Re: CISCO PIX Vulnerability

From: Damir Rajnovic (Damir.Rajnovicat_private)
Date: Wed Jun 03 1998 - 23:54:00 PDT

  • Next message: Aleph One: "FreeBSD Security Advisory: FreeBSD-SA-98:05.nfs"

    Hi there,
    
    At 19:25 -0700 3/6/98, David Wagner wrote:
    >In article <v03007801b19b0b9bd8f5@[194.82.141.242]> you write:
    >> CISCO PIX Private Link feature uses DES key that is only 48 bits in length.
    >[...]
    >> Apparently, knowing what bits are fixed will not bring attacker
    >> any additional 'gain' in breaking a DES. At least I was told that by
    >> people from sci.crypt group.
    >
    >Either the sci.crypt folks were confused, or I am.  With only 48
    >unknown bits in the DES key, you can break the encryption 2^8 = 256
    >times faster than you can break DES.  This is a serious weakness.
    
    Probably I was unclear. What I want to say is that it does not matter
    what bits inside key are known. It is the same if you know that first
    8 bits are 0 or middle or end bits. In all cases you must put the same
    effort to break encryption. In that sense there is no 'additional gain'
    knowing WHAT bits are fixed it does matter only that some are fixed.
    
    Cheers,
    
    Gaus
    
    
    ---------------------------------------------------------------
    EuroCERT                                tel: (+44 1235) 822 382
    c/o UKERNA                              fax: (+44 1235) 822 398
    Atlas Centre
    Chilton, Didcot
    Oxfordshire OX11 0QS, UK
    



    This archive was generated by hypermail 2b30 : Fri Apr 13 2001 - 13:56:44 PDT