Re: Comcast man-in-the-middle attack

From: jon schatz (jonat_private)
Date: Fri Feb 08 2002 - 10:42:23 PST

  • Next message: J Edgar Hoover: "Re: Comcast man-in-the-middle attack"

    On Thu, 2002-02-07 at 20:33, J Edgar Hoover wrote:
    > This allows them to not only log all http requests, but to also log the
    > response. Apparently they aren't using it to maximize bandwidth, because it's not
    > configured to serve cached data.
    
    How do you know that it's not configured to serve up cached content?
    
    > And yes, they have purchased a lot of the specific, unique hardware that
    > is required to do all this logging.
    
    Once again, where's your inside knowledge of this?
    
    > If a comcast victim/customer sends a packet to port 80 at any IP address,
    > it is intercepted by the Inktomi Traffic-Server, the contents of the
    > packet are examined for the GET url and the "Host:" field. The Inktomi
    > Traffic-Server then sends the http request on to your destination from
    > it's address with modified content and headers. It then caches the
    > returned data, changes both the header and the content, and sends the
    > packet to your machine with the spoofed IP of the server you had
    > requested.
    
    This is standard behavior for a transparent web proxy. Nothing new here.
    These have been around for a while, and Inktomi is not the only company
    to deploy one. Hell, you can do this with squid and ipchains:
    
    http://www.linuxpowered.com/archive/mini/TransparentProxy.html#toc5
    
    > This allows them to monitor and change (or insert ads into) what
    > you read.
    
    It most certainly does. How do you know that they aren't already? They
    probably aren't though, because as of 6 months ago, none of the major
    players had the ability to insert content into requests. (more on this
    later). 
    
    > Interestingly, regardless of what IP you address the packet to, the
    > Inktomi Traffic-Server reads the Host: field to determine where to send
    > the packet. 
    
    Once again, standard behavior for a proxy request. Most (if not all)
    proxies are dependant on a partial HTTP/1.1. implementation, and without
    the host header, all would be lost...
    
    > US Code TITLE 18, PART I, CHAPTER 119, Sec. 2511. (2) (a) (i)
    > "...a provider of wire communication service to the public shall not
    > utilize service observing or random monitoring except for mechanical or
    > service quality control checks."
    
    AFAIK, this isn't snooping. I don't see the big deal. Most dialup users
    are surfing transparently through a cache; the next big thing is
    supposedly edge appliances that do this as a feature. 
    
    Disclaimer: I do have inside knowledge. Not of Inktomi, but of a former
    employer who manufactured a multi protocol transparent proxy capable of
    real-time modification of content. It was pretty sweet technology.
    
    > Does federal law only apply when a little guy snoops on a big  
    > corporation? Where are the feds now?
    
    They're monitoring this whole exchange through the carnivore they
    installed at mae-[east|central|west] :-)
    
    -jon
    
    -- 
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