Richard Masoner wrote: >Part of covert channel detection, for example, might >be flagging a user who copies text from an X window >and pastes that text into an X window that's at a >lower privilege level. I wouldn't call that a covert channel; I'd call that an overt channel. It's just a violation of an information flow style mandatory access control policy, and not all such violations are covert channels. (Now if you described a Trojan horse X app leaking text to another program on the same machine by banging hard on the X server with lots of requests for a second to send a 1 bit or going idle for a second to send a 0 bit, that would indeed be a covert channel. Trying to stop the latter example is probably futile.)
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