Re: Borderware predictable initial TCP sequence numbers

From: Gigi Sullivan (sullivanat_private)
Date: Wed Sep 02 1998 - 01:56:52 PDT

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    Hello there,
    
    This can be applied also to Firewall-1 (CheckPoint) running on an
    HP-UX 10.X series.
    
    
    bye bye
    
    
                            -- gg sullivan
    
    --
    Lorenzo Cavallaro
    Intesis SECURITY LAB            Phone: +39-2-671563.1
    Via Settembrini, 35             Fax: +39-2-66981953
    I-20124 Milano  ITALY           Email: sullivanat_private
    
    
    On Tue, 1 Sep 1998, Roy Hills wrote:
    
    > Date: Tue, 1 Sep 1998 09:55:24 +0100
    > From: Roy Hills <Roy.Hills@NTA-MONITOR.COM>
    > To: BUGTRAQat_private
    > Subject: Borderware predictable initial TCP sequence numbers
    >
    > While performing an Internet security scan (aka penetration test) for a UK
    > corporate customer, I've discovered that version 5 of Borderware Firewall
    > generates predictable initial TCP sequence numbers in response to incoming
    > SYNs.  The observed pattern is the familiar "64k increments" often seen
    > on older Unix kernels.  This allows TCP connections to be established
    > with a spoofed source address.
    
    [snip]
    
    >
    > --
    > Roy Hills                                    Tel:   01634 721855
    > NTA Monitor Ltd                              FAX:   01634 721844
    > 6 Beaufort Court, Medway City Estate,        Email: Roy.Hills@nta-monitor.com
    > Rochester, Kent ME2 4FB, UK                  WWW:   http://www.nta-monitor.com/
    >
    



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