Insider rumors: UK to introduce domestic crypto bans next week. Mobilize against this as a threat to real national security. To read iwar moderator MW's views on this subject, you could view http://www.anonymizer.com/press/970917.7pillars.html . Excerpt: 'Escrow and government involvement are antithetical positions to safety, security, and, incidentally, reliability and serviceability.... As far as I can see, the real criminals are those supporting escrow, or blocking cryptography's use by the market--- they are allowing a situation to persist that perpetuates the risk.' >X-Sender: jyaat_private >Mime-Version: 1.0 >Date: Wed, 11 Feb 1998 19:19:56 -0500 >To: cypherpunksat_private >From: John Young <jyaat_private> >Subject: UK Crypto Ban? >Sender: owner-cypherpunksat_private >Precedence: first-class >Reply-To: John Young <jyaat_private> >X-Loop: cypherpunksat_private > >From: Campaign Against Censorship of the Internet <cacibat_private> >To: ukcryptoat_private >Date: Tue, 10 Feb 1998 18:18:28 +0100 >Subject: Key escrow announcement > > >A source who is a lobbyist in a non-computer sector has just called me >to say that Margaret Beckett will be announcing a (compulsory?) key >escrow program next Tuesday. > >So far I don't have independent confirmation, although Nigel Hickson >recently said here that he was expecting an announcement "soon". > >Here's hoping we can get it out before the gvt machine controls the >spin. > >Regards, > >Malcolm Hutty. > >----------------------------------------------------------------- >Campaign Against Censorship Tel: 0171 589 4500 >of the Internet in Britain Fax: 0171 589 4522 > e-mail: cacibat_private >Say NO to Censorship Web: http://www.liberty.org.uk/cacib > >---------- > >Date: Wed, 11 Feb 1998 23:57:32 +0000 >To: ukcryptoat_private >From: T Bruce Tober <octobersdadat_private> >Subject: More rumours? > >-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- > > >Free Life Commentary >Editor: Sean Gabb >Issue Number Ten >Tuesday 10th February 1998, 11:20pm > >========================== >"Over himself, over his own mind and body, >the individual is sovereign" >(J.S. Mill, On Liberty, 1859) >========================== > > Next Week's British Encryption Ban > by Sean Gabb > >Earlier this evening, I was given confidential information by someone >close to a British Cabinet Minister. I am not in the habit of speaking >to such people, let alone having them leak state secrets to me. But >that is what happened. In publishing what I heard, I am now risking a >prosecution under the Official Secrets Acts - or, more likely, being >made to look ridiculous if what I predict does not happen. These risks >being accepted, here is the leak. > >Next Tuesday, the 17th February 1998, the Department of Trade and >Industry will announce plans to outlaw the use of strong encryption >software within the United Kingdom. We are to be encouraged - and >ultimately forced - to encrypt our e-mail only in ways that will allow >the authorities to read it. > >My source was vague about the details of the scheme, saying that they >had not yet been circulated to the full Cabinet. But I imagine that it >will be more or less a reprint of the Conservative Government's public >consultation paper of March 1997. This came to nothing because of the >change of Government, and it was even hoped that Labour would have a >more liberal policy on Internet regulation. However, Margaret Beckett, >the Minister now responsible for trade and industrial policy, is neither >bright nor forceful; and she was early captured by the officials who in >theory are supposed to do her bidding. If next Tuesday's consultation >paper differs at all from the last one, it will be only in matters of >small detail and presentation. For this reason, it is probably safe to >take the last paper as a guide to what we can expect. > >The Government will propose creating a network of what are called >Trusted Third Parties, or TTPs. These are to be organisations licensed >to provide encryption services to the public - that is, software, >consultancy and other support. Because they have been licensed by the >State, we are to be encouraged to believe that they really are >trustworthy - that they are not distributing bad encryption software, or >robbing their clients in other ways. But just in case we decide not to >believe any of this, it will be made illegal for any unlicensed person >to offer encryption services. Here, it is worth quoting from last >year's consultation paper: > > The legislation will prohibit an organisation from offering or >providing encryption services to the UK public without a licence. >Prohibition will be irrespective of whether a charge is made for such >services. The offering of encryption services to the UK public (for >example via the Internet) by an unlicensed TTP outside of the UK will >also be prohibited. For this purpose, it may be necessary to place >restrictions on the advertising and marketing of such services to the >public. > >Enacted into law, this would make it illegal for me to copy encryption >software from my hard disk for a friend, and for computer magazines to >include it on their free cover disks. It would also allow a strict >supervision of the material and the links given access to by British >sites on the World Wide Web. > >The paper never clarifies why we need TTPs in the first place, or why - >their need granted - they can only be trusted if licensed by the State. >But it does say a lot about law enforcement and national security. Or, >to be more accurate, it does say a lot in the usual code about the need >to fill in any last potholes on the road to a British police state. > >Starting with the Interception of Communications Act 1985, the British >State has given itself powers of surveillance that a Third World >dictator might envy. It can tap our phones on the word of a Minister. >It can burgle our homes and leave recording devices behind on the word >of a senior policeman. It can trawl through and inspect any records on >us held by any organisation. It can do all this without our knowledge, >and without any effective system of appeal and redress. The relevant >laws are careful to describe the permissions for this as "warrants". >But they really are no more than what in France before the Revolution >were called Lettres du Cachet - things that our ancestors boasted did >not and could not exist in the freer air of England. > >The spread of personal computers seemed likely at first to extend the >scope of surveillance still further. This had until then been limited >by cost. For all the theoretical risks, sending letters in sealed >envelopes through the post has always been reasonably secure: the costs >of interception can only be justified in exceptional cases. For the >same reason, most private papers are safe. But the routing of an >increasing amount of mail through the Internet promised to bring down >the costs of surveillance to the point where everyone could be watched. >The storage of records on computers connected to the Internet promised >to make it possible for the authorities to spy on people by remote >control. > >The problem is the development of strong encryption software like pgp, >and its growing popularity among millions of ordinary people who, though >not criminals, have a strong regard for privacy. It allows us to keep >our e-mail and private records secret to all but the most determined and >expensive attacks. It gives to us the benefits of instant communication >and mass data storage, but keeps the authorities - despite their new >powers of surveillance - no better informed than in the old days of due >process and envelope steaming. > >Therefore all the talk of Trusted Third Parties. The terms of their >licences will require them to sell encryption software with keys that >cannot be modified by their clients, and to collect and store copies of >these keys for handing over to the authorities. Last year's document is >full of promises about "strict safeguards" and the like. But the >reality is this: > > The legislation will provide that the Secretary of State may issue a >warrant requiring a TTP to disclose private encryption keys... or a body >covered by that warrant. > >No mention of judicial involvement at the time, or judicial review >afterwards - just more police state commands. > >We can ignore anything the Government parrots next week about law >enforcement and national security - or, for that matter, child >pornography and complex fraud. These really are just code words. If I >were a criminal, or a terrorist, or a foreign spy, the last encryption >software I would use would come from a Trusted Third Party. Strong >encryption packages are available all over the Internet, or can pass >from hand to hand on a single floppy disk. Nor would I worry much about >laws against the transmission of data encrypted with unlicensed >software. There are ways of keeping the authorities from even knowing >that an Internet message contains encrypted data. > >Somewhere, I have an early version of a program called Steganography, >created by Romana Machado. This takes an encrypted text and merges it >into a graphics file. My version produces a visible degradation of >picture quality. Almost certainly, the newer releases have solved this >problem. Assuming I had them, and were sufficiently unpatriotic - >neither applies in my case, let me add - I could e-mail this country's >battle plans straight off to Saddam Hussain merged invisibly into a >picture of my dog. GCHQ would never notice until the Scud missiles >began landing on Cheltenham. > >No - the encryption ban will be aimed at us, the honest public. We are >the people who tend to respect the law - or at least to be afraid of it >enough to comply in most cases. It is our privacy that is to be >stripped away. It is we who are to become like Winston Smith, living >for every moment when the telescreens are not monitoring our facial >expressions. > >Why this is desired I cannot say. But we are living though an age of >withering trust in the common people. In this country, we are not >trusted to possess guns for our self-defence - or indeed to carry carpet >knives locked inside our cars. We are not trusted to choose and >administer our own medicines, or to bring up our own children in the >manner of our choice, or to decide whether or not oxtail soup might be >bad for us. Plugging in the telescreens is only a logical next step. > >Normally, when I write on these issues, I work myself into a frenzy of >pessimism. At the moment, though, I feel rather optimistic. Next >Tuesday's proposals will cause an uproar. This will not come from the >so-called civil liberties groups like Liberty - excepting a few small >bodies like the Libertarian Alliance, they have all been taken over by >New Labour apparatchiks who can be trusted to keep their mouths shut. >It will come from the big business interests. > >British Telecom is the third or fourth largest telecommunications >company in the world. If operates in more than 40 markets, often >needing to provide its clients with very secure networks. In the City >of London there are more representative offices of foreign banks than in >the rest of the European Union combined. These have a taste for >confidentiality. There are many other large interests - all paying >billions in taxes, all likely to be very hostile to any scheme that will >make them appear less useful to foreign clients. We have a Labour >Government that still needs to establish itself in the public mind as a >party friendly to business. These facts can surely be trusted to ensure >the dropping of a scheme that would not merely turn the country into a >full police state, but also do the greatest damage to British business >since nationalisation. > >Or so I hope. >========================== >Free Life Commentary is an independent journal of comment, published on >the Internet. To receive regular issues, send >e-mail to Sean Gabb at old.whigat_private > >Issues are archived at > > <http://freespace.virgin.net/old.whig/> > >Contact Address: 25 Chapter Chambers, > Esterbrooke Street, > London, SW1P 4NN; > Telephone: 0181 858 0841 > >If you like Free Life Commentary, you may also care to subscribe to my >longer, hard copy journal, Free Life, subscription details for which can >be obtained by writing to me at the above address. > >========================== >Legal Notice: Though using the name Free Life, this journal is owned by >me and not by the Libertarian Alliance, which in consequence bears no >liability of whatever kind for the contents. >- -- >Sean Gabb | "Over himself, over his own | >E-mail: old.whigat_private | mind and body, the individual| ><http://freespace.virgin.net/old.whig/> | is sovereign" | >Mobile Number: 0956 472199 | J.S. Mill, On Liberty, 1859 | > >-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- >Version: PGPfreeware 5.0i for non-commercial use >Charset: noconv > >iQCVAwUBNOI4cDzmzFmU9IJVAQFOFAQAlLgKRAM6wTztCSVvUAAUY/g8k0iOKCGY >4s8O7c+axQUcf3e3RTxKbIPqoIeb81uIcKwv86havRuUsm2r2OHADuRBlWT7VgrR >RKKCuuvrF19G4/hLTn7094NqUvnp5LAZpKOX7ITYQC/grQL8gnkd/xvpj55Z9oek >idz0EU18xJo= >=cNRU >-----END PGP SIGNATURE----- > > > >tbt -- >-- >|Bruce Tober, octobersdadat_private, Birmingham, England +44-121-242-3832| >| Freelance PhotoJournalist - IT, Business, The Arts and lots more | >|pgp key ID 0x94F48255. Website - http://www.homeusers.prestel.co.uk/crecon/ | >
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