[Politech] Judge dismisses John Gilmore's ID-required lawsuit [priv]

From: Declan McCullagh (declan@private)
Date: Mon Mar 29 2004 - 10:25:29 PST

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    GILMORE v. ASHCROFT
    
    JOHN GILMORE, Plaintiff, v. JOHN ASHCROFT, in his official capacity as 
    Attorney General of the United States; ROBERT MUELLER, in his official 
    capacity as Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation; NORMAN 
    MINETA, in his official capacity as Secretary of Transportation; MARION 
    C. BLAKEY, as Administrator of the Federal Aviation Administration; 
    Admiral JAMES M. LOY, in his official capacity as Acting Undersecretary 
    of Transportation for Security; TOM RIDGE, in his official capacity as 
    Chief of the Office of Homeland Security; UAL CORPORATION, aka UNITED 
    AIRLINES; and DOES I-XXX, Defendants.
    
    No. C 02-3444 SI
    
    UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
    
    March 19, 2004, Decided
    March 23, 2004, Filed
    
    ...
    
    Defendants have moved to dismiss plaintiff's complaint for failure to 
    state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Having carefully 
    considered the arguments of the parties and the papers submitted, the 
    Court GRANTS the motions to dismiss n1 and DENIES plaintiff's request 
    for judicial notice.
    
    ...
    
    BACKGROUND
    
    Plaintiff John Gilmore is a California resident who is suing the United 
    States n2 and Southwest Airlines for refusing to allow him to board an 
    airplane on July 4, 2002 without either displaying a government-issued 
    identification consenting to a search. Plaintiff alleges that these 
    security requirements imposed by the United States government and 
    effected by the airline companies violate several of his constitutional 
    rights, including his rights under the First and Fourth Amendments. n3
    
    ...
    
    LEGAL STANDARD
    
    The Court may dismiss a complaint when it is not based on a cognizable 
    legal theory or pleads insufficient facts to support a cognizable legal 
    claim. Smilecare Dental Group v. Delta Dental Plan, 88 F.3d 780, 783 
    (9th Cir. 1996).
    
    DISCUSSION
    
    Plaintiff's complaint alleges that as a result of the requirement that 
    passengers traveling on planes show identification and his unwillingness 
    to comply with this requirement, he has been unable to travel by air 
    since September 11, 2001. Plaintiff's complaint asserts causes of action 
    challenging the apparent government policy that requires travelers 
    either to show identification or to consent to a search which involves 
    wanding, walking through a magnetometer or a light pat-down. Whether 
    this is actually the government's policy is unclear, as the policy, if 
    it exists, is unpublished. However, this Court for the purpose [*6]  of 
    evaluating plaintiff's complaint, assumes such a policy does exist, and 
    reviews plaintiff's complaint accordingly.
    
    Plaintiff asserts the unconstitutionality of this policy on the 
    following grounds: vagueness in violation of the Due Process Clause; 
    violation of the right to be free from unreasonable searches and 
    seizures; violation of the right to freedom of association; and 
    violation of the right to petition the government for redress of grievances.
    
    The federal defendants and airline defendant both brought motions to 
    dismiss. As plaintiffs' claims are common to both sets of defendants, 
    this Court treats them collectively. While there are questions about the 
    private defendant's liability as a state actor and about the federal 
    defendants' liability for the private defendant's actions, as this Court 
    has not found plaintiff's complaint to have alleged a constitutional 
    violation, those issues need not be addressed at this time.
    
    ...
    
    1. Standing
    
    As a preliminary matter, the federal defendants have objected to all of 
    plaintiff's claims other than plaintiff's challenges to the 
    identification requirement. It is unclear from plaintiff's complaint 
    whether he intended to plead any [*7]  other claims, but he did allude 
    to the "government's plan to create huge, integrated databases by 
    mingling criminal histories with credit records, previous travel history 
    and much more, in order to create dossiers on every traveling citizen," 
    including creation of "no fly" watchlists. Complaint, P8. He pointed to 
    newspaper and magazine articles and internet websites describing various 
    activities and directives issued by various federal agencies, including 
    the increased use of the Consumer Assisted Passenger Prescreening System 
    ("CAPPS") in the wake of the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001. 
    Complaint, PP35-50.
    
    The federal defendants argue that "as a threshold matter, plaintiff has 
    standing in this action solely insofar as he challenges an alleged 
    federally-imposed requirement that airlines request identification as 
    part of the screening process at airports. The complaint is devoid of 
    any allegation that plaintiff personally has suffered any injury that is 
    fairly traceable to any other practice, procedure, or criterion that may 
    be used by any defendant in screening airline passengers for weapons and 
    explosives." Motion to Dismiss at 2:21-25.
    
    ...
    
    Accordingly, to the extent that plaintiff pleads causes of action beyond 
    those stemming from the identification requirement, those causes of 
    action are DISMISSED for lack of standing or jurisdiction.
    
    2. Plaintiff's First Cause of Action: violation of the Due Process Clause
    
    Plaintiff alleges that the identification requirement is 
    "unconstitutionally vague in violation of the Due Process Clause of the 
    Fifth Amendment because it is vague, being unpublished, and thus 
    provides no way for ordinary people or reviewing courts to conclusively 
    determine what is legal." Complaint, P52. This claim directly attacks 
    the policy, regulation, order or directive requiring production of 
    identification at airports.
    
    In this case, the federal defendants refuse to [*10]  concede whether a 
    written order or directive requiring identification exists, or if it 
    does, who issued it or what it says. They contend, however, that to the 
    extent this action challenges an order issued by the TSA or the FAA, 49 
    U.S.C. § 46110(a) vests exclusive jurisdiction in the Courts of Appeals 
    to decide the challenge.
    
    ...
    
    Because this claim squarely attacks the orders or regulations issued by 
    the TSA and/or the FAA with respect to airport security, this Court does 
    not have jurisdiction to hear the challenge. As a corollary, without 
    having been provided a copy of this unpublished statute or regulation, 
    if it exists, the Court is unable to conduct any meaningful inquiry as 
    to the merits of plaintiff's vagueness argument. This argument would 
    better be addressed to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals or to the 
    Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, both of which 
    have jurisdiction to review these matters.
    
    3. Plaintiff's Second Cause of Action: violation of the Fourth Amendment 
    right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures
    
    ...
    
    In plaintiffs' case, he was not required to provide identification on 
    pain of criminal or other governmental sanction. Identification requests 
    unaccompanied by detention, arrest, or any other penalty, other than the 
    significant inconvenience of being unable to fly, do not amount to a 
    seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. Plaintiff has not 
    suggested that he felt that he was not free to leave when he was asked 
    to produce [*15]  identification. None of the facts submitted by 
    plaintiff suggests that the request for identification implicated 
    plaintiff's Fourth Amendment rights. Therefore, plaintiff's claim that 
    the identification requirement is unreasonable does not raise a legal 
    dispute that this Court must decide.
    
    ...
    
    
    3. Plaintiff's Third and Fourth Causes of Action: violation of the right 
    to travel protected by the Due Process Clause
    
    ...
    
    However, plaintiff's allegation that his right to travel has been 
    violated is insufficient as a matter of law because the Constitution 
    does not guarantee the right to travel by any particular form of 
    transportation. Miller v. Reed, 176 F.3d 1202, 1205 (9th Cir. 1999) 
    ("Burdens on a single mode of transportation do not implicate the right 
    to interstate travel."); Monarch Travel Serv. Assoc. Cultural Clubs, 
    Inc., 466 F.2d 55 2(9th Cir. 1972). The right to travel throughout the 
    United States confers a right to be "uninhibited by statutes, rules and 
    regulations which unreasonably burden or restrict this movement." Saenz 
    v. Roe, 526 U.S. 486, 499 (9th Cir. 1973). This Court rejects 
    plaintiff's argument that the request [*20]  that plaintiff either 
    submit to search, present identification, or presumably use another mode 
    of transport, is a violation of plaintiff's constitutional right to travel.
    
    ...
    
    4. Plaintiff's Fourth Cause of Action: violation of the right to freedom 
    of association protected by the First and Fifth Amendments
    
    Plaintiff's allegation that his right to associate freely was violated 
    fails because the only actions which violate this right are those which 
    are "direct and substantial or significant." Storm v. Town of Woodstock, 
    944 F. Supp. 139, 144 (N.D. N.Y. 1996). Government action which only 
    indirectly affects associational rights is not sufficient to state a 
    claim for violation of the freedom to associate. To the extent that 
    plaintiff alleged plans to exercise his associational rights in 
    Washington, D.C., the Court finds that plaintiff's rights were not 
    violated as plaintiff had numerous other methods of reaching Washington.
    
    ...
    
    
    For the foregoing reasons, plaintiff's complaint is dismissed. 
    Plaintiff's claims against the federal defendants and Southwest Airlines 
    are dismissed with prejudice; plaintiff's claims against United Airlines 
    are dismissed without prejudice. Plaintiff's request for judicial notice 
    is denied. [Docket ## 6, 8, 10, 22, 28].
    
    IT IS SO ORDERED.
    
    Dated: March 19, 2004
    
    SUSAN ILLSTON
    
    United States District Judge
    
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