[RRE]Mapping Globalization

From: Phil Agre (pagreat_private)
Date: Thu Aug 09 2001 - 12:21:06 PDT

  • Next message: Phil Agre: "[RRE]pointers"

    [The publisher's Web site isn't very helpful, but you can order single
    copies of this journal issue by phone.]
    
    =-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=
    This message was forwarded through the Red Rock Eater News Service (RRE).
    You are welcome to send the message along to others but please do not use
    the "redirect" option.  For information about RRE, including instructions
    for (un)subscribing, see http://dlis.gseis.ucla.edu/people/pagre/rre.html
    =-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=
    
    Date: Sat, 4 Aug 2001 10:55:23 -0400 (EDT)
    From: Eszter Hargittai <eszterat_private>
    
    American Behavioral Scientist
    Special Issue on Mapping Globalization
    
    Edited by Eszter Hargittai and Miguel Angel Centeno
    Princeton University
    
    This special issue is part of a larger project supported in
    part by the International Networks Archive, Princeton University.
    ( http://www.princeton.edu/~ina )
    AMERICAN BEHAVIORAL SCIENTIST, Vol. 44 No. 10, June 2001 1545-1560
    (c) 2001 Sage Publications, Inc.
    
    Single copies are available from the publisher for $20 by phone
    (800-818-7243 or 805-499-9774), fax (800-583-2665), or e-mail
    (orderat_private).
    
    The Sage Web site is <http://www.sagepub.com/>.
    
    CONTENTS
    
    The Authors
    
    Introduction
    Defining a Global Geography
    ESZTER HARGITTAI and MIGUEL ANGEL CENTENO
    
    ECONOMIC NETWORKS
    
    World-System Structure and Change:
    An Analysis of Global Networks and Economic
    Growth Across Two Time Periods
    EDWARD L. KICK and BYRON L. DAVIS
    
    Global Institutions and Networks:
    Contingent Change in the Structure of World Trade Advantage, 1965-1980
    MICHAEL ALAN SACKS, MARC J. VENTRESCA, and BRIAN UZZI
    
    The Global 500:
    Mapping the World Economy at Century's End
    ALBERT J. BERGESEN and JOHN SONNETT
    
    Shifting Governance Structures in Global
    Commodity Chains, With Special Reference to the Internet
    GARY GEREFFI
    
    COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    
    A Longitudinal Analysis of the International
    Telecommunication Network, 1978-1996
    GEORGE A. BARNETT
    
    World City Networks and Hierarchies, 1977-1997:
    An Empirical Analysis of Global Air Travel Links
    DAVID A. SMITH and MICHAEL F. TIMBERLAKE
    
    THE INTERNET
    
    Old Hierarchies or New Networks of Centrality?
    The Global Geography of the Internet Content Market
    MATTHEW A. ZOOK
    
    Network Cities and the Global Structure of the Internet
    ANTHONY M. TOWNSEND
    
    Mapping the "Worlds" of the World Wide Web:
    (Re)Structuring Global Commerce Through Hyperlinks
    STANLEY D. BRUNN and MARTIN DODGE
    
    KNOWLEDGE NETWORKS
    
    Global Webs of Knowledge:
    Education, Science, and Technology
    THOMAS SCHOTT
    
    Netting Scholars:
    Online and Offline
    EMMANUEL KOKU, NANCY NAZER, and BARRY WELLMAN
    
    ---
    
    Introduction
    Defining a Global Geography
    
    Eszter Hargittai and Miguel Angel Centeno
    Princeton University
    
    The articles in this special issue provide a map for understanding the
    networks of transfers and relationships that make up the international
    web of globalization.  Globalization involves a variety of links
    expanding and tightening a web of political, economic, and cultural
    interconnections. A variety of data indicate that we are undergoing
    a process of compression of international time and space and an
    intensification of international relations. Both popular accounts
    and more rigorous analyses tell us that international connections
    are increasing; an expanding variety of goods and services are
    being exchanged across boundaries; more and more people live their
    professional, family, and intellectual lives in more than one country;
    and cultural autarky is no longer possible (1).  Yet, individual data
    sources tell us little more than that. How fast are we integrating?
    What does the global web look like?  Who is in the center and who is
    on the margins?  How have these positions shifted over the past two
    decades?  The following dozen studies explore these questions through
    systematic and historical data, delving into the underlying structure
    of the apparent integration.
    
    GLOBALIZATION IN CONTEXT
    
    WHAT IS GLOBALIZATION?
    
    Defining globalization has become something of a cottage industry.
    Mauro Guillen (2001) has counted literally hundreds of citations
    using the term globalization, each often offering a new version of
    a definition.  Common elements include the intensification of global
    compression, interdependence, and integration.  Essentially, global
    inhabitants have much more to do with one another and interact more
    often than they once did.
    
    Definitional uncertainty aside, there is considerable debate regarding
    the significance of this phenomenon.  Castells (1996, p. 92) contends
    that we are living through a dramatic transformation into a global
    economy distinct from the "world" economy born in the 16th century.
    Yet, other scholars offer evidence indicating that the current process
    of global interconnection is much less dramatic than what occurred
    in the late 19th and early 20th centuries (Hirst & Thompson, 1996).
    For some theorists, globalization has altered the economic chances of
    significant populations (Reich, 1991; Rodrik, 1997), but others argue
    that its effect has been exaggerated (Berger, 1996; Fligstein, 1998;
    Krugman, 1994).
    
    Does globalization matter?  We believe that much of the argument
    stems from collapsing two quite different elements of the issue at
    hand.  The first is the process of globalization, the mechanics of
    international integration; the second is the product or consequences
    thereof.  The latter has received more attention, and we turn to that
    first.
    
    SIGNIFICANCE AND CONSEQUENCES OF GLOBALIZATION
    
    Given the themes of this special issue, we obviously believe that
    globalization matters (or more accurately, might matter).  The
    real question is how it will matter and for whom.  We may begin by
    analyzing the limits of the effects of globalization to define the
    outer boundaries of the phenomenon.  The naysayers do have a point
    in reminding us that the talk of globalization is often precisely that.
    The triumphalism (or panic) that often characterizes discussions of
    the topic neglects the many aspects of daily life that for all intents
    and purposes, remain relatively unaffected by international flows and
    transfers.
    
    Perhaps the most obvious limit on these is the continued salience
    of territorial frontiers (2).  With very few exceptions, for example,
    one must be both a citizen and a resident to vote in a political
    election.  Some countries obviously have an international element
    in their domestic politics, and ease of travel has complicated some
    electioneering strategies (3).  The opinions of major international
    players are courted and watched.  Nevertheless, each arbitrarily drawn
    nation-state still formally determines the most significant aspects
    of its policies.  Similarly, on which side of a border one is born
    often makes a very important economic difference.  A child in Nuevo
    Laredo, Mexico, might have a harder time accessing the potential of
    the U.S. economy than one born across the border in Laredo, Texas;
    citizens of Greece and Hong Kong enjoy access to wider markets than
    those of Turkey and the People's Republic of China.
    
    The significance of borders illustrates the different ways that
    globalization affects social groups.  For example, borders are more
    significant for labor than for capital.  The European Union may be
    a transnational labor market, but it is not officially open to all
    comers.  Latin American immigrants working on the bottom rungs of the
    U.S. labor market have little protection.  In much the same way that
    exclusive neighborhoods increasingly separate themselves from the
    poverty that surrounds them, rich countries may build higher barriers
    as a response to their being increasingly "near" to poorer societies.
    One of the more interesting future developments in globalization will
    be the extent to which it either allows freer transborder labor flows
    or increasingly relies on the power of the nation-state to restrict it.
    
    Frontiers place limits on other aspects of life.  Although capital
    may face fewer restrictions than labor, states do sometimes try to
    control the price of their currencies, limit their flows, and prohibit
    certain transactions or interchanges.  Despite the possible congruence
    in the definition of human rights (Keck & Sikkink, 1998; Meyer, Frank,
    Hironaka, Schofer, & Tuma, 1997), the opportunities available and
    support expected differ radically from one citizenry to another, even
    keeping all other factors constant.  Certainly, political violence
    and the direction thereof is most often defined and constrained by
    international boundaries.  Overall, as long as nation-states retain
    a monopoly over the means of destruction, globalization will operate
    under significant limitations.
    
    Nor has globalization affected everyone.  Perhaps the most obvious
    gulf is between societies internationally.  No matter what indicator
    one may use (trade, communication, etc.), significant parts of the
    world are essentially outside the new global society.  In some cases,
    whole countries are excluded for a variety of reasons; for example,
    North Korea is isolated ideologically, Sierra Leone economically.
    This is to say not that the global economy or political divisions do
    not affect what goes on in these countries but that the vast majority
    of citizens and institutions do not regularly interact with the rest
    of the world.  Generally, we may speak of a core group of countries
    largely defined by the Organization for Economic Cooperation
    and Development (OECD), with some hangers-on where international
    exchanges are a regular part of life for large parts of the society.
    On the bottom, there is a group (much of Africa, for example) largely
    isolated from these trends (4).  In between are the most interesting
    countries, where significant groups of people and large parts of the
    economy have been transformed by international contacts but isolated
    regions and groups also exist in significant numbers.
    
    What accounts for the different rates of participation?  The obvious
    explanation is money.  Richer countries have more to buy and sell in
    the global market-place and more access to the means with which to do
    so (5).  Domestically, the same differences apply.  The upper class
    and those living in major urban centers are, as a rule, much more
    likely to participate in the globalized world (6).
    
    What does it mean to be included or excluded?  Much of the academic
    debate has dealt with the consequences for countries and their
    populations of finding themselves within the global web.  The effect
    of globalization on income distribution, state authority, and culture
    has been amply studied and debated, but definitive conclusions elude
    us (Geertz, 1998; Meyer et al., 1997; Panitch, 1996; Sklair, 1991;
    Strange, 1996; see Guillen, 2001, for a fuller list).
    
    Given that there is still little agreement about the possible
    consequences of being globalized, we know even less about what effects
    remaining marginalized from globalization might have.  From the point
    of view of globalization boosters such as Thomas Friedman (1999),
    avoiding globalization is both practically impossible and potentially
    disastrous.  Those not connected to the global economy will miss out
    on the next economic and social revolution and will be permanently
    relegated to the global trash bin, they believe.  Although we may not
    share Friedman's vision of no alternatives to globalization or his
    enthusiasm for the changes it brings, he may be right in contending
    that efforts to avoid participation or the inability to participate
    will have dire consequences.
    
    Even those who minimize the impact of globalization recognize that
    the increasing amount of international contact has, at the very least,
    transformed the context in which countries operate.  It is impossible,
    for example, to analyze a modern economy without reference to trade or
    foreign investment.  Labor may not flow freely, but the globalization
    of production has had significant effects on employment and wages in
    selected economic sectors.  A society's cultural preferences cannot
    be studied in isolation; the international flow of images and ideas
    (or the protection against these) must be considered.  But the
    manner in which globalization affects different aspects of social and
    economic life remains unclear.  What are the channels through which
    international pressures make themselves felt?  Does this happen in
    the same way that a uniform gas exerts identical pressure everywhere,
    or are there special zones where influence is greatest?  What are
    the windows through which societies observe globalization and through
    which it penetrates their homes?
    
    Arguably the most important (and most debated) consequence of
    globalization is the increasing concentration of power and wealth.
    For example, in practically every industry, a few transnational
    firms now claim huge market shares.  How is globalization responsible?
    Globalization has been accompanied and supported by an intense
    process of international isomorphism on practically every level and
    in almost all aspects of life.  We are seeing the universalization
    of a single set of criteria for judging the worth of projects,
    firms, and, yes, individuals.  Where previously each region, country,
    or even city prized different things (or in the case of protection,
    forced many competitors out of markets), now we have a global standard
    for performance and, increasingly, a global standard for aesthetic
    preferences.  Combined with the hegemony of the market, this produces
    a set of efficiency mechanisms that prize specific criteria, encourage
    the adoption of certain policies, and select a particular set of
    actors for survival.  Although these mechanisms may not be operating
    at a definition of efficiency that we like, what matters is that
    what the global market says is good becomes good everywhere: There
    is no escape.  This leads to concentration for several reasons.
    First, the criteria for success are not socially or geographically
    neutral but reflect the standards and preferences of leading powers.
    These criteria tend to favor certain players (e.g., Hollywood films,
    Web sites in English, Microsoft products).  Because competition
    on a global market allows for massive economies of scale, these
    increasingly large corporations can compete with anyone on price and
    force local competitors out.  Their dominant positions create huge
    barriers to entry.  In the end, the ubiquity of these products becomes
    part of their appeal.  Homogeneity and monopoly reinforce each other.
    
    We are particularly interested in how globalization will shape global
    inequality as measured between nations and societies (7).  There is no
    denying the interdependence that globalization brings about, but the
    asymmetries of that dependence, the consequences of the hierarchical
    flows, and the relative position within a set of relationships will
    help shape the nature of global power over the next decades.  Research
    done on telephone communications indicates that international contact
    has increased, but so has the centrality of the United States in a
    global system (Louch, Hargittai, & Centeno, 1999).  To what extent
    can this new-found power be explained by the exogenous effects of
    globalization itself, as opposed to the internal characteristics of
    the countries involved?
    
    A DIFFERENT ROAD MAP
    
    To answer this question, we must shift to the second half of a
    discussion on globalization: the process rather than the outcome.
    Analysts have been understandably concerned with the substantive areas
    linked to globalization: wages, trade balances, cultural diffusion,
    and so on.  We have paid much less attention to the infrastructure
    network that actually makes up globalization.
    
    The transformation of the technical and organizational infrastructure
    of international integration is obvious and needs to be considered
    in any analysis of globalization.  The road - not only what is on it
    - has changed dramatically over the past several decades.  Hirst and
    Thompson (1996) are correct, for example, in noting that other periods
    have also seen dramatic expansions in international commerce and
    that international flows have been freer or played a more significant
    role in social and economic dynamics.  This is certainly true if we
    compare the relative importance of international trade within the
    total global economic product or if we emphasize facility of movement
    across frontiers.  What is new is the vast range of connections, the
    speed at which they occur, and the complexity of their interactions.
    International transfers now include a much wider array of products
    and services across forms of technology unimagined a decade, much
    less a century, ago.  More important, these transfers are much more
    tightly intertwined, producing what we call a truly global web.
    Figure 1 illustrates the dramatic decline in the cost of international
    transport and communication, which not only has facilitated (and been
    encouraged by) globalization but may be its most important legacy.
    (Figure 1: Cheaper Tolls on the Global Highway)
    
    Recent progress in international communications is a good example of
    how today's information exchange happens in a truly global intertwined
    network.  There is a tendency to exaggerate the novel aspect of the
    Internet and its capacity to cut across vast distances in no time.
    That facet is not what makes the Internet novel; the telegraph
    had already achieved that more than a century ago (Standage, 1998).
    Rather, the truly unique feature of the network is that it allows
    communication in a type of distributed web that spans the globe in
    an intertwined manner.  It allows a user to send a message from one
    location to 50 others while also storing that message for subsequent
    access by yet others from yet different locations.  This is how space,
    time, and contact nodes genuinely converge, thanks to the Internet.
    Moreover, one need not even send a message to a specific person for
    it to be read.  A passive posting on a Web site will generate its
    own readership.  If international communications used to represent
    thousands or even millions of dyads, the current situation involves
    billions or possibly trillions of overlapping and open-ended
    multiperson groups (8).
    
    Under the previous system of international contact, different parts
    of the world might be connected to relatively few others.  Now, the
    number of paths between different people and locations has exploded.
    This implies that changes in the form and frequency of flows between
    two points may have reverberations in unexpected paths far removed
    from them.  Whereas previously we might have spoken of a world on
    which a variety of lines were drawn, we now need to think of the
    globe as enmeshed in a web (9).  The new global geography has made
    relative position within the web simultaneously more difficult to
    define and much more important.  The old references to continents
    or even to core/periphery refer to a two-dimensional perspective on
    the world, which has become increasingly useless and deceptive in an
    N-dimensional reality (where N is the number of forms of international
    interactions).
    
    Globalization, if it is a significant social phenomenon in its own
    right, involves much more than the intensification of a single form of
    exchange or even the cumulative effect of a series of transformations.
    It is the possibility of interaction between a variety of interchanges
    across the globe, the complexity of these interactions, and the
    density of the ties between previously distant societies that may be
    truly consequential.  The potential significance of globalization can
    be appreciated only when analyzed as a whole.  We believe the first
    step toward a better understanding of the phenomenon in question is to
    define a new global geography that takes into account not merely the
    physical environment in which societies operate but their relational
    environment - those with whom they work, speak, exchange, and fight.
    Where countries fit in an overlapping set of global relations will
    help determine the extent to which globalization will have an effect
    on them and the nature of that influence.
    
    If we are to ascertain the specific effect of globalization, we
    need to define a standard measure not automatically correlated to
    one of the substantive issues being addressed.  That is, we need an
    indicator that both serves as a representation of a society's position
    within a global web and is relatively independent of the phenomenon
    globalization is supposed to affect.  Categorizations by income,
    regime types, or political blocks may miss the critical dynamics of
    global cliques.  Coordinates within a new geography of globalization
    represent a much more promising alternative.  These indicators
    would describe a country's position vis-a-vis other countries in a
    combination of various transactions.  Centrality and reciprocity would
    be obvious indicators of where a society stood.  Perhaps more useful
    would be comparisons of its position within the various subnets
    defined by specific transactions.  The combination of these measures
    would then help explain (a) what forms of globalization affect a
    particular society and (b) the direction of the change (10).
    
    MEASURING GLOBALIZATION
    
    NETWORKS AS MAPS
    
    Except for the seminal but crude measures of world systems analysis,
    we know of little work that has taken the different countries'
    relational position in the process of integration itself as the
    key differentiation between them (11).  Only this form of formally
    structural approach allows us to begin to understand both the
    processes of global integration and different societies' and
    countries' position therein.  The absence of structural analyses
    is especially surprising, given that the study of globalization
    seems tailor-made for that buzzword of contemporary social science:
    networks.  We now live, or so we are told, in a "network society"
    (Castells, 1996; Wellman, 1988).  Some have suggested that networks
    represent a third major category of human interaction (after markets
    and hierarchies) and that increasingly, it is this form of connection
    that will determine our lives (Powell, 1990).  Yet, network analysis
    has only begun to map the manner in which relational structures shape
    social action.
    
    Network theory and methods offer an excellent means with which
    to understand globalization; they are ideally suited to defining
    the underlying pattern of the literally millions of sets of ties
    across the globe (12).  To begin with, networks represent the best
    metaphor for the new international society.  Borrowing from Powell
    (1990), we can argue that global relationships cannot be understood
    entirely as either markets or hierarchies; rather, they involve a
    set of political, social, cultural, and economic links reinforcing,
    producing, and contradicting each other.  Societies are connected
    through language, transportation, trade, families, tourism, and
    educational exchanges.  The resulting relationships are not a product
    of any single one of these connections but of the manner in which
    these reinforce or contradict each other.  Network analysis offers
    the best means with which to begin mapping these relationships in a
    coherent manner because it provides precise and concrete means with
    which to measure and compare them.
    
    Network analysis privileges relationships rather than individual
    attributes.  Who you are may be irrelevant; it is whom you know
    (or do not know) that counts (Granovetter, 1974/1995).  A society's
    relative wealth or even military power may be relevant only in terms
    of the network of political and economic relationships in which it is
    embedded.  To understand A and B's relationship, their mutual links to
    C may be more important than the specific attributes they share or the
    nature of their conflict or cooperation.  With this emphasis on social
    structure, network analysis is, thus, best positioned to provide
    an accurate portrait of the new global relationships without the
    encumbrance of a priori categorizations.  It provides an alternative
    to overdeterministic explanations, whether materialist or culturalist.
    
    Networks are particularly useful for the analysis of how globalization
    channels its influence.  For example, the discussion of cultural
    convergence and organizational isomorphism (DiMaggio & Powell,
    1983; Meyer et al., 1997) has never specified how cultural and
    organizational standards are actually transported across firm and
    national boundaries.  Network analysis would provide the road map
    through which one could trace policy preferences or legitimization
    strategies.  Based on a nation's position within the global web,
    we might then be able to predict the likelihood that it would adopt
    certain practices or engage in particular forms of learned behavior.
    In short, network methods would give the analysis of globalization
    predictive power and the capacity to test its hypotheses.
    
    NETWORKS OF WHAT AND BETWEEN WHOM?
    
    If networks represent the best lenses with which to understand
    globalization, what kind of data should we analyze with them?
    The possibilities are endless, but we first need to be aware of
    areas left unexplored.  That is, before discussing networks of
    visible interactions, we need to be cognizant of the invisible set of
    relationships helping to shape the external surface of our global map.
    One area of concern is transactions that are not adequately measured
    yet may play a significant role in the construction of international
    networks.  Another issue is the unit of analysis that should be used
    or the level at which we theorize international transactions taking
    place.
    
    With regard to the first, perhaps the most obvious missing data
    concern illegal transfers (13).  One estimate of the globalized black
    market suggests that it may represent $500 billion of transactions
    a year (Castells, 1998, Vol. 3, p. 169).  In general, smuggling (writ
    large) may be the oldest form of globalization.  It may also be the
    purest expression of the phenomenon, if we think of globalization as a
    global search for economic or social efficiency that explicitly seeks
    to evade formal state authority.
    
    What are some of these data-less transfers?  Although it is possible
    to make some calculations based on international financial balances,
    we obviously do not have a comprehensive idea of the undeclared
    or illegal flows of money to and from different countries.
    Money laundering may total the equivalent of 2% to 5% of global
    Gross Domestic Product (United Nations Development Program [UNDP],
    1999, p. 5).  Drugs may be one of the most important international
    commodities, with important consequences for capital flows, transport
    networks, and political complications.  One estimate places this trade
    at $400 billion annually or 8% of world trade (UNDP, 1999, p. 5).
    Small arms may also represent an important international commodity
    whose flows are not well documented.  Prostitution alone is said to
    be a $20 billion industry with an important international dimension
    ("Giving the Customer," 1998) (14).
    
    Given that the movement of illegal migrants affects the most
    underprivileged groups of societies, lacking information in
    this domain prohibits us from gaining a clear understanding of
    how globalization and social stratification interact.  Consider,
    for example, the likely importance of illegal transfers to the
    transnational communities that have received so much recent attention
    in the social sciences (Portes, 1997).  Entry into such a community
    may begin with an illegal migration.  Wage labor may be illegal or
    occur in marginalized or even prohibited industries; remittances may
    be unreported to both host and native countries.  The ties that bind
    these communities across borders may thus elude us when defining our
    new geography yet represent one of its most important components.
    
    We also possess few data on computer links, transfers, and
    relationships.  This is particularly important, given that so much
    of globalization appears to be fueled by Internet connections and
    information transacted across fiber-optic cables.  Unfortunately,
    several aspects of the technology make it inherently impossible to
    collect the type of relational data that would allow an analysis of
    the communication networks underlying this traffic (15).  Despite
    these difficulties, some have attempted to quantify Internet traffic
    (OECD, 1998) by relying on the few clues we have of where data may
    be residing, but the accuracies of such data are highly questionable.
    
    Although it may be difficult to classify consumption as a network,
    we might also consider the level of globalization that occurs by that
    means.  It is quite clear that McDonald's and the Gap are all over
    the globe and that the British Spice Girls and the Puerto Rican singer
    Ricky Martin have touched teenage music fans' hearts everywhere (16).
    However, it is less transparent how the consumption of such products
    infiltrates into the rest of people's lives.  Although there is an
    ongoing debate on how the diffusion of such cultural icons affects
    local cultures (Ritzer, 1996; Watson, 1997), we have no information
    on how many people are actually affected and what areas of their lives
    are influenced, both directly and indirectly, through the exposure to
    consumer items from other countries and cultures.
    
    If much of the above is currently uncountable or untraceable, there
    is, nonetheless, enough information out there to define the basic
    shape of the global network.  Thanks to the institutional fascination
    with data that have accompanied and supported globalization,
    practically every legal transaction across borders is counted and
    reported.  Telephone calls, plane arrivals, shipments of goods, and
    receipts for services can all be used to trace the shape and dynamics
    of the new international order (or to determine the extent to which
    it is new).  These measures are often imperfect and certainly not
    exhaustive, but they do provide an adequate first brush with the new
    global geography.
    
    There are equally difficult challenges with units of analysis.
    International networks consist of millions and perhaps billions of
    individuals making decisions and establishing contacts.  These operate
    within millions of organizations of an infinite variety.  These,
    in turn, tend to be concentrated in particular cities and regions.
    Yet, much of the information available and certainly the majority
    of the analysis emphasizes relationships between national societies.
    This is partly a reflection of a nation-centric bias in much of social
    science.  More important, it is a product of the very data-gathering
    techniques and protocols on which international analysis depends.
    This is particularly paradoxical given that a significant part of the
    globalization literature predicts the withering away of the relevance
    of the nation-state.
    
    The new geography of globalization should begin to gather data at
    levels of aggregation smaller than the nation-state.  Saskia Sassen
    (1991) has demonstrated the critical importance of global cities in
    maintaining the new international system.  On a larger scale, specific
    regions within countries (e.g., Emilia-Romagna in Italy, Catalonia in
    Spain, the American coasts) are much more integrated into the global
    economy.  Cross-border zones are very much a part of globalization and
    may account for a disproportionate share of relational links.  The new
    geography should make every attempt to privilege these subunits, which
    are increasingly more relevant than our nation-centric analytical
    atlas.
    
    IN THIS ISSUE
    
    Having established a set of ambitious goals, we need to admit that
    this special issue is but a start.  Given the constraints of global
    network data availability highlighted above, this special issue
    focuses on analyses of informational and commercial flows while
    leaving other areas for future exploration.  The articles do not
    resolve all the issues discussed above.  Some do not use formal
    network methods.  Others continue to rely on national-level data.
    We believe, however, that the articles represent a beginning or an
    indication of the kind of work that will produce a more useful and
    insightful analysis of globalization.  One clear bias deserves to
    be acknowledged.  We have largely ignored the microfoundations on
    which these relationships are based.  We speak of states, societies,
    and organizations being linked, with only cursory attention paid to
    the individuals who actually make up the web (Koku, Nazer, & Wellman,
    2001 [this issue] being a prominent exception).  We can only hope that
    a parallel project will analyze the human relationships that underlie
    the global structures we have documented.
    
    We begin with a section devoted to economic interactions, arguably
    the foundation for all other connections.  Kick and Davis explore
    world-system structure across two periods, 1960 to 1965 and 1970
    to 1975.  The two authors assess the interplay between global and
    national domains of analyses.  They also examine the national-level
    consequences of strong, weak, and intermediate ties for the non-core
    countries of the world.  When taken together, the dynamics studied
    permit an examination of the central themes of world-system theory
    and network approaches in general and identify future agendas for
    sociological theorizing and research.
    
    Sacks, Ventresca, and Uzzi continue assessing the effects of
    country position in the global social structure of international
    trade on economic performance.  Their first finding is the relative
    insignificance of much-touted domestic factors such as savings rates
    or education.  They demonstrate that relative position within a global
    trade network is a significant factor in determining economic success.
    The relationship is not simplistic, however.  Actors within the
    world-trade network are differentially able to reap benefits based
    on their position, and unique social structural conditions provide
    different types of benefits to distinct kinds of actors.
    
    Bergesen and Sonnett use Fortune magazine's Global 500 to analyze the
    structure of the world economy and to speculate about the rise and
    fall of hegemonic states.  They show that about half the global firms
    are involved in basic production and the rest split between finance
    and service industries; these are about equally divided among Asia,
    Europe, and the United States.  In terms of the number of firms and
    industries in which countries produce, the relative position of the
    United States shows a clear decline, that of Japan has improved, and
    Europe's has remained relatively stable.
    
    Gary Gereffi's article examines how the commodity-chains framework
    facilitates our understanding of the structure and dynamics of global
    industries, as well as the development prospects for nations and firms
    within them.  First, he introduces the seminal distinction between
    producer-driven and buyer-driven commodity chains.  Second, he
    identifies the main types of lead firms in the automobile and apparel
    commodity chains.  Third, he illustrates how this approach can be used
    to study multiple dimensions of development.
    
    The second section of the special issue analyzes international
    communications infrastructures.  George Barnett examines the
    international telecommunications network and how it has changed
    since the late 1970s.  The network may be described as one large
    interconnected group of nations arrayed along a center-to-periphery
    dimension.  Barnett then discusses the future of the international
    communication structure and the implications for the development of
    a universal culture.
    
    David Smith and Michael Timberlake provide a parallel analysis of
    shifts in the global infrastructure through their study of airline
    traffic.  They highlight the shift in the global hierarchy of cities
    reflecting many of the changes discussed in accompanying chapters.
    
    The next three articles focus on the geography of the Internet.
    Matthew Zook uses a combination of domain names and user counts to
    provide an assessment of the global distribution of Internet content
    creation at the national and urban level and the structure of the
    supply and demand for this content at the national level.  This
    article relies on the theories of export-based development to assess
    the strengths and weaknesses of countries' Internet presence and the
    ramifications of this for future development.
    
    Anthony Townsend's article challenges assumptions regarding global
    city dominance of telecommunications networks.  To illustrate global
    cities' role in the deployment of Internet networks, the author
    presents a comprehensive map of New York City's international
    linkages.  By showing that the city is dependent on a broad group of
    other metropolitan areas for international backbone connections - the
    underlying infrastructure of the Internet - the author argues that the
    network is both driving and reflecting broader trends toward far more
    complex webs of interurban economic and communications flows than was
    experienced previously.
    
    In their article, Stanley Brunn and Martin Dodge analyze the
    connections between nations, using data on the number of Web pages
    and hyperlinks gathered from a commercial search engine in 1998.
    They analyze and describe the geography of the hyperlinks between
    nearly 200 nations, revealing the most and least connected regions
    and nations, with a particular focus on African and Central Asian
    countries.
    
    The final two pieces focus on exchanges between scholars.  Thomas
    Schott's article is a review describing findings in previous
    studies of the global networks promoting and constraining the
    global circulation of knowledge.  The cultivation of knowledge is
    institutionalized around the world in the three social institutions
    called education, science, and technology.  The article summarizes
    what is known about these global webs, specifies what is unknown,
    and proposes an agenda for mapping and analyzing these global webs.
    
    Koku et al. (2001) consider how distance affects interpersonal
    communication within scholarly communities.  The article serves as a
    possible challenge to those who might see in globalization all things
    made new again and reminds us of the importance of face-to-face
    communication.  In a special issue devoted to globalization, this
    article serves to highlight both the promise and the limitations of
    this new geography.
    
    CONCLUSION
    
    So what does this bright new world look like?  The articles in this
    special issue suggest that the new global geography will have two
    critical characteristics.
    
    First, almost all the authors make note of the nonlinear complexity
    of the new global structure and how this helps determine economic,
    political, and social outcomes.  Post-1980 globalization is not
    simply a form of the 19th-century world economy at faster speed and
    greater volume; it represents a substantive shift in the manner in
    which individuals, organizations, and societies are interconnected.
    
    Second, it is clear that globalization does not involve a flattening
    of a global hierarchy.  Some countries are richer, have better
    communications, and play a more central role.  Moreover, there are
    clear benefits to be derived from this centrality.  As globalization
    intensifies, these benefits might even increase, producing practically
    insurmountable (if invisible) walls around the new empires.  More
    specifically, practically all the studies point to the dominant
    position of the United States in practically every international
    network.  In many ways, globalization may be better understood as the
    Americanization of the world.
    
    The combination of global scale and complexity of relationships may
    imply that models of international governance and domination borrowed
    from earlier eras may no longer be relevant.  If this is true,
    then students of globalization will have to begin laying down the
    most essential foundation blocks of a new social scientific project.
    
    NOTES
    
    1. World exports are now $7 trillion a year or 21% of the global
    product; various forms of foreign investment total $2.5 trillion;
    foreign exchange activity is estimated at $1.5 trillion daily;
    workers' remittances now total $58 billion and represent an important
    part of the Latin American and Middle Eastern economies; and nearly
    600 million international tourists travel each year (United Nations
    Development Program [UNDP], 1999, p. 25).
    
    2. See Held, McGrew, Goldblatt, and Perraton (1999) for a summary of
    positions of the continuing relevance of states.
    
    3. The election flights to Israel are but one example.  Candidates for
    national office in Santo Domingo campaign in New York.  As elections
    become cleaner in Mexico and as citizenship rights are redefined, the
    U.S.-based vote may become decisive.
    
    4. Even here, however, globalization (broadly understood) plays
    a role.  While Sierra Leone may be a perfect example of the global
    underclass removed from the transnational arena, the existence of
    an international diamond market has fueled that country's civil war.
    
    5. For example, Germany exports 20 times more than Brazil per capita
    and 85 times more than Kenya while importing 15 times more than Brazil
    and 55 times more than Kenya (again, per capita).  Germany also has
    6 times more telephones per capita than Brazil and 42 times more than
    Kenya (No Limits Ventures Ltd., 1999).
    
    6. But there may be significant and important exceptions.  For labor-
    exporting countries, the working class may be as international as the
    elite.
    
    7. As we will explain later, due to limitations in the way data are
    collected, most current analyses are restricted to investigations at
    the national level.
    
    8. The unequal international distribution of access to the Internet
    also serves as an excellent indication of how the shape of the
    infrastructure of globalization may determine the outcomes it produces
    (Hargittai, 1998, 1999; International Telecommunication Union, 1997).
    The United States, for example, has more computers than the rest of
    the world's countries combined; it accounts for a large percentage
    of the creation and distribution of Web content (Organization for
    Economic Cooperation and Development, 1997); 80%of World Wide Web
    content is in English.  The typical Internet user is a member of a
    very elite minority (UNDP, 1999, Press Kit, pp. 1-2).
    
    9. An illustrative tale follows: The typical international transaction
    of 1900 was essentially linear.  The port of Buenos Aires might
    include a ship loaded with wheat and meat destined for London, another
    holding locomotive parts from Liverpool, and a third immigrants
    from Naples.  The lines between origins and final destinations
    were straight, and the contents only interacted in the sense that
    one helped pay for the other.  Today, a plane landing from London
    at Ezeiza Airport might include executives planning an investment
    in Argentina for export to Brazil, a shipment of computer boards
    that a local IBM subsidiary will transform prior to re-export to
    Peru, a German student hoping that her improved Spanish will help
    her find work in international banking, a Boston couple on their
    round-the-world honeymoon, and a Bolivian doctor hoping to immigrate.
    Moreover and most important, equivalent transactions and movements
    will be occurring over a wider variety of media (other airlines, cars,
    ships, phones, the Internet, etc.)
    
    10. This would allow, for example, a much more precise articulation
    of a country's position within a global system.  Core countries might
    be characterized both by their centrality and by the consistency of
    their relational position within a variety of transactional subwebs.
    Peripheral societies would share this consistency but remain on the
    margins of the system.  Semiperipheries would be characterized by
    relatively high centrality on some measures (e.g., commercial trade)
    but low centrality on others (e.g., cultural exports).
    
    11. The theoretical model closest to this enterprise is the work of
    Breiger (1981) on international interdependence.
    
    12. It is important to clarify that we are using the term networks
    in the "soft" sense of the word.  Networks are not necessarily self-
    aware or even cohesive and exclusive.  We cannot speak of networks
    for themselves or even in themselves.  Networks are, in many ways,
    artificial groupings placed in a myriad of relationships by an
    external observer.  The real point is not to discover hidden agents
    in the formation of a new global order but to accurately reflect
    social relations and patterns of power and influence.
    
    13. Some legal transfers may also not be properly analyzed.
    Intracompany transactions may represent a hidden world of
    globalization.  Similarly, we need to be aware of what we might call
    intranetwork transfers involving informal markets in bonds, currency,
    and futures.  Data on capital/ communication flows may err on the
    conservative side, given that such transfers often happen through
    internal networks that often do not show up in official national
    aggregate statistics.
    
    14. Although there are popular accounts of the most common supplier
    nations, it is less clear where these people end up; in general,
    no precise data exist on such flows because some of the people are
    transported officially through various visas whereas others are
    smuggled across borders.
    
    15. Internet data can get from Point A to Point B through various
    channels.  This is precisely what made it so attractive for military
    needs when it was being developed in the 1960s (Hafner & Lyon, 1996).
    Unfortunately, information about the physical location of Points A
    and B is often difficult to learn from electronic identification data.
    An e-mail address such as nameat_private often implies no information
    about the physical location of the user.
    
    16. The first result of a Web search for Ricky Martin's picture on a
    popular American search engine yields a link to a Hungarian teenager's
    Web site (Lycos 1999 Web search, http://www.lycos.com/picturethis/).
    
    REFERENCES
    
    Berger, S. (1996). Introduction. In S. Berger &R. Dore (Eds.),
    National diversity and global capital-ism (pp. 1-25). Ithaca, NY:
    Cornell University Press.
    
    Breiger, R. (1981). Structures of economic interdependence among
    nations.  In P. Blau &R. Merton (Eds.), Continuities in structural
    inquiry. Beverly Hills, CA: Sage.
    
    Castells, M. (1996). The rise of the network society. Cambridge, MA:
    Blackwell.
    
    Castells, M. (1998). The end of the millenium. Cambridge, MA:
    Blackwell.
    
    Chase-Dunn, C., & Grimes, P. (1995). World-systems analysis. Annual
    Review of Sociology, 21, 387-417.
    
    DiMaggio, P., & Powell, W. W. (1983). The iron cage revisited:
    Institutional isomorphism and collective rationality in organizational
    fields. American Sociological Review, 48,147-160.
    
    Fligstein, N. (1998). Is globalization the cause of the crises of
    welfare states? (EUI Working Paper SPS No. 98/5). Badia Fiesolana, San
    Domenico: European University Institute.
    
    Friedman, T. L. (1999). The Lexus and the olive tree. New York:Farrar,
    Straus, Giroux.
    
    Geertz, C. (1998). The world in pieces: Culture and politics at the
    end of the century. Focaal: Tijdschrift voor Antropologie, 32, 91-117.
    
    Giving the customer what he wants. (1998, February 14). The
    Economist,p.21.
    
    Granovetter, M. (1995). Getting a job: A study of contacts and
    careers.  Chicago: University of Chicago Press. (Original work
    published 1974)
    
    Guillen, M. (2001). Is globalization civilizing, destructive, or
    feeble? A critique of six key debates in the social science
    literature. Annual Review of Sociology, 27.
    
    Hafner, K., & Lyon, M. (1996). Where wizards stay up late. New York:
    Simon & Schuster.
    
    Hargittai, E. (1998). Holes in the net: The Internet and international
    stratification revisited. Proceedings of the Internet Society's
    Internet Summit meetings [Online]. Available: http://www.isoc.
    org/inet98/proceedings/5d/5d_1.htm
    
    Hargittai, E. (1999). Weaving the Western web: Explaining the
    differences in Internet connectivity among OECD
    countries. Telecommunications Policy, 23(10/11).
    
    Held, D., McGrew, A., Goldblatt, D., & Perraton, J. (1999). Global
    transformations: Politics, economics, and culture. Palo Alto, CA:
    Stanford University Press.
    
    Hirst, P. Q., &Thompson, G. (1996). Globalization in question: The
    international economy and the possibilities of governance. Cambridge,
    UK: Polity.
    
    International Telecommunication Union. (1997). Challenges to the
    network: Telecoms and the Internet. Geneva, Switzerland: Author.
    
    Keck, M. E., & Sikkink, K. (1998). Activists beyond borders: Advocacy
    networks in international politics. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University
    Press.
    
    Koku, E., Nazer, N., &Wellman, B. (2001). Netting scholars: Online and
    offline. American Behavioral Scientist, 44,1750-1772.
    
    Krugman, P. (1994). Peddling prosperity. New York: Norton.
    
    Louch, H., Hargittai, E., &Centeno, M. A. (1999). Phone calls and
    fax machines: The limits to globalization.  The Washington Quarterly,
    22(2), 83-100.
    
    Meyer, J., Frank, D. J., Hironaka, A., Schofer, E., & Tuma,
    N. B. (1997).  The structuring of a world environmental regime,
    1870-1990. International Organizations, 51(4), 623-651.
    
    No Limits Ventures Ltd. (1999). Your nation [Online]. Available:
    http://www.your-nation.com Organization for Economic Cooperation and
    Development. (1997). Webcasting and convergence: Policy implications.
    Paris: Author. Available online:
    http://www.oecd.org/dsti/sti/it/cm/prod/ e_97-221.htm
    
    Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development. (1998). OECD
    Internet infrastructure indicators. Paris: Author.
    
    Panitch, L. (1996). Rethinking the role of the state. In
    J. H. Mittelman (Ed.), Globalization: Critical reflections
    (pp. 83-113). Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner.
    
    Portes, A. (1997). Globalization from below: The rise of transnational
    communities (Working paper 98-08). Princeton, NJ: Center for Migration
    and Development.
    
    Powell, W. W. (1990). Neither market nor hierarchy. In B. Staw &L.
    L.Cummings (Eds.), Research in organizational behavior (Vol. 12).
    Greenwich, CT: JAI.
    
    Reich, R. (1991). The work of nations: Preparing ourselves for
    twenty-first century capitalism.New York: Simon & Schuster.
    
    Ritzer, G. (1996). The McDonaldization of America. Thousand Oaks, CA:
    Pine Forge Press.
    
    Rodrik, D. (1997). Has globalization gone too far? Washington, DC:
    Institute for International Economics.
    
    Sassen, S. (1991). The global city: New York, London,
    Tokyo. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
    
    Sklair, L. (1991). Sociology of the global system. New York: Harvester
    Wheatsheaf.
    
    Standage, T. (1998). The Victorian Internet. New York: Walker.
    
    Strange, S. (1998). Globalization in question. International Political
    Economy, 54, 704-711.
    
    United Nations Development Program. (1999). Human development
    report. New York: Human Development Report Office.
    
    Watson, J. L. (1997). Golden arches east. Stanford, CA: Stanford
    University Press.
    
    Wellman, B. (1988). Structural analysis: From method and metaphor to
    theory and substance. In
    
    B. Wellman &S. D. Berkowitz (Eds.), Social structures: A network
    approach (pp. 19-61). Cam-bridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
    
    end
    



    This archive was generated by hypermail 2b30 : Thu Aug 09 2001 - 12:36:29 PDT