Re: Re: ssh trojaned

From: Nick Lange (nicklangeat_private)
Date: Mon Aug 05 2002 - 07:02:38 PDT

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    Ok, a weekend late [ I forgot to send this]...
    
    once again, forcing a web of trust on the code we deploy anyways...
    so we can either take up Signature authorities for files on the net [Which I
    don't like... as this is only the first real case of poisoned files on a big
    distro]
    OR
    have MD5 Sums from multiple locations pulled and then an average presented
    to the user, assuming that these locations wouldn't be updated as fast
    [perhaps forcing a 1-2 day delay on updating any sums for a given mirror
    except for new entries?] we can increase the probability that a release can
    be trusted slightly...
    or perhaps, if I am mirror A have a watchdog script compare my md5 sum to
    every other md5 sum accross the mirrors, and take some action should the
    ratio of unmatching MD5's falls below a certain percentage...
    or something like that.
    Do scripts like that exist already?
    Cheers,
    nick
    ----- Original Message -----
    From: <wozzat_private>
    To: "Eirik Seim" <defaultat_private>
    Cc: <vuln-devat_private>; "Steve Wright" <stevewat_private>
    Sent: Friday, August 02, 2002 1:20 PM
    Subject: Re: Re: ssh trojaned
    
    
    >
    > -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
    > Hash: SHA1
    >
    > Of course, verifying checksums does you no good if the checksums have been
    replaced along with the binary.  Be sure to aquire your checksums from some
    other, presumably safe, location.
    >
    > On Thu, 1 Aug 2002 22:41:39 +0200 (CEST), Eirik Seim <defaultat_private>
    wrote:
    >
    > >
    > >Oh, and the guys that inserted the trojan might easily had access to more
    > >on the same ftp site, and subsequently also its mirrors.  If you don't
    > >usually verify checksums, now is a great time to start doing so.
    > >
    > >
    > >- Eirik
    > >--
    > >New and exciting signature!
    > >
    > >
    > >
    >
    > -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
    > Version: Hush 2.1
    > Note: This signature can be verified at https://www.hushtools.com
    >
    > wlsEARECABsFAj1KzbEUHHdvenpAMHhkZWFkYmVlZi5vcmcACgkQ1vK8vFo3sjzZEQCf
    > YpqiXaafmDfMuhErWoaJ/u86csgAoLvBK8uxMoIDpfZdfOwBrwdnRRYD
    > =EoUt
    > -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
    >
    



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