Re: PGP scripting...

From: Frank Knobbe (fknobbeat_private)
Date: Tue Jan 07 2003 - 18:19:42 PST

  • Next message: Brian Hatch: "Re: PGP scripting..."

    On Tue, 2003-01-07 at 14:19, Valdis.Kletnieksat_private wrote:
    
    > Simple answer:  "GAME OVER".
    > 
    > Detailed answer:  If the system is compromised, they have all the data they
    > need to get all the data.  The only way to "fix" this is to have a "pgp daemon"
    > that needs to be started by hand so you can give it the passphrase.
    
    
    Is that really so? (I'm using your reply for the nice summary, but it
    applies to other's as well).
    
    Assuming a PGP encryption to itself is performed, then I agree. But
    shouldn't it be possible to encrypt to a key which does not reside on
    the encrypting computer? Once could leave only the recipients public key
    and the batch process' private on this system and encrypt to the
    recipient, then move the data out. At this point the data can not be
    decrypted since we don't have the recipients secret key. Not having the
    process' public key will prevent the encryption-to-self issue.
    
    The data at its other location can then be decrypted with the recipients
    secret keys and the encrypting process' public key.
    
    So once the data has been encrypted on that box, the statement "If the
    system is compromised, they have all the data they
    > need to get all the data." is not true since all they can get is the encrypted data.
    
    Or did I miss the benefits of public key crypto-systems here and I'm way
    off?
    
    Regards,
    Frank
    
    
    
    



    This archive was generated by hypermail 2b30 : Tue Jan 07 2003 - 18:31:41 PST