[ISN] Microsoft Security Bulletin (MS98-009)

From: mea culpa (jerichot_private)
Date: Mon Jul 27 1998 - 20:36:43 PDT

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    [Moderator: For those who missed it, Microsoft is now releasing their
     own advisories. http://www.microsoft.com/security is where you can
     sign up to receive them. Aleph1 also forwards these to Bugtraq.
    
     I have this funny feeling that they will pass up CERT and CIAC
     in the amount of advisories. :) ]
    
    ---------- Forwarded message ----------
    From: Microsoft Product Security Response Team <securet_private>
    To: MICROSOFT_SECURITYt_private
    Date: Mon, 27 Jul 1998 20:28:44 -0700
    Subject: Microsoft Security Bulletin (MS98-009)
    
    Microsoft Security Bulletin (MS98-009)
    --------------------------------------
    
    Update Available for Windows NT Privilege Elevation attack
    
    Last Revision: July 27, 1998
    
    Summary
    =======
    Recently Microsoft was notified by Mark Joseph Edwards
    (http://www.ntshop.net) of a Privilege Elevation vulnerability on
    Microsoft(r) Windows NT(r). A program called sechole.exe written by Prasad
    Dabak, Sandeep Phadke and Milind Borate (psdabakt_private,
    sandeepsandeept_private and milindt_private) exploits this
    vulnerability, and was published on the Internet. Sechole.exe performs a
    sophisticated set of steps to allow a non-administrative user who is logged
    on locally (at the console) of a system to gain debug level access on a
    system process. Using this program, the non-administrative user is able to
    run arbitrary code in the system security context and thereby grant
    themselves local administrative privileges on the local system.
    
    The purpose of this bulletin is to inform Microsoft customers of this issue,
    its applicability to Microsoft products, and the availability of
    countermeasures Microsoft has developed to further secure its customers.
    
    Issue
    =====
    This exploit can potentially allow a non-administrative user to gain local
    administrative access to the system and thereby elevate their privileges on
    the system. In order to perform this attack the user has to have a valid
    local account on the system and be able to run arbitrary code on the system.
    Normally this means they must have physical access to the computer in order
    to login in locally to the system.
    
    Sensitive systems such as the Windows NT Domain Controllers where
    non-administrative users do not have any local log on rights by default are
    not susceptible to this threat. The attack cannot be used over the network
    get domain administrative privileges remotely.
    
    Specific Details
    ================
    In this attack, a non-administrative user obtains administrative access to
    the system by virtue of being able to gain debug level access on a system
    process. Specifically, the exploit program does the following:
    
       * Locates the memory address of a particular API function
       used by the DebugActiveProcess function.
    
       * Modifies the instructions at that address to return success
       in a failure case.
    
       * Iterates through the processes running as local system,
       calling DebugActiveProcess on each until a successful attach
       is performed. The server side component of DebugActiveProcess
       does not correctly check for valid access to the target process.
    
       * Creates a thread in the victim process that runs code from an
       accompanying DLL This thread will add the user running the program
       to the local administrators group.
    
    The hotfixes listed below ensure that the access check to grant any rights
    is done correctly by the server.
    
    Affected Software Versions
    ==========================
       * Windows NT Workstation versions 3.51 and 4.0
       * Windows NT Server versions 3.51 and 4.0
       * Windows NT Server 4.0 Terminal Server Edition
    
    What Microsoft is Doing
    =======================
    Microsoft has posted hotfixes to address this problem.  NOTE: The URLs in
    the following section have been wrapped for readability.
    
       * Fix for Microsoft Windows NT 4.0 x86 version -
       ftp://ftp.microsoft.com/bussys/winnt/winnt-public/
       fixes/usa/nt40/hotfixes-postSP3/priv-fix/privfixi.exe
    
       * Fix for Microsoft Windows NT 4.0 Alpha version -
       ftp://ftp.microsoft.com/bussys/winnt/winnt-public/
       fixes/usa/nt40/hotfixes-postSP3/priv-fix/privfixa.exe
    
       * Fix for Microsoft Windows NT 3.51 - This fix will be released
       shortly. When it is available, http://www.microsoft.com/security
       will carry an announcement that provides the location of the fix.
    
       * Fix for Microsoft Windows NT Server 4.0 Terminal Server Edition -
       This fix will be released shortly. When it is available,
       http://www.microsoft.com/security will carry an announcement that
       provides the location of the fix.
    
    What customers should do
    ========================
    Microsoft highly recommends that customers using Windows NT operating
    systems immediately apply the appropriate hotfixes to their systems.
    
    More Information
    ================
    Please see the following references for more information related to this
    issue.
       * Microsoft Security Bulletin 98-009, Update Available for
       Windows NT Privilege Elevation attack (the Web posted version of this
       bulletin), http://www.microsoft.com/security/bulletins/ms98-009.htm
    
       * Microsoft Knowledge Base article Q190288, SecHole lets
       Non-administrative Users Gain Debug Level Access
       http://support.microsoft.com/support/kb/articles/q190/2/88.asp.
       This article will be posted on 30 July; in the meantime,
       it can be downloaded from ftp://ftp.microsoft.com/bussys/winnt/
       winnt-public/fixes/usa/NT40/hotfixes-postSP3/priv-fix/Q190288.txt
       NOTE: The above URL has been wrapped for readability.
    
    Revisions
    =========
       * July 27, 1998: Bulletin Created
    
    For additional security-related information about Microsoft products, please
    visit http://www.microsoft.com/security
    
    THE INFORMATION PROVIDED IN THE MICROSOFT KNOWLEDGE BASE IS PROVIDED "AS IS"
    WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. MICROSOFT DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES, EITHER
    EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING THE WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS
    FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. IN NO EVENT SHALL MICROSOFT CORPORATION OR ITS
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    POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGES. SOME STATES DO NOT ALLOW THE EXCLUSION OR
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    FOREGOING LIMITATION MAY NOT APPLY.
    
    (c) 1998 Microsoft and/or its suppliers. All rights reserved.
    For Terms of Use see http://support.microsoft.com/support/misc/cpyright.asp.
    
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