Borderware predictable initial TCP sequence numbers

From: Roy Hills (Roy.Hills@NTA-MONITOR.COM)
Date: Tue Sep 01 1998 - 01:55:24 PDT

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    While performing an Internet security scan (aka penetration test) for a UK
    corporate customer, I've discovered that version 5 of Borderware Firewall
    generates predictable initial TCP sequence numbers in response to incoming
    SYNs.  The observed pattern is the familiar "64k increments" often seen
    on older Unix kernels.  This allows TCP connections to be established
    with a spoofed source address.
    
    I've only seen this behaviour on Borderware 5, but I suspect that this
    is a generic Kernel issue that would affect previous versions as well.
    Would anyone with earlier versions care to check to see if they are
    vulnerable?  (If you want a test program, drop me an Email and I'll
    send you the C source of the tool I use).
    
    After being informed of this issue, Borderware Technologies, Inc. have
    reproduced the problem and plan to address it in the next release.
    
    As long as Borderware doesn't use source IP address for authentication, then
    this is probably not a serious issue.  However, I guess that it would be
    possible
    to send "perfectly spoofed" Email - complete with fake connecting IP
    address using
    a spoofed SMTP session...
    
    It's surprised that such a well-known issue on a Firewall with significant
    market-share has not been discovered before.  Does this mean that ICSA
    certification and field-testing failed to pick this up, or just failed to
    report it?
    
    Roy Hills
    NTA Monitor Ltd
    
    --
    Roy Hills                                    Tel:   01634 721855
    NTA Monitor Ltd                              FAX:   01634 721844
    6 Beaufort Court, Medway City Estate,        Email: Roy.Hills@nta-monitor.com
    Rochester, Kent ME2 4FB, UK                  WWW:   http://www.nta-monitor.com/
    



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