Re: [IWAR] RETHINKING DEFENSE - Revision to 2 MRC Doctrine

From: Rosenthal (rosenthal_annat_private)
Date: Wed Dec 17 1997 - 08:38:24 PST

  • Next message: David Platten: "Re: [IWAR] RETHINKING DEFENSE - Revision to 2 MRC Doctrine"

    Not asking questions is ignorant; questions never are.  International
    conflict resolution is increasingly complex with the near-nation-state
    status of multinational corporations and the influence of economic
    variables on internal politics.  Certainly scholars study diplomacy if they
    study international conflict resolution, along with a whole arsenal of
    rhetorical weapons.  We are in the age of information warfare, which does
    not preclude the use of force but does entail getting others to do the
    fighting amongst themselves or local rivals.
    I don't know how old you are, but you sound young.  My reaction to the
    article up until about age 35 would probably have been similar to yours. 
    Now, after 30 years experience with and study of the art of warfare, I just
    think:  "Another set of army bureaucrats trying to stand out from the
    crowd; another set of _new_ visions for the military."  
    By asking your question, you are insuring the continued attention to
    Ann Rosenthal
    > From: Mark Hedges <hedgesat_private>
    > To: iwarat_private
    > Subject: Re: [IWAR] RETHINKING DEFENSE - Revision to 2 MRC Doctrine
    > Date: Tuesday, December 16, 1997 5:28 PM
    > I have perhaps an ignorant question, if you will bear with me. Does
    > study diplomacy anymore, or was diplomacy abandoned with the relegation
    > the entire world to continuous battle, along with moral questioning?
    > Certainly, the United States should be able to defend its homeland
    > aggressors, but does anyone ever question why the rest of the world
    > sometimes seems to be so angered with America's conduct?
    > As America should be able to defend its homeland against aggressors, so
    > should she recognize and take responsibility for her own recent and
    > contemporary place as an aggressor Grenada, Panama, Iraq, El
    > Salvador, Korea, Vietnam, and so on. This, I hope, is something
    > for change in the "Army After Next". 
    > Justice -- Pallas Athena -- leads the military, in ideal. Her balanced
    > rationality and skillful art of warfare commands over the fierce fire of
    > Ares, symbol of destructive, violent warfare. Ares' purpose lies in his
    > acts themselves. Athena's purpose is far greater.
    > One must ask why, in all those beautiful statues, Athena is blindfolded.
    > Should she lack her sight of the enemy she fights -- injustice -- even if
    > injustice works within the ranks of her own officers?
    > In my humble opinion, Justice' blindfold should be removed.
    > Mark Hedges
    > On Tue, 16 Dec 1997, G. Mark Hardy wrote:
    > >RETHINKING DEFENSE. A Congressionally-chartered National Defense Panel
    > >(NDP) said in a report released 1 December, that the longstanding
    > >Pentagon policy of preparing to fight two major regional wars at the
    > >same time will soon be outdated and has become an excuse for maintaining
    > >existing force structure.  The panel, consisting of private-sector
    > >experts, said the Pentagon should be moving faster to prepare for the
    > >likely threats to national security in the 21st century.  Senators Dan
    > >Coats (R-IN), Joseph Lieberman (D-CT), and Charles Robb (D-VA), who
    > >sponsored the 1996 legislation calling for the panel's review, praised
    > >the report.
    > >
    > >Following are selected highlights (not a summary) of the NDP report.
    > >Complete report can be found at the following web site:
    > >
    > >
    > >OVERALL
    > >*  Put more emphasis on experimentation with weapons and military
    > >concepts.
    > >*  Permit more base closings.
    > >*  Services should share facilities.
    > >*  Concentrate less on preparing for large-scale warfare overseas.
    > >*  Focus more on protecting the U.S. from unconventional attacks by
    > >hostile forces with access to weapons of mass destruction.
    > >
    > >*  Under no circumstances should we reduce the quality or training of
    > >our people.
    > >*  Reserve and Guard units must be prepared and resourced for use in a
    > >variety of ongoing worldwide operations.
    > >*  Shared operational and training experiences, common educational
    > >opportunities, and frequent exchange of leaders among active and reserve
    > >components, the different services, coalition partners, and national and
    > >international agencies will serve to deepen mutual respect and reinforce
    > >a common ethic.
    > >
    > >*  Create a Joint Battle Lab for experimentation and joint exercises.
    > >*  Establish a Joint National Training Center.
    > >*  Establish a Joint Urban Warfare Center.
    > >*  Establish a Joint Concept Development Center.
    > >*  Integrate existing service battle labs and facilities.
    > >
    > >*  Maintain Strategic Command and Special Operations Command.
    > >*  Create Joint Forces Command to provide combat ready forces for joint
    > >and combine operations.
    > >*  Eliminate U.S. Atlantic Command.
    > >*  Create Logistics Command to provide global logistics, transportation,
    > >and asset visibility operations.
    > >*  Add the information support mission to the responsibilities of Space
    > >Command.
    > >*  Create Americas Command; subordinate Southern Command.
    > >*  Realign European, Central, and Pacific Commands.
    > >
    > >*  Shift funds from upgrade of legacy systems to new systems focused on
    > >meeting the challenges of 2010-2020.
    > >*  Place more emphasis on directed energy, electromagnetic energy, and
    > >cyber-weapons.
    > >*  Enable greater speed, and penetration capability for Special
    > >Operations Forces to preempt or resolve terrorist activity or weapons of
    > >mass destruction (WMD) threat.
    > >*  Provide more near-zero miss, long-range stealthy cruise missiles,
    > >brilliant munitions, and submunitions in lieu of dumb weapons.
    > >*  Integrate ballistic and cruise missile defense to protect forces
    > >(both point and area targets), theaters, and regions; harmonize land-
    > >and sea-based missile defenses (i.e., ballistic and air breathers) in an
    > >effort to eliminate duplicative systems.
    > >*  Establish a distributed user-friendly global information system that
    > >includes a broadcast architecture.
    > >*  Create a "distributed," in-theater logistics structure in lieu of
    > >"iron mountains" (large stockpiles).
    > >*  Provide the ability to project significant power from forward
    > >deployed areas, as well as the United States, within hours or days
    > >rather than months.
    > >*  Explore new air and sealift concepts emerging in the commercial
    > >world.
    > >*  Accelerate network-centric operations linking sensors and weapons.
    > >*  Replace individual service component-unique systems with integrated,
    > >joint command, control, communications, computers, intelligence,
    > >surveillance, and reconnaissance systems.
    > >*  Structure less manpower-intensive forces.
    > >*  Create highly networked forces able to see the battlespace in near
    > >real time and to dynamically task and control forces.
    > >
    > >*  Become more expeditionary: fast, shock-exploiting forces, with
    > >greater urban operations capability.
    > >*  Reduce systems that are difficult to move and support; shift to
    > >lighter, more agile automated systems.
    > >*  Evolve to lighter, greater range, more lethal fire-support systems.
    > >*  Develop the twenty-first century tank to be a unique vehicle relying
    > >on speed, agility, and hyper-velocity gun technology for operational
    > >effectiveness (the Panel's view is that 30-35 tons is the appropriate
    > >weight range).
    > >*  Move beyond Force XXI to incorporate the concepts embodied in Army
    > >After Next.
    > >*  Restructure above-the-line units, which evolve to smaller operational
    > >elements with equivalent (or greater) lethality.
    > >*  Move toward advanced vertical lift systems versus service-life
    > >extensions of current rotary-wing aircraft.
    > >
    > >*  Move toward small-signature ships capable of providing sustained
    > >long-range, precision firepower.
    > >*  Design ship production to allow rapid incorporation of latest
    > >technology.
    > >*  Provide greater quantities of small unmanned underwater vehicles to
    > >augment and extend the reach of submarines.
    > >*  Construct follow-on carriers to capitalize on short take-off,
    > >vertical landing; unmanned aerial vehicle; and unmanned combat aerial
    > >vehicle aircraft characteristics with attendant reduction in size and
    > >personnel.
    > >*  Consider sea-based mobile off-shore bases to provide access in
    > >situations where forward bases are unavailable or at risk to
    > >pre-positioned forces.
    > >*  Provide insertion vehicles incorporating the latest technologies to
    > >extend the reach of the maneuver component of the naval power projection
    > >forces.
    > >
    > >*  Ensure a proper mix of short- and long-range aerospace forces to
    > >enable optimal strike operations.
    > >*  Move toward fewer numbers of short-range aircraft providing increased
    > >delivery capacity with smaller, but more accurate weapons.
    > >*  Explore new approaches to long-range, precision delivery vehicles.
    > >*  More distributed satellite systems to provide redundancy and
    > >survivability of command, control, communications, computers,
    > >intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance.
    > >*  Short-take-off-vertical-landing aircraft on wide array of airfields,
    > >ships, and sea-based platforms.
    > >*  Increase ground surveillance capability.
    > >
    > >*  Develop integrated active and passive defense measures against the
    > >use of weapons of mass destruction (WMD).
    > >*  Develop and retain the option to deploy a missile defense system
    > >capable of defeating limited attacks.
    > >*  Incorporate all levels of government into managing the consequences
    > >of a WMD-type attack.
    > >*  Prepare reserve components to support consequence management
    > >activities.
    > >*  Support the recommendations of the President's Commission on Critical
    > >Infrastructure Protection.
    > >*  Use Department of Defense assets to advise and assist law enforcement
    > >in combating terrorist activities.
    > >
    > >*  Achieve and maintain technological superiority through time-based
    > >competition.
    > >*  Pursue commercial-off-the-shelf opportunities.
    > >*  Exploit dual-use technologies.
    > >*  Identify and protect military-unique technologies.
    > >*  Encourage new enterprises (as well as established firms) to develop
    > >innovative ideas-and penalize pedestrian efforts.
    > >*  Develop new rules and procedures that emphasize technology
    > >development and de-emphasize large production quantities.
    > >*  Review mobilization policy for balance, timeliness, relevance, and
    > >synchronization.
    > >
    > >*  Reduce or eliminate Cold War infrastructure without delay.
    > >*  Develop financial systems that give commanders cost visibility.
    > >*  Change the budgeting process to create incentives to foster savings
    > >initiatives.
    > >*  Pass legislation to allow flexibility in resource reallocation.
    > >*  Revamp PPBS to facilitate innovation and change.
    > >*  Compete all commercial-oriented activities.
    > >*  Consider the "New Base Concept."
    > >*  Accelerate and expand the scope of BRAC 2001/2005.
    > >*  Develop a Department of Defense Installation Master Plan.
    > >

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