-------- Original Message -------- Subject: the new Internet voting scheme Date: Wed, 25 Oct 2006 10:26:53 -0700 From: Barbara Simons <simons@private> To: Declan McCullagh CC: info@private Dear Declan, PLEASE CIRCULATE: My colleagues David Jefferson, Avi Rubin, David Wagner and I have just released a short paper about the government's IVAS system that involves absentee voting using email and fax and ballot distribution over the Internet. See http://servesecurityreport.org/ivas.pdf We wanted to bring this to your attention because we believe this system poses significant risks, as described in this excerpt from our article: In summary, we see three main risks: 1. Tool One exposes soldiers to risks of identity theft. Sending personally identifiable information via unencrypted email is considered poor practice. No bank would ask their customers to send SSNs over unencrypted email, yet Tool One does exactly that. This problem is exacerbated by potential phishing attacks. 2. Returning voted ballots by email or fax creates an opportunity for hackers, foreign governments, or other parties to tamper with those ballots while they are in transit. FVAP's system does not include any meaningful protection against the risk of ballot modification. 3. Ballots returned by email or fax may be handled by the DoD in some cases. Those overseas voters using the system sign a waiver of their right to a secret ballot. However, it is one thing for a voter's ballot to be sent directly to their local election official; it is another for a soldier's ballot to be sent to and handled by the DoD – who is, after all, the soldier's employer. Regards, Barbara Simons _______________________________________________ Politech mailing list Archived at http://www.politechbot.com/ Moderated by Declan McCullagh (http://www.mccullagh.org/)
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