-------- Original Message -------- Subject: Re: [Politech] First-hand report of problems with "secure" e-voting Date: Tue, 2 Mar 2004 11:35:00 -0600 From: César I. BENAVIDES C. Organization: eden To: Declan McCullagh <declan@private> Declan: Please remove my e-mail address if you choose to post this message. I'm an election judge for this Primary Election for a precinct in central Texas so I thought I'd pipe in. Fraud and human error are always threats in an electoral process, but I believe that we should be looking at these elections and comparing the respective error rates of electronic and paper systems before we as an electorate determine which system is safer overall. This process of comparison will take time. Personally, I'd prefer to see more of a paper trail associated with eVoting to make the process more accountable, but these are not the concerns brought up by your anonymous reader. At any rate, my county uses a Hart eSlate system instead of the Diebold system your reader describes, but the many of the set-up procedures are similar. Voting machines are typically dropped off at polling sites a day or two before an election (Super Tuesday in the case brought up by your reader in Georgia, I believe). The machines are inoperative for voting purposes until they are set-up and connected to a dedicated computer that the election judge brings with him/her on election day. In the Diebold system, the judge's computer loads "ballots" into the machine at setup, then downloads the results when the polls close. The "zip tie" tags are seals with unique serial numbers that are checked and verified during set-up; any sign of tampering and that particular machine isn't used. I reckon that repairing a broken plastic seal is beyond the abilities of most meddlers. The provisional voting box your reader mentions holds supplies for a paper-based voting system (electronic in some jurisdictions) meant to allow people who aren't listed on the voter rolls to vote anyway. A provisional ballot is counted later if and only if the voter is found to be eligible after the appropriate election official researches the matter. This is a procedure designed to prevent the problems that came up when voters complained of being disenfranchised during the last presidential election in Florida. The other box your reader mentions likely holds supplies for the election judges such as tape, pens, and forms needed by the judges to handle contingencies. Here is a link to a recent position paper on voting systems in Georgia that addresses electronic voting security issues in that state in more detail: http://www.commoncause.org/states/georgia/evs.htm Here is a link to the text of the Help America Vote Act of 2002 (HAVA) which addresses some of the issues brought up by your reader: http://vote.nist.gov/hr3295.pl107252.final.pdf Here is a link to a site with general eVoting information and related links to useful position papers: http://vote.nist.gov/index.html -c _______________________________________________ Politech mailing list Archived at http://www.politechbot.com/ Moderated by Declan McCullagh (http://www.mccullagh.org/)
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