FC: U.K. plan to create huge biometric database, from RISKS Digest

From: Declan McCullagh (declanat_private)
Date: Tue Jan 07 2003 - 09:34:28 PST

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    Date: Sun, 05 Jan 2003 01:09:40 +0000
    From: Markus Kuhn <Markus.Kuhnat_private>
    Subject: Risks of diverse identification documents
    
    The Home Office is currently running a consultation exercise on the
    introduction of an identity infrastructure for Britain. This would consist
    of a biometric database with basic records of the entire population. Anyone
    in the database would be able to get an identity card, which would
    essentially enable the holder to grant easily read access to his or her
    record to any peer who needs some form of assurance about one's
    identity. Details on the consultation are on
    
       http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/dob/ecu.htm
    
    The system proposed is nothing unusual and quite similar to what most
    European and many Asian countries have used successfully for several
    decades.
    
    Such identity infrastructures are generally widely accepted in these
    countries, where most people consider them today to be a desirable and
    effective protection against what has become known in some countries that
    still lack them as "identity theft".
    
    Nevertheless, there is fierce opposition to the proposals from various
    British privacy advocacy groups. Similar discussions can be observed at the
    moment in the US and Japan.
    
    While much of the opposition is of a somewhat religious/tinfoil-hat nature
    and therefore difficult to address, some of it has been voiced by notable
    computer-security experts and therefore deserves some serious response.
    
    The probably most commonly recurring theme is that the introduction of a
    national identity card would lead to over-reliance on a single document. The
    need to corrupt only the issuing procedures of a single mechanism -- so the
    often expressed concern -- would ultimately make identity theft easier
    rather than harder. This is probably based on the implicit assumption that
    independent identity systems perform independent checks with statistically
    independent failure probabilities. Therefore their security should increase
    exponentially with the number of verification systems and more would be
    better.
    
    Defense-in-depth and its use of multiple diverse security mechanisms is in
    general a feature of sound security engineering. However, applying this
    general idea in the context of government infrastructures against identity
    theft this way is in my opinion horribly wrong and naive for a number of
    reasons, which I'd like to address very briefly.
    
    The most obvious problem is that the UK's present alternative --
    identification based on multiple documents and issuing procedures -- adds
    very little as none of the currently widely available documents is protected
    by controls of desirable strength. This is just illustrated again by recent
    media demonstrations on how easily it is to abuse UK birth certificates:
    
       http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/programmes/kenyon_confronts/2625395.stm
    
    In practice, anyone wishing to verify an identity gets only the *minimal*
    protection of all the ID schemes in common use, because as soon as you break
    one of them, you can quite easily proliferate your fake identity into
    several other systems. Get a fake UK birth certificate (fairly easy) and
    apply with it for a fake UK drivers license (therefore also not much more
    difficult), use both to get a fake UK passport and all three to comfortably
    get fake account access, education degrees, travel documents, security
    clearances, etc. etc.  Most of the existing systems depend on each other,
    which leads easily to circular verification (A thinks B knows I and B thinks
    A knows I).  They all lack the somewhat more expensive direct checks of
    non-document evidence that for example a properly protected distributed
    add-only database of the biometric long-term history of those registered
    could support economically and effectively.
    
    Multiple documents? Unfortunately, the world of fake ID documents currently
    works more like "Buy one, get three more free!" The number of systems
    doesn't count much after all.
    
    But this is not the only reason why it is so crucial to have at least one
    identification scheme that is seriously difficult to break, while having
    more than one of these is unlikely to be worth the cost and hassle.
    
    There is first of all also the problem that within a single infrastructure,
    it is far easier for those in charge of its integrity to verify and ensure
    that the overall policies such as the separation of duties for critical
    checks really leads to checks that are independent by design, and not by
    chance.
    
    Another reason is that the costs for the training/equipment/time/etc.
    necessary for the adequate verification of security documents increases at
    least linearly with the number of different document types accepted. And the
    risk of fraudsters finding by brute-force search one accepted type of
    identification for which a particular verifier is not well prepared to
    recognize comparatively simple fakes increases even exponentially with the
    overall number of different identification forms accepted.
    
    Hence I am not surprised by the desire in the UK government to finally also
    offer its tax payers one single simple cheap properly engineered and run
    identity infrastructure. It is needed to replace all the existing often
    ridiculously weak alternatives (including old birth certificates, old
    driving licenses, magstripe-cards, knowing mother's maiden name or showing a
    laser-printed utility bill) that are all currently used by especially the UK
    financial industry as acceptable means for gaining access to critical
    personal information and property.
    
    Perhaps the discussion should first of all be driven by comparing actual
    practical identity-theft versus privacy-violation statistics in countries
    with and without proper government-provided identification infrastructures,
    instead of naively applying generic security recipes such as
    more-mechanisms-are-better to an application area with far more specific
    properties.
    
    Markus Kuhn, Computer Lab, Univ of Cambridge, GB
    http://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/~mgk25/ 
    
    
    
    
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