RISKS-LIST: Risks-Forum Digest Friday 20 February 2009 Volume 25 : Issue 57 ACM FORUM ON RISKS TO THE PUBLIC IN COMPUTERS AND RELATED SYSTEMS (comp.risks) Peter G. Neumann, moderator, chmn ACM Committee on Computers and Public Policy ***** See last item for further information, disclaimers, caveats, etc. ***** This issue is archived at <http://www.risks.org> as <http://catless.ncl.ac.uk/Risks/25.57.html> The current issue can be found at <http://www.csl.sri.com/users/risko/risks.txt> Contents: Taiwan immigration computer down again (jidanni) Wikipedia prankster dupes German media (Allen Hainer) The Trouble with Trusting Trend Micro (Kevin Way) ESTA visa waiver online doesn't provide existing waiver ref number (George Michaelson) Stove's Bad Crash Handling (Gene Wirchenko) Dates of birth are not unique identifiers (Steven J Klein) Re: Train brake failure; broken valve (Matt Roberds) Re: Collision - UK and French Nuclear subs (Richard I. Cook, Geoffrey Brent) Re: What if you can't pull the plug? (Michael Loftis, David Lesher) Re: Windshields and Windows combine to provide malware vector (Tom Perrine) Re: Godel and correctness (Martyn Thomas) Re: Tony Hoare: "Null References" (Dimitri Maziuk, King Ables) Re: The mystery of `Ireland's worst driver' (David Cantrell) Re: Opening event goes with a bang (Mark Brader) Re: Risks of reading RISKS (jidanni, Martyn Thomas, Scott Miller) Abridged info on RISKS (comp.risks) ---------------------------------------------------------------------- Date: Sun, 15 Feb 2009 14:28:20 +0800 From: jidanni_at_private Subject: Taiwan immigration computer down again I swear I'm not making this up just trying to give itty bitty countries who can't fend for themselves a bad name, see: http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2009/02/14/2003436061 IMMIGRATION: Airport system crashes again The immigration computer system at Taiwan Taoyuan International Airport experienced another breakdown yesterday morning, lasting 20 minutes. Added to the two more serious breakdowns suffered last month, yesterday's incident marked the third system breakdown this year. National Immigration Agency Deputy Director-General Huang Pi-hsia said that yesterday's incident happened because of a system database capacity shortage when the agency was converting files in the database. No flight delays were caused as a result of the incident and no one banned from leaving or entering the country passed immigration during the 20-minute stoppage. (Including Ex-President Chen "Count TheTowels" Shuibian, still safely in the slammer.) ------------------------------ Date: Thu, 12 Feb 2009 16:51:58 +0100 From: Allen Hainer <risks_at_hain-veilchen.de> Subject: Wikipedia prankster dupes German media "An article meant to poke fun at the lengthy royal name of new Economy Minister Karl-Theodor zu Guttenberg turned out to be a joke on daily *Das Bild* and other German publications who revealed their reliance on Internet encyclopedia Wikipedia when they published his name incorrectly this week." http://www.thelocal.de/society/20090212-17397.html ------------------------------ Date: Thu, 12 Feb 2009 10:26:24 -0500 From: Kevin Way <kevin_at_private> Subject: The Trouble with Trusting Trend Micro Many of us use blacklists such as those provided by Trend Micro's MAPS program as part of an anti-spam solution. However, by doing so we're adding significant risk due to ineffective (or absurd) administrative procedures on the part of the list provider. For example, a datacenter I use has IP space incorrectly listed on Trend Micro's MAPS DUL. When they attempted to have the static space removed (15 blocks totaling 159,744 IPs), Trend Micro responded that they would not remove the IPs from their blacklist unless the rDNS for every IP in the space was modified to include the word 'static'. Trend Micro was unwilling to offer any alternative way to correct the DUL, and indicated that since the center hadn't changed rDNS on all of the IPs that their space would remain listed, incorrectly, on the DUL. The damage done by such mistakes is then magnified by the common anti- spam practices of either silently dropping the mail, or delivering the mail to a "Junk Mail" folder which often remains unchecked. In both cases, the sender is unaware that a problem has occurred, and that an alternate means of communication must be established. The experience made me wonder how many blacklist consumers really understand and recognize the amount of risk they're accepting, when they trust a third-party blacklist so thoroughly that they will silently squelch communications according to that list. ------------------------------ Date: Thu, 19 Feb 2009 15:39:58 +1000 From: George Michaelson <ggm_at_private> Subject: ESTA visa waiver online doesn't provide existing waiver ref number The US Government instituted an online mandatory visa waiver process for travelers. The visa waiver consists of a 16 character alphanumeric string. If you visit the URL: https://esta.cbp.dhs.gov/esta/esta.html you can either apply for a new waiver, or re-update an existing one. If you HAVE one, you cannot use the new application side: it terminates 5 screens in. this is not made plain to you until you have completed the entire I94w equivalent "no I am not a former nazi" declaration (cute, that they removed the "nor am I a member of the communist international") If you HAVE one, but don't know the number, then the site cannot send you your number, not tells you your number. Therefore, unless you record your number offline, you are locked out. Sure, there are risks of telling people their number. But one presumes that the system at least understands people might have forgotten a 16 digit magic number. 72-hour deadline. You have to do it, or you risk being offloaded by the airline. Nice! ------------------------------ Date: Sun, 15 Feb 2009 13:40:56 -0800 From: Gene Wirchenko <genew_at_private> Subject: Stove's Bad Crash Handling Following is a post from alt.folklore.computers about a stove's software crashing. The risk is what happens: it turns everything on at lowest setting. Date: Sun, 15 Feb 2009 18:20:55 +0100 From: Morten Reistad <first_at_private> Subject: Re: I need magic incantation for a power conditioner In article <proto-9E06BD.11220115022009_at_private>, Walter Bushell <proto_at_private> wrote: >In article <v318ng.lht.ln_at_private>, > Morten Reistad <first_at_private> wrote: > >> In article <19tep4l1vgahtate1dofomm0aks3u0ai4d_at_private>, >> krw <krw_at_private> wrote: >> >On Sat, 14 Feb 2009 07:39:23 -0500, jmfbahciv <jmfbahciv_at_aol> wrote: >> > >> >>Charles Richmond wrote: >> >>> jmfbahciv wrote: >> >>>> sidd wrote: >> >> >>>> >> >>>> I was thinking of the field. The way I stopped the modems >> >>>> from getting busted was to ban the cleaning lady from the >> >>>> the terminal room. >> >>>> >> >>> >> >>> Aside: Did you leave your stove that interfered with you >> >>> AM radio... when you moved to your new house??? >> >>> >> >>You betcherass I did. It is Mass. law that a stove be >> >>left on the premises. >> > >> >Ok, gotta ask... Does the new stove kill the radio like the old? >> > >> >... or as completely as congress is about to? >> >> Or does the new stove have software crashes, like I discovered >> ours has. >> >> "Sorry Dear, dinner is late, had to reboot the stove." >> >> -- mrr > >Now that is just wrong, putting Microsoft in critical life support >equipment. It says in the contract that it is not to be used in mission >critical equipment. I have no reason to believe there is Micro$oft in$ide; the whole controller box with 8-character display is around 5x5xsub 1 cm, 2x2x1/3rd inches. It has three cable attachments plus power; one to the touch panel, one to a series of BIG regulators, and one to a front panel. It went "Error 32" (ISTR) blinking, while all active positions went on, but on the lowest possible setting. (A fencepost error in the error handling code?) This means it turns ON the stove, but at a very low setting, on crash. Sheesh. It then just said "beep" when trying to manipulate something. We had to drop the fuse for around 5 seconds before it restarted, beeped loudly, said "Error 32" again, then a couple of other diags, including a hex value, and then went back to being happy again. -- mrr ------------------------------ Date: Wed, 11 Feb 2009 02:13:23 -0500 From: Steven J Klein <steven_at_private> Subject: Dates of birth are not unique identifiers USAA is a membership-based financial services company; existing members like myself can create memberships for family members -- even minor children. Recently I used their web site to try and create memberships for my kids. It worked for my son, and the first of my three TRIPLET daughters. (Some of you have already guessed where this is going.) But after putting in all the info for my 2nd daughter (name, social security number, date of birth, and other data), I got an error message saying "We have canceled your request. To add this person, please call ..." As their customer service rep later explained to me, there was some concern that careless users might accidentally try to add the same child more than once. To overcome this, their programmers decided to use the birth-date as a unique identifier. But it's not unique for twins, triplets, etc. It's also possible (though less likely) for two step-siblings in a "blended family" to have the same date of birth. Why not use the social security number, which is guaranteed to be unique? I don't know, and neither did the person who answered my call. [* It is probably illegal, unethical, and subject to misuse. PGN] (It is interesting to note that 2 of my triplets received sequential social security numbers, but the 3rd differs by 1,930.) Steven J Klein, CompTIA A+ Certified,Apple Certified, Your Mac & PC Expert Phone: (248) YOUR-MAC or (248) 968-7622 ------------------------------ Date: Fri, 20 Feb 2009 15:12:41 +0000 From: Matt Roberds <mroberds_at_private> Subject: Re: Train brake failure; broken valve (Lesher, RISKS-25.56) In RISKS-25.56, David Lesher commented on a report of a rail accident in the UK. Following the release of that report, there was also a bit of discussion in news:misc.transport.rail.americas . (Part of the summary posted to RISKS appears to be from the first post in that thread.) There was also a discussion a few weeks earlier in news:uk.railway . Links: http://groups.google.com/group/misc.transport.rail.americas/browse_thread/thread/2e15e2405ed0114a http://groups.google.com/group/uk.railway/browse_thread/thread/48705d7fd6838040 The discussion shows that the risks of not having an independent emergency valve have been known for some time; one poster cited a steam locomotive built in 1913 that had two such valves, presumably as standard equipment. There was speculation that the accident locomotive probably had an independent emergency valve from the factory, but that it was later removed. (This is likely a well-known story on RISKS: your computer (locomotive) can have as much buggy hardware as you want if it's just sitting in the corner (running around the quarry) by itself. Once you plug it into the network, though, you can cause problems for everybody.) A couple of posters also echoed the statement in the accident report that if the train driver had _released_ the locomotive brakes, the dead-man system would have started operating again, and would have applied the train brakes, probably stopping the train. As noted briefly in the report, this is a training issue. As Stephen Furley put it, "When you're running downhill, with a heavy stone train behind you and the train brakes have failed, it's not exactly obvious that the best thing to do is to release the only functioning brake that you do have, even if that's not managing to stop the train." (Two more well-known stories: training and user interfaces.) Anyway, I think that the problem here wasn't so much that a new critical failure mode was discovered, but that part of the system that was designed to cope with a known failure mode was disabled. (Another well-known story.) ------------------------------ Date: Thu, 19 Feb 2009 20:11:31 -0600 From: "Richard I. Cook" <ri-cook_at_private> Subject: Re: Collision - UK and French Nuclear subs (Wood, RISKS-25.56) Charles Wood hypothesized the collision was the result of... (1) ...one of the submarines stalking the other, and as an unexpected outcome, colliding with the target? or (2) ...current submarine navigation systems constrain the vessels to travel at specific, and integral, depths and tracks? (1) is extremely unlikely. The vessels are strategic nuclear submarines (missile launch platforms) and unsuited to pursuit and shadowing. This function is provided by 'attack' submarines which are smaller, more agile, and armed differently. (BTW, the number of attack submarines in the U.S. fleet is maintained at number sufficient to have at least one follow each Soviet sub as it leaves harbor and this has been the practice for a very long time.) (2) is probably closer to the mark, although the reasons are different. The ballistic and accuracy characteristics of each country's sea-launched ICBMs are quite similar because of the physics of flight. The targeting of these missiles is also likely to be similar because potential targets are all in the few nuclear-armed and potentially hostile countries. Given the ocean characteristics which effect the 'hiding' of strategic submarines and the interior location of their major targets (mostly Russian missile silos, etc.), the number of cruise routes that allow a strategic sub to carry out its mission is actually rather limited. Remember that the entire purpose of strategic nuclear submarines is deterrence and for deterrence to be credible it has to be continuously present -- that is, unlike other weapons systems, strategic nuclear submarines must always be prepared to launch their missiles against their targets. This is a rather severe requirement that makes the useful ocean relatively small. For this reason, it is not at all unlikely that two strategic subs would collide. BTW, all of this info is publicly available...you just need to know where to look. ------------------------------ Date: Sat, 21 Feb 2009 02:37:36 +1100 From: Geoffrey Brent <gpbrent_at_private> Subject: Re: Submarine collisions (Wood, RISKS-25.56) Charles Wood suggests that integral depth settings might be a cause of the recent submarine collision (perhaps this problem could be avoided if the British agreed to use imperial units and the French metric?) Another consideration is that while there are about a billion cubic kilometers of water in the Earth's oceans, some of them are much more attractive than others for submarine commanders - seafloor topography and gradients in water temperature or salinity can have a lot of influence on stealth. Increasing precision in measuring these things might also have something to do with why the French and British commanders ended up hiding on top of one another. ------------------------------ Date: Tue, 10 Feb 2009 21:57:07 -0700 From: Michael Loftis <mloftis_at_private> Subject: Re: What if you can't pull the plug? One thing about all the current apple devices is that the power button (or a combination of buttons on the iPods) have a supervisory power circuit system that can, and will, disconnect the main software controlled power supply when held down. The macbook air, new macbook pro, and even all the old macbook pro's are no different. The power management subsystem cooperates with the software in the OS, but is itself a separate, and very simple, embedded device. So if you hold the power button down, even if there's no OS going, it'll go off. But it will take ~10 seconds. This is in fact a very common behavior (and architecture) for many battery operated devices. For the iPod there's a set of supervisory circuits that allow you to cause the power to be turned off/on, and for the reset line to be triggered on the CPU. I've not used an iPhone, but I think it does have a power button. Apple's engineers however, are usually a little more thorough with details than some other companies, so I can't say that this holds true for all hardware manufacturers, but it does for most. ------------------------------ Date: Wed, 11 Feb 2009 01:03:16 -0500 (EST) From: "David Lesher" <wb8foz_at_private> Subject: Re: What if you can't pull the plug? (RISKS-25.55) > Software-controlled power switches > Long-life batteries that can't be removed > Continuous wireless Internet access via WiFi or mobile phone networks I agree with the risk, but have a suggestion. Place in plastic bag. Wrap with foil. Insert in freezer. Not only is it as good a RF cage as your house likely has; the reduced temp will sap the battery's enthusiasm... Alternately, you can but RF-proof zipper bags, but they are rather costly. Of course, if the FBI is tracking you/listening via same; you'll soon get a visit... {The OTHER RISK of never-off devices...} ------------------------------ Date: Wed, 11 Feb 2009 12:23:42 -0800 From: Tom Perrine <tperrine_at_private> Subject: Re: Windshields and Windows combine to provide malware vector (RISKS-25.55) This may just be my former "cold war" past rising up after all these years, but Grand Forks is an interesting place to see this happen (first). Grand Forks is the home of a US Air Force base for aerial refueling and airlift. The refueling and airlift commands have information about the missions of all the groups that they support, and are a prime source of military planning and readiness data. The malware had 3 components: 1) join to botnet, 2) steal passwords, and 3) buy fake A/V software. Items 1 and 2 would be great vectors to get "on base", if a home or laptop computer of a military member became infected. But, it's probably just someone trying to make a buck on the fake A/V. ------------------------------ Date: Wed, 18 Feb 2009 10:51:30 +0000 From: Martyn Thomas <martyn_at_thomas-associates.co.uk> Subject: Re: Godel and correctness (Was: Tony Hoare ...) In the context of Schaefer's posting, I assume * Correct = self-consistent = code implements the specification. * Complete = "The specification doesn't omit anything I consider important". The issue of whether the specification actually describes the system that, with hindsight, you would wish you had specified is also helped by formal specification (because you get faced by a lot of questions that force you to think hard about the properties you want your system to have and the consequences of those properties). But no formal system can guarantee 20/20 hindsight. Martyn Thomas CBE FREng http://www.thomas-associates.co.uk ------------------------------ Date: Fri, 20 Feb 2009 09:48:32 -0600 From: Dimitri Maziuk <dmaziuk_at_private> Subject: Re: Tony Hoare: "Null References" (Franklin, RISKS-25.56) Sometimes I think the problem with C is that they're teaching it backwards. What they should teach is "here's how you create a memory area, here's how you use pointers to fill it with values of the same type. Here's how you can emulate multi-dimensional arrays, and here's how you emulate one-dimensional array of printable bytes that you can use as a close enough approximation of a string." Once they're certain the students got it, then they could say "oh, and by the way, for our convenience we've created this square bracket notation and this nifty zero-byte hack. Keep in mind they're just handy shortcuts, there are no strings. Nor arrays." There are languages that have built-in string data type and no buffer overflow in gets. There are languages with array data type that knows its own size, has bounds checking and often lets you indexed elements from e.g. -3 to 5. C just isn't one of them. All it is is glorified assembler and all it really has is what the computer has: integers and floats. With some integers getting special treatment because they represent memory addresses. ------------------------------ Date: Fri, 20 Feb 2009 06:13:25 -0600 From: King Ables <king.ables_at_private> Subject: Re: Tony Hoare: "Null References" (Franklin, RISKS-25.56) > The inventors of the C language did not merely omit array bounds checking > from C; they encouraged C programmers to omit manual bounds checking as > well. This is what really bothers me. I think one has to be older than "a certain age" to understand the mindset. This was a time when many people wrote in assembly language. For many writing in "high-level languages," that language was FORTRAN (and the 1966 standard, at that). What you wanted from a high-level language was data structure and functional convenience without losing any of the direct access to any location in memory that you were accustomed to in assembly code (this is why peek() and poke() stayed around so long in early PC languages, they were useful). I'm the programmer, I'll keep track of what I'm doing and where I'm putting things, thank you. When you had a buffer overflow, it was because your own code did something you didn't intend, and the only result was your program crashed. Your only incentive to fix your bug was to prevent the crash. Buffer overflows with a specific and malicious intent were unknown. There was no Internet. Nobody in another country was pushing data into your program, nor could you conceive of any such an eventuality. Heck, you were happy when the operator mounted the right tape with the right input file on it. I'm not defending it, clearly, with the benefit of hindsight, it was the wrong choice. But it wasn't such a bad choice at the time. There were good reasons for doing it that way. Try telling a caveman that one day he'll leave his cave and build a house out of wood and then that fire he just invented will be dangerous so he'd better go invent the fire extinguisher right now. His biggest problem today is keeping the fire going, why would he ever want to put it out? He has no context in which to see your issue. Assigning blame for the current state of things when we have much more information than those to whom we may try to assign that blame is unfair. We're all making choices today that people 20 or 50 years from now will look back and wonder "what where those idiots thinking?" ------------------------------ Date: Fri, 20 Feb 2009 15:23:15 +0000 From: David Cantrell <d.cantrell_at_private> Subject: The mystery of `Ireland's worst driver' (Power, RISKS-25.56) "Max Power" wrote: > Ultimately, in Greater Europe (from Vladivostok to Iceland to Saint Helena) > the traffic-oriented part of the police forces must be trained in knowing > all the variants of driver's permits in their region. Within the EU, the layout of drivers' licences is standardised. So even if you don't know the Polish or Finnish or German or whatever for "name" and "surname" you can still tell which fields they are. Here are licences from Germany, the UK, and Poland: http://www.bundesdruckerei.de/pics/produkte/fuehrerschein/fuehrerschein_front_internet.jpg http://www.day-tripper.net/xzi/xphotodriving-licence.jpg http://www.eng.pwpw.pl/rep/f39/r48/min_prawo_jazdy.jpg Fields 1 and 2 are surname and forename. There are, of course, still some people driving around with old pre-standardisation licences, and I don't know how far along the road to standardisation Ireland is, but Irish police should already be familiar with the layout, as it's already commonly used elsewhere. David Cantrell, Outcome Technologies Ltd, BUPA House, 15-19 Bloomsbury Way, London WC1A 2BA ENGLAND Registered in England, No: 3829851 ------------------------------ Date: Thu, 19 Feb 2009 22:58:10 -0500 (EST) From: msb_at_private (Mark Brader) Subject: Re: Opening event goes with a bang (Alexander, RISKS-25.56) Well, it's not the first time a ceremonial opening has turned lethal. Look up how William Huskisson died in 1830; there must have been others. Destroying the building as well is a nice touch, though. Mark Brader, Toronto msb_at_private ------------------------------ Date: Fri, 20 Feb 2009 10:44:34 +0800 From: jidanni_at_private Subject: Re: Risks of reading RISKS (Horrocks, RISKS-25.56) BH> For example, hands up how many of you read "390,000 to access child BH> database ... of all under 18 year-olds in England" and assumed that BH> this means all 390k have full access to the whole database? Ah, [It will cost one] 390,000 [British pounds] to access the child database... wherein the "pounds" symbol is not ASCII and went bye-bye... :-) [Noted in the archive copy of 25.56 as well. PGN] ------------------------------ Date: Fri, 20 Feb 2009 10:26:05 +0000 From: Martyn Thomas <martyn_at_thomas-associates.co.uk> Subject: Re: Risks of reading Risks (Horrocks, RISKS-25.56) Most RISKS readers understand that the risks from improper access to data involve the nature of the data, who has access to it, and what they can do with it. For example, if access to the child database were limited to those in the geographic area where the child data subject lived, it would greatly reduce the number of people who had access to any particular child's data, without significantly reducing the risk to children from the data being abused - as most abuses would involve people who know or have access to the child, and most of these will be in that geographic area. Martyn Thomas CBE FREng http://www.thomas-associates.co.uk ------------------------------ Date: Fri, 20 Feb 2009 09:10:44 -0500 From: Scott Miller <SMiller_at_private> Subject: Re: Risks of reading RISKS (Horrocks, RISKS-25.56) It might also be helpful if those who appear to be claiming that a submission is inaccurate, incomplete, or misleading would supply some specific information regarding the perceived deficiencies. Otherwise a RISK exists of evoking an analogy involving cooking vessels. Is Mr. Horrocks stating that the 390,000 did *not* have full read access to the entire database? In that case, what are some examples of the limitations? If that access was limited, did the limitations meaningfully restrict access to all government employees who might be careless enough to leave it laying about unprotected on a laptop or portable media (of course this would be unprecedented in the UK)? Was it restricted to all (hypothetical) government-employed pedophiles in such a way as to protect the vital information of the children from would-be predators? The only statement regarding access that I find in the article cited by A. Shapir is from Minister Morgan, "For someone fleeing domestic violence for example it is important we make sure the ContactPoint directory can shield in some way." Coming from someone who should be thoroughly familiar with whatever confidentiality measures are planned, had I the welfare of such a child entrusted to me, I would find that example of vague bureaucrat-speak more distressing than reassuring. As a long-time RISKS reader, I am convinced that the choice made to submit the incident with only those facts that were available was consistent with established RISKS practice, and the correct decision. Some risks are adequately and succinctly self-defining by description, and I believe this is an example. I'm also pretty certain that my comment clearly indicated my additional perceived risk (albeit somewhat sarcastically): assuming that government regulations, employees, and systems exist solely to serve the public interest and typically succeed in that endeavor. ------------------------------ Date: Thu, 29 May 2008 07:53:46 -0900 From: RISKS-request_at_private Subject: Abridged info on RISKS (comp.risks) The ACM RISKS Forum is a MODERATED digest, with Usenet equivalent comp.risks. => SUBSCRIPTIONS: PLEASE read RISKS as a newsgroup (comp.risks or equivalent) if possible and convenient for you. The mailman Web interface can be used directly to subscribe and unsubscribe: http://lists.csl.sri.com/mailman/listinfo/risks Alternatively, to subscribe or unsubscribe via e-mail to mailman your FROM: address, send a message to risks-request_at_private containing only the one-word text subscribe or unsubscribe. You may also specify a different receiving address: subscribe address= ... . You may short-circuit that process by sending directly to either risks-subscribe_at_private or risks-unsubscribe_at_private depending on which action is to be taken. Subscription and unsubscription requests require that you reply to a confirmation message sent to the subscribing mail address. Instructions are included in the confirmation message. Each issue of RISKS that you receive contains information on how to post, unsubscribe, etc. => The complete INFO file (submissions, default disclaimers, archive sites, copyright policy, etc.) is online. <http://www.CSL.sri.com/risksinfo.html> The full info file may appear now and then in RISKS issues. *** Contributors are assumed to have read the full info file for guidelines. => .UK users should contact <Lindsay.Marshall_at_private>. => SPAM challenge-responses will not be honored. Instead, use an alternative address from which you NEVER send mail! => SUBMISSIONS: to risks_at_private with meaningful SUBJECT: line. *** NOTE: Including the string "notsp" at the beginning or end of the subject *** line will be very helpful in separating real contributions from spam. *** This attention-string may change, so watch this space now and then. => ARCHIVES: ftp://ftp.sri.com/risks for current volume or ftp://ftp.sri.com/VL/risks for previous VoLume <http://www.risks.org> redirects you to Lindsay Marshall's Newcastle archive http://catless.ncl.ac.uk/Risks/VL.IS.html gets you VoLume, ISsue. Lindsay has also added to the Newcastle catless site a palmtop version of the most recent RISKS issue and a WAP version that works for many but not all telephones: http://catless.ncl.ac.uk/w/r <http://the.wiretapped.net/security/info/textfiles/risks-digest/> . ==> PGN's comprehensive historical Illustrative Risks summary of one liners: <http://www.csl.sri.com/illustrative.html> for browsing, <http://www.csl.sri.com/illustrative.pdf> or .ps for printing ==> Special Offer to Join ACM for readers of the ACM RISKS Forum: <http://www.acm.org/joinacm1> ------------------------------ End of RISKS-FORUM Digest 25.57 ************************Received on Fri Feb 20 2009 - 15:24:43 PST
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