Re: Regarding Mudge's OBP/FORTH root hack (PHRACK53)

From: Casper Dik (casperat_private)
Date: Mon Jul 13 1998 - 12:58:43 PDT

  • Next message: Darren J Moffat - SunService ETZ-N OS Product Support Group: "Re: Regarding Mudge's OBP/FORTH root hack (PHRACK53)"

    >On Fri, 10 Jul 1998, Jericho Nunn wrote:
    >
    >>     An easy and quick work-around that avoids granting  just anybody at
    >> the console the ability to "Stop-A" and drop into OBP, is to enable the
    >> "security-mode" and "security-password" variables within OBP.  Changing
    >> the default value of "security-mode" from 'none' to 'full', forces a
    >> user who tries to halt the system to authenticate against the password
    >> defined in "security-password" before having access to the OBP command
    >> line.
    >
    >On some (older?) OBP versions, you can reset the NVRAM to default
    >values (hence disabling the password) by pressing Stop-N.
    
    That doesn't work.    (Well, maybe on really old Rev 1.0 PROMS).
    L1-N only works if the PROM isn't in secure mode.
    
    While the Forth in the Openboot PROM make it a bt easier (and I'm sure
    I've seen code snippets to set your creds years ago), the older
    Sun 3 and pre openboot Sun roms have similar functionality but with
    arcane syntax.
    
    And, you can boot in kadb; and have even more support to walk around in
    the kernel.    Then there's kadb work-a-like in Forth that we use
    at Sun.
    
    >And of course, a truly dedicated attacker simply has to open the box up
    >and drop in his own NVRAM chip which has no password.
    
    
    There's no security with physical access. Modge article serves to highlight
    what everbody should have realized a long time ago; with password protection
    on the boot firmware, cracking root is easy.
    
    Casper
    



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