BSD coredumps follow symlinks

From: Ronny Cook (ronnyat_private)
Date: Thu Apr 02 1998 - 00:02:00 PST

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    > Date:         Tue, 31 Mar 1998 17:55:40 +6500
    > From: Denis Papp <dpappat_private>
    >
    > I have a system running BSD/OS 2.1 with all the patches from BSDi, including
    > K210-029 which I quote:
    > "This patch addresses a security problem with core dumps from setuid programs."
    >
    > I don't know what this patch really does but apparently this patch does
    > not fix the problem where coredumps follow symlinks.  If a user knows
    > how to core dump any setuid root program that user can then clobber any
    > file on the system (/root/.rhosts, /etc/passwd, /etc/hosts.equiv,
    > whatever).  Furthermore if that user knows how to clobber
    > a setuid root program that calls getpass* then the user can get
    > all the shadowed passwords.
    
    Not quite all (depending on the size of your password file), but
    certainly some.
    [...]
    > What can I do about it?  Is there a way to turn off core dumps?  That
    > would be a reasonable temporary fix.
    >
    There is a later patch for BSD/OS 3.0 (M300-023) which is described as:
    
            Fixes a potential denial of service attack related
            to the kernel following symbolic links when writing core files.
    
    which I expect fixes the problem once and for all. The initial release of 3.0
    attempted to fix the problem differently and failed. :-) The M300-023 patch,
    as nearly as I can tell, doesn't disable SUID core dumps altogether but
    does prevent them from following symlinks.
    
    Unfortunately, upgrading to 3.0 requires you to pay BSDI. :-( However, if you
    have access to sources, you can always download that patch yourself, unpack
    it and apply the source patches included.
    
    If you don't have access to sources, I've back-ported the patch (in a rough
    & ready fashion) and can supply the modified object file (kern_sig.o)
    to BSDI licensees. Licence conditions preclude my making it available for
    public download without explicit permission from BSDI. :-(
    
                    ...Ronny
    --
     Ronald Cook, Technical Manager - Message Handling Systems/The Message eXchange
     Email: ronnyat_private ----- Phone: +61-2-9550-4448 ---- Fax: +61-2-9519-2551
    
    All opinions are my own and not those of TMX unless explicitly stated otherwise.
    



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