[VulnWatch] iDEFENSE Security Advisory: iSCSI Default Configuration File Settings

From: David Endler (dendlerat_private)
Date: Thu Aug 08 2002 - 01:27:40 PDT

  • Next message: David Endler: "iDEFENSE Security Advisory: iSCSI Default Configuration File Settings"

    iDEFENSE Security Advisory 08.08.2002 
    iSCSI Default Configuration File Settings
    
    
    DESCRIPTION 
    
    iSCSI is a popular new protocol that allows the SCSI protocol 
    to be used over traditional IP networks. This allows for SAN 
    like storage arrays without requiring new network 
    infrastructure. iSCSI’s primary authentication mechanism for 
    users is the CHAP protocol (Challenge Handshake Authentication 
    Protocol), which is very resilient against replay attacks and 
    provides strong protection for the user’s password. The CHAP 
    protocol requires the user’s password to connect, and in order 
    to automate this process the user must provide the cleartext 
    password to the system that is then stored, typically in 
    cleartext, so that it will be accessible when needed. Care 
    must be taken to ensure configuration files containing the 
    cleartext password are properly protected.  For more 
    information on the CHAP protocol please see RFC 1994. 
    
    The primary iSCSI implementation for Linux, “Linux-iSCSI” is a 
    freely available software package primarily maintained by 
    Cisco Systems. This package stores it primary configuration 
    directives in the file:
    
    /etc/iscsi.conf
    
    This file is created world writeable by default and no mention 
    is made in the file of the importance of protecting it from 
    being read by attackers. At least one vendor has shipped this 
    file world readable in the default configuration of a beta 
    release of an operating system, when notified they stated it 
    would be fixed in the release version of the operating system.
    
    ANALYSIS
    
    Any authentication systems that require cleartext passwords to 
    be stored should be carefully audited to ensure that passwords 
    are properly protected. This problem can also potentially 
    affect numerous packages, ranging from NTP and BIND to iSCSI 
    all of which require stored passwords or secrets. 
    
    DETECTION
    
    Check the permissions on the file:
    
    /etc/iscsi.conf
    
    The file should be owned by the user and group root, and only 
    the root user should be granted read and write access to the 
    file, all other permissions should be removed (i.e. file 
    permissions should be 0400) 
    
    VENDOR RESPONSE
    
    Red Hat has confirmed that the file /etc/iscsi.conf was set 
    world readable in the Limbo Beta, and that it will be fixed in 
    the next release version of Red Hat Linux. SuSE has confirmed 
    that the file permissions are set correctly on 
    /etc/iscsi.conf. No other major Linux vendors appear to be 
    shipping the iSCSI package yet. 
    
    DISCOVERY CREDIT
    
    Kurt Seifried (kurtat_private)
    
    DISCLOSURE TIMELINE
    
    July 11, 2002:	Problem found on Red Hat Linux Limbo Beta #1
    		      Initial contacts sent to Red Hat, SuSE and Cisco
    
    July 12, 2002:	SuSE confirms file mode 600 by default, not 
    vulnerable
    Email sent to Matthew Franz at Cisco, additional Cisco 
    employees also contacted, iSCSI for Linux is an external 
    project at Cisco, PSIRT was not used, no response ever 
    received. 
    
    July 17, 2002:   iDEFENSE client disclosure
    
    July 29, 20022:  Problem confirmed in Red Hat Limbo Beta #2, 
    Red Hat contacted again, no response received. 
    
    August 6, 2002:  No update of Linux iSCSI, nor mention of 
    problem on website. 
    
    August 8, 2002:  Public Advisory
    
    
    http://www.idefense.com/contributor.html
    
    David Endler, CISSP
    Director, Technical Intelligence
    iDEFENSE, Inc.
    14151 Newbrook Drive
    Suite 100
    Chantilly, VA 20151
    voice: 703-344-2632
    fax: 703-961-1071
    
    dendlerat_private
    www.idefense.com
    



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