RE: PGP scripting...

From: Glenn_Everhartat_private
Date: Wed Jan 08 2003 - 11:39:30 PST

  • Next message: Mark Reardon: "Re: RE: PGP scripting..."

    This whole thing sounds like it could have ben approached as usefully
    with an encrypting disk. That kind of thing can be somewhat safer than
    having data in the clear, but what it protects against is mainly the
    data if someone steals the disk, if you are a criminal enterprise and 
    want not to have your data readable if you are raided, if you have
    a privileged user who you distrust who might access the system when
    it is unused otherwise, or might access backups. 
    
    Those are the main things encrypting on disk data, where it is to be
    r/w accessed by normal users, are good for. It can be terribly costly
    in performance and as long as the system is running and merrily
    decrypting data for anyone trying to read it, the encryption is 
    USELESS apart from guarding you from the times after hours, or letting
    The Law pull the plug and thereby leaving the data all safe from prying
    eyes. 
    
    For laptops or cases where data is to be accessed by one person, on
    disk encryption can be highly useful. The more people that need access,
    the less useful it is, because keys tend to have to be left in place
    and access is in effect controlled by the system ACLs and so on, and the
    encryption only wastes time and processor power (in huge chunks!).
    
    You can obscure key setup and make it harder for someone to steal the
    online keys in many ways. That might help against some adversaries.
    In general you cannot block access.
    
    Sounds to me like the consultant here heard somewhere that encryption is
    good for access control, heard that PGP is a good encryption product,
    and
    came up with recommendations based on minimal understanding. Since there
    are commercial products I have seen that claim they are helping you by
    providing things like network attached disks that automatically encrypt
    all contents on write/decrypt on read (so they get to act like regular
    disks,
    only slower and way more expensive) evidently this kind of
    misinformation
    is common.
    
    Perhaps the managers in this company will be interested to hear that the
    security solution they are imposing is mainly useful in protecting them
    if
    they are worried about raids from the police. Such a tidbit might
    possibly
    shock them into thinking about what their threat model is.
    
    Glenn Everhart
    
    
    -----Original Message-----
    From: Andrew MacKenzie [mailto:amackenzat_private]
    Sent: Wednesday, January 08, 2003 2:23 PM
    To: Chris Matthews
    Cc: 'Frank Knobbe'; secprogat_private
    Subject: Re: PGP scripting...
    
    
    > I believe the original question involved more of a dynamic
    modification
    > of data on the machine's harddrive.  If this is the case, and
    automatic
    > encryption/decryption would require the public/private keys.
    Actually, modification of the data isn't necessarily a large concern, so
    much as an intruder viewing the data.  I actually hadn't quite thought
    of
    an intruder modifying the data though.  But, since we are not only
    encrypting the data, but signing it as well (I hadn't mentioned that)
    then
    perhaps we are covered for that?
    
    > Which key is being used to encrypt the data? If the public key is
    being
    > used (and bear with me; my pgp theory is foggy this morning :), then
    > technically anyone that has that public key can corrupt your encrypted
    > data.  If the private key was used, then anyone with the public key
    can
    > easily decrypt it.  This means that both keys need to be kept
    "secret",
    > or am I mistaken on this?
    Encrypting with public key, signing with private.
    
    > Perhaps you should propose to your client a reevaluation of what
    exactly
    > you're trying to protect and then try to find an encryption solution
    > that more closely matches your requirements.
    This is the difficult part (imho).  The client (like many) doesn't
    always
    know just what they want, just that they want things secure.  From who?
    Why?  How?  They're not sure.  They have another security consultant who
    is
    supposedly determining these (and I don't get insight into this).
    
    -- 
    // Andrew MacKenzie  |  http://www.edespot.com
    // perl -e 'print
    $i=pack(c5,(41*2),sqrt(7056),(unpack(c,H)-2),oct(115),10);'
    
    
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