Re: More Rconsole stuff

From: costello, don (don_costelloat_private)
Date: Sat Oct 10 1998 - 01:32:00 PDT

  • Next message: Ken Williams: "Re: Another Netscape 4.07 cache reading bug"

    Since when is SYS:ETC readable by everyone???  Not on my default NetWare
    install!  You might want to check your rights at the root of SYS or see if
    some knucklehead gave read rights at the ETC directory.
    
    The separate NCF idea is actually pretty good, seeing as how INETCFG can get
    kind of stupid sometimes.  For example, we're running ATM on the servers
    using Novell's ATM stack, INETCFG reeks all kinds of havoc...we had to use a
    separate NCF to load/bind the drivers/protocols.  Novell is aware of this
    issue (seems to be a problem with INETCFG not understanding how ATM works).
    Don't know if this happens with NetWare 5 or not.  BTW - being on an ATM
    network (for us) makes it damn near impossible to sniff the wire.  You have
    to physically break the connection to get a trace.
    
    I still go back to my original statement - RCONOSLE, although it appears
    subject to compromise, it's still difficult to do.  The data destruction
    threat is more likely than the threat of the system being compromised for
    inappropriate access.  BTW - if you have a firewall, SPX won't work.  If
    you're running IP via XCONSOLE (included with NetWare/IP or the older
    Flex/IP product), you can easily set up deny rules to prevent telnet
    sessions to your NetWare servers.  Also, truly truly paranoid people can put
    a firewall between their internal net and the NetWare servers, if you're
    interested in adding a hop (and some serious latency) into the network in
    the name of security ;-).
    
    As for the internal threat, that's easy to deal with from where I stand.
    Scare someone into realizing his/her job is at stake and that it's a felony
    to compromise computer data or systems, and you should be able to deter the
    internal threat somewhat.
    
    -- dcc --
    
    
            -----Original Message-----
            From:   Chris Brenton [SMTP:cbrentonat_private]
            Sent:   Friday, October 09, 1998 11:07 AM
            To:     BUGTRAQat_private
            Subject:        More Rconsole stuff
    
            Since we're on the subject of Rconsole and I did not find this in
    the
            archives...
    
            As of NetWare 4.x, Novell recommends using the Inetcfg utility for
            managing networking. If you have "load remote" in the autoexec.ncf,
            Inetcfg will try to grab it and add it to Inetcfg's scripts.
    
            The problem here is that Inetcfg saves the Rconsole password to
    SYS:ETC
            in a file named Netinfo.cfg. All users have full read access to this
            directory so anyone with a valid account can view the Rconsole
    password.
            Given Simple Nomad's post, even if you cut and paste in order to
    ensure
            that the password is encrypted, it is still extremely vulnerable.
    
            The patch would be to call remote from another NCF file which is
    stored
            in the SYS:SYSTEM directory. This will at least limit access to only
            Admins. This will also prevent Inetcfg from trying to grab it. Of
    course
            the real fix would be to not use Rconsole. ;)
    
            I've also noticed (with 4.1x anyway) that if you enable Telnet
    access to
            the server, remote sessions are not logged. Combine this with the
    above
            and any user can now whack away at the server console without
    leaving an
            audit trail.
    
            Any known patches for the above would be most cool,
            Chris
            --
            **************************************
            cbrentonat_private
    
            * Multiprotocol Network Design & Troubleshooting
    
    http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/ISBN=0782120822/0740-8883012-887529
            * Mastering Network Security
    
    http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/ISBN%3D0782123430/002-0346046-8151850
    



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