal activity from external sources.
    
    	Under the current guidelines, FBI investigators cannot surf the web the 
    way you or I can.  Nor can they simply walk into a public event or a public 
    place to observe ongoing activities.  They have no clear authority to use 
    commercial data services that any business in America can use.  These 
    restrictions are a competitive advantage for terrorists who skillfully 
    utilize sophisticated techniques and modern computer systems to compile 
    information for targeting and attacking innocent Americans.
    
    	That is why the Attorney General's guidelines and procedures relating to 
    criminal investigations and national security were high on the list of 
    action items for reform.  Beginning in the 1970s, guidelines have been 
    developed to inform agents of the circumstances under which investigations 
    may be opened, the permissible scope of these investigations, the 
    techniques that may be used, and the objectives that should be 
    pursued.  These guidelines provide limitations and guidance over and above 
    all requirements and safeguards imposed by the Constitution and beyond the 
    legal framework established by federal statutes enacted by 
    Congress.  Promulgated for different purposes and revised at various times, 
    the guidelines currently cover FBI investigations, undercover operations, 
    the use of confidential informants, and consensual monitoring of verbal 
    communications.
    
    	The guidelines defining the general rules for FBI investigations, for 
    example, were first issued over 20 years ago.  They derive from a period in 
    which Soviet communism was the greatest threat to the United States, in 
    which the Internet did not exist, and in which concerns over terrorist 
    threats to the homeland related mainly to domestic hate groups.
    
    	Shortly after September 11, I took two steps to free FBI field agents to 
    prevent additional terrorist attacks.  First, I authorized the FBI to waive 
    the guidelines, with headquarters approval, in extraordinary cases to 
    prevent and investigate terrorism.  That authority has been used, but I am 
    disappointed that it was not used more widely.  This experience over the 
    past few months reinforces my belief that greater authority to investigate 
    more vigorously needs to be given directly to FBI field agents.
    
    	Second, I directed a top-to-bottom review of the guidelines to ensure that 
    they provide front-line field agents with the legal authority they need to 
    protect the American people from future terrorist attacks.  That 
    comprehensive review showed that the guidelines mistakenly combined 
    timeless objectives - the enforcement of the law and respect for civil 
    rights and liberties - with outdated means.
    	
    	Today, I am announcing comprehensive revisions to the Department's 
    investigative guidelines.  As revised, the guidelines reflect four 
    overriding principles.
    
    	First, the war against terrorism is the central mission and highest 
    priority of the FBI.  This principle is stated explicitly in the revised 
    guidelines, and it is facilitated and reinforced through many specific 
    reforms.  The guidelines emphasize that the FBI must not be deprived of 
    using all lawful authorized methods in investigations, consistent with the 
    Constitution and statutory authority, to pursue and prevent terrorist actions.
    
    	Second, terrorism prevention is the key objective under the revised 
    guidelines.  Our philosophy today is not to wait and sift through the 
    rubble following a terrorist attack.  Rather, the FBI must intervene early 
    and investigate aggressively where information exists suggesting the 
    possibility of terrorism, so as to prevent acts of terrorism.  The new 
    guidelines advance this strategy of prevention by strengthening 
    investigative authority at the early stage of preliminary inquiries.  Also, 
    even absent specific investigative predicates, FBI agents under the new 
    guidelines are empowered to scour public sources for information on future 
    terrorist threats.
    
    	Third, unnecessary procedural red tape must not interfere with the 
    effective detection, investigation, and prevention of terrorist 
    activities.  To this end, the revised guidelines allow Special Agents in 
    Charge of FBI field offices to approve and renew terrorism enterprise 
    investigations, rather than having to seek and wait for approval from 
    headquarters. I believe this responds to a number of concerns we have heard 
    from our field agents.  The guidelines expand the scope of those 
    investigations to the full range of terrorist activities under the USA 
    Patriot Act.  These major changes will free field agents to counter 
    potential terrorist threats swiftly and vigorously without waiting for 
    headquarters to act.
    
    	Fourth, the FBI must draw proactively on all lawful sources of information 
    to identify terrorist threats and activities.  It cannot meet its paramount 
    responsibility to prevent acts of terrorism if FBI agents are required, as 
    they were in the past, to blind themselves to information that everyone 
    else is free to see.  Under the revised guidelines, the FBI can identify 
    and track foreign terrorists by combining its investigative results with 
    information obtained from other lawful sources, such as foreign 
    intelligence and commercial data services.   To detect and prevent 
    terrorist activities, the FBI under the revised guidelines will also be 
    able to enter and observe public places and forums just as any member of 
    the public might.
    
    	Let me pause here for a moment.  What I am saying is this:  FBI field 
    agents have been inhibited from attending public events, open to any other 
    citizen -  not because they are barred by the U.S. Constitution, or barred 
    any federal law enacted by Congress, but because of the lack of clear 
    authority under administrative guidelines issued decades ago.  Today, I am 
    clarifying that, for the specific purpose of detecting or preventing 
    terrorist activities, FBI field agents may enter public places and attend 
    events open to other citizens, unless they are barred from attending by the 
    Constitution or federal law.
    	Our new guideline reads, "For the purpose of detecting or preventing 
    terrorist activities, the FBI is authorized to visit any place and attend 
    any event that is open to the public, on the same terms and conditions as 
    members of the public generally."
    
    	I believe in the principle of community policing, in which an active, 
    visible law enforcement presence is linked to communities and 
    neighborhoods.  Local police can enter public places and attend public 
    events in their communities, and they detect and prevent crime by doing 
    so.  To protect our communities from terrorism, the FBI must be free to do 
    the same.
    
    	The revised guidelines will take effect immediately and will be 
    incorporated into the training of FBI agents.  These guidelines will also 
    be a resource to inform the American public and demonstrate that we seek to 
    protect life and liberty from terrorism and other criminal violence with a 
    scrupulous respect for civil rights and personal freedoms.  The guidelines 
    are available on the internet at www.usdoj.gov. <http://www.usdoj.gov>
    
    	The campaign against terrorism is a campaign to affirm the values of 
    freedom and human dignity that transcend national boundaries, racial 
    classifications, and religious differences.  Called to the service of our 
    nation, we are called to the defense of liberty for all men and women.  On 
    behalf of the Department of Justice and the people of this great nation, I 
    thank Director Mueller and the FBI for their hard work to defend 
    freedom.  And I thank Deputy Attorney General Larry Thompson, and Assistant 
    Attorneys General Michael Chertoff and Viet Dinh for their efforts in 
    revising the guidelines to honor these values.
    
    # # #
    
    ---
    
    Fact Sheet
    Attorney General's Guidelines:
    Detecting and Preventing Terrorist Attacks
    
    Understanding the Problem:
    Past Investigative Guidelines Have Hampered the FBI
    In Conducting Investigations Capable of Preventing Terrorist Attacks
    
    Problem #1: Emphasis on Prosecuting Past Crimes Instead of Preventing 
    Future Crime
    
    The previous guidelines emphasized investigation and prosecution of past 
    crimes.  They generally barred the FBI from taking the initiative to detect 
    and prevent future crimes, unless it learned of possible criminal activity 
    from external sources.  As a result, the FBI was largely confined to a 
    reactive role.
    
    *	General Internet Searches Could Not Be Conducted, Unless Tied to a 
    Specific Investigation.  In the past, there was no clear basis for 
    conducting online research for counterterrorism purposes-even of publicly 
    available information-except when investigating a specific case.  For 
    example, FBI agents could not conduct online searches to identify websites 
    in which bomb-making instructions or plans for cyberterrorism are openly 
    traded and disseminated.
    
    *	The FBI Had No Clear Authority To Use Commercial Data Services Any 
    Business in America Could Use.  Under previous guidelines, the FBI could 
    not use commercial data mining services-entities that collect and analyze 
    information on various topics, such as threats to computer systems-unless 
    in connection with a particular investigation.  In other words, the FBI was 
    sharply limited in its ability to use services that private businesses 
    regularly hire to assess threats against them.
    
    *	Information Collected in the Earliest Investigative Stages Could Only Be 
    Used to Investigate Specific Crimes, Not Groups Suspected of 
    Terrorism.  Under the old Guidelines, preliminary inquiries-where agents 
    gather information before enough evidence has been uncovered to merit an 
    outright investigation-could be used only to determine whether there was 
    enough evidence to justify investigating an individual crime.  They could 
    not be used to determine whether to open a broader investigation of groups 
    involved in terrorism (i.e., "terrorism enterprise investigations").
    
    *	Investigations of Criminal Groups Were Impeded by Limits on Scope, 
    Duration, and Red Tape.  The previous guidelines impeded the effective use 
    of criminal intelligence investigations (i.e., investigations of criminal 
    enterprises) by imposing limits on the scope of such investigations, short 
    authorization periods, and burdensome approval and renewal requirements.
    
    *	No Clear Authority to Visit Public Places that Are Open to All 
    Americans.  Under the old guidelines, FBI field agents were inhibited from 
    visiting public places, which are open to all other citizens.  Agents 
    avoided them not because they were barred by the Constitution, or any 
    federal statute, but because of the lack of clear authority under 
    administrative guidelines issued decades ago.
    
    Solution #1: Detect and Neutralize Terrorists Before They Attack
    
    The new guidelines reflect the Attorney General's mission for the Justice 
    Department's war on terror: to neutralize terrorists before they are able 
    to strike, not simply to investigate past crimes.  The revised guidelines 
    create new information- and intelligence-gathering authorities to detect 
    terrorist plots, and strengthen existing provisions to promote effective 
    intervention to foil terrorists' plans.
    
    *	Enhancing Information Gathering.  The new guidelines strengthen the FBI's 
    intelligence-gathering capabilities by expressly stating that agents may 
    engage in online research, even when not linked to an individual criminal 
    investigation.  They also authorize the FBI to use commercial data mining 
    services to detect and prevent terrorist attacks, independent of particular 
    criminal investigations.
    
    *	Allowing FBI Field Agents to Use Information Collected in the Earliest 
    Stages To Investigate Groups Suspected of Terrorism.  The FBI will be able 
    to use preliminary inquiries to determine whether to launch investigations 
    of groups involved in terrorism (i.e., "terrorism enterprise 
    investigations").
    
    *	Expanding the Scope and Duration of Investigations, and Easing Red Tape 
    for FBI Field Agents.  The guidelines will expand the scope of criminal 
    intelligence investigations, lengthen their authorization periods, and ease 
    the approval and renewal requirements.  This flexibility enhances the FBI's 
    terrorism-preventing function and helps the agents in the field.
    
    *	Authorizing the FBI to Have Normal Public Access to Public Places.  The 
    new guidelines clarify that FBI field agents may enter any public place 
    that is open to other citizens, unless they are prohibited from doing so by 
    the Constitution or federal statute, for the specific purpose of detecting 
    or preventing terrorist activities.  The guidelines do not, and cannot, 
    nullify any existing Constitutional or statutory duty to obtain judicial 
    approval as required to conduct their surveillance or investigations.
    
    
    Problem #2: FBI Headquarters Was Responsible for Decision-Making, But 
    Lacked the Field Information Needed to Make Sound Decisions
    
    Under the old guidelines, decision-making authority was centralized at FBI 
    headquarters, while field offices were largely responsible for intelligence 
    analysis.  This reversed the proper order: what was centralized 
    (decision-making) should have been devolved, and what was devolved 
    (analysis) should have been centralized.
    
    *	Previous Guidelines Placed Roadblocks in Front of Agents' 
    Investigations.  Before the revisions, FBI field agents were hampered by 
    burdensome rules requiring them to secure headquarters' approval before 
    launching counterterrorism investigative activities.  As a result, field 
    agents lost significant investigative opportunities as they waited for 
    headquarters to consider their requests over a period of weeks, or even months.
    
    *	FBI Headquarters Lacked the Intelligence and Analysis It Needed.  The 
    guidelines contained no clear authority to engage in counterterrorism 
    information gathering and analysis, apart from investigations in particular 
    criminal cases.  FBI headquarters thus lacked the ability to analyze the 
    information necessary to make informed investigative decisions.
    
    Solution #2: Field Offices Are Authorized to Make More Decisions, and FBI 
    Headquarters Will Analyze Information
    
    The revised guidelines enhance FBI headquarters' ability to analyze 
    critical intelligence information, and enable field offices to make more 
    independent investigative decisions.  The revised guidelines centralize 
    what should be centralized (analysis), and devolve what should be devolved 
    (decision-making).
    
    *	Strengthening FBI Headquarters' Intelligence-Gathering and Analysis 
    Capabilities.  The revised guidelines allow the FBI to operate 
    counterterrorism information systems, and to collect and retain information 
    from all lawful sources, including publicly available sources, for that 
    purpose.  They also expressly state that all such activities must be based 
    on a valid law enforcement purpose, and must be consistent with applicable 
    statutes and regulations.  The guidelines prohibit the FBI from using this 
    authority to keep files on citizens on the basis of their constitutionally 
    protected activities.
    
    *	Increasing Decision-Making Authority in the Field.  Special Agents in 
    Charge at FBI field offices may now approve and renew terrorism enterprise 
    investigations.  (Under the old guidelines only by the Director or an 
    Assistant Director at FBI headquarters could approve such 
    investigations.)  The revisions also allow a Special Agent in Charge to 
    authorize for up to a year preliminary inquiries, which are used to gather 
    information about a crime before enough evidence is discovered to justify a 
    full investigation.  (The old guidelines only authorized 90-day preliminary 
    inquires, and required the approval of FBI headquarters for 30-day extensions.)
    
    
    Problem #3: Agents Did Not Use Lawful Investigative Methods When 
    Investigating Some Suspected Terrorists
    
    The old guidelines lacked clear direction to use lawful, authorized methods 
    to prevent terrorism.  As a result, FBI agents have declined to use 
    available investigative techniques when investigating crimes committed by 
    affiliates of some political and religious organizations.
    
    *	The Lack of Clear Authority Frustrated the Sheik Rahman 
    Investigation.  In 1993, the FBI received intelligence information about 
    terrorist activities planned by Sheik Abdel Rahman-who later would be 
    convicted of plotting to bomb landmarks in New York City, including the 
    World Trade Center in 1993.  Because of ambiguity in the then-current 
    guidelines, the FBI did not call Rahman before a grand jury, question him, 
    or conduct surveillance of his offices or the religious buildings where he 
    met with his co-conspirators.
    
    Solution #3: Investigate Suspected Terrorists on a Neutral Basis
    
    The revised guidelines make clear that investigations of suspected 
    terrorists with ties to religious and political organizations will proceed 
    according to the principle of neutrality.  As President Bush has noted, our 
    enemy is not any one faith or creed, but "a radical network of terrorists."
    
    *	Lawful Techniques Can Be Used in All Investigations of Suspected 
    Terrorists.  The new guidelines simply clarify that agents who are 
    investigating suspected terrorists, even if they have ties to religious and 
    political groups, could use the same investigative techniques they would 
    use when investigating any other type of organization.  At no time will 
    religious or political entities be singled out for special scrutiny, but 
    neither will terrorists with ties to such groups be granted effective 
    immunity from lawful investigations.
    
    *	Investigations Can Only Take Place When There Is Evidence of Criminal 
    Activity.  Under the revised guidelines, agents can investigate suspected 
    terrorists with ties to religious or political groups only when they are 
    acting on the basis of information indicating a possibility of actual 
    criminal activity.  All investigative activities must have a legitimate 
    law-enforcement purpose; these new tools do not provide the FBI with the 
    unlimited authority to conduct investigations of any group.
    
    *	Preserving Constitutional and Statutory Limitations.  The work of the FBI 
    remains subject to all applicable constitutional and statutory 
    limitations.  The guidelines do not, and cannot, authorize the FBI to do 
    anything prohibited by the Constitution or federal law.  Instead, they 
    impose restrictions on FBI investigative activities that supplement other 
    legal limits.  The guidelines expressly state that:  "All requirements for 
    the use of such methods under the Constitution, applicable statutes, and 
    Department regulations or policies must, of course, be observed."  [General 
    Investigations Guidelines, Introduction, § C]
    
    *	Protecting Constitutional Rights.  The guidelines stress that the FBI may 
    not use investigative activities as a pretext for suppressing suspects' 
    constitutional rights.  As the guidelines expressly state, "It is important 
    that such investigations not be based solely on activities protected by the 
    First Amendment or on the lawful exercise of any other rights secured by 
    the Constitution or laws of the United States."  (General Investigations 
    Guidelines, May 29, 2002)
    
    
    Maintaining Limitations on Undercover Operations:
    
    The revised guidelines maintain, and in some respects strengthen, the 
    strict and extensive requirements necessary to justify an undercover 
    investigation that involves infiltration of suspected terrorist groups.
    
    Field Agents Continue to Have Extensive Certification Requirements.  When 
    applying to conduct such an undercover operation, FBI agents must, among 
    other things, provide headquarters with:
    1.	A certification that the operation will be conducted with minimal intrusion;
    2.	A statement as to why the undercover operation is necessary;
    3.	A description of the procedures that will be used to minimize the 
    acquisition of information that is not relevant to the investigation; and
    4.	An explanation of how any potential constitutional concerns and any 
    other legal concerns have been addressed.
    
    To secure approval for such an undercover operation, FBI agents must also 
    obtain:
    1.	A letter of concurrence from the appropriate federal prosecutor;
    2.	Review of the proposed operation by the Undercover Review Committee 
    (composed of FBI and Criminal Division personnel);
    3.	Approval of the operation by the FBI Director, Deputy Director, or a 
    designated Executive Assistant Director; and
    4.	Authorization of the undercover operation for a limited period, not to 
    exceed six months.
    
    (General Investigations Guidelines, Part III.B(1)(a), (4); Undercover 
    Operations Guidelines, Part IV.A-B, .C(2)(l), .D, .E(1), .F-G.)
    
    
    
    
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