ISS Security Advisory: BMC PATROL File Creation Vulnerability

From: X-Force (xforceat_private)
Date: Mon Nov 02 1998 - 14:57:11 PST

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    ISS Security Advisory
    November 2nd, 1998
    
    BMC PATROL File Creation Vulnerability
    
    Synopsis:
    
    Internet Security Systems (ISS) X-Force has discovered a vulnerability in BMC
    Software PATROL(r) Patrol network management software.  PATROL contains a
    vulnerability that may allow local attackers to compromise root access.  The
    agent creates insecure temporary files that may lead to a symbolic link attack.
    
    Affected Versions:
    
    ISS X-Force has confirmed that this vulnerability exists on version 3.2.3 of
    PATROL Agent(tm) software product.  Earlier versions of PATROL Agent are also
    vulnerable.
    
    Executing any of the PATROL binaries with the -v flag will report version
    information.
    
    Fix Information:
    
    BMC Software has been notified of this vulnerability on August 20, 1998.
    Contact BMC Software at http://www.bmc.com to obtain a patch when it is made
    available.
    
    Until a patch is available, ISS suggests administrators restrict access to
    PATROL Agent.  Administrators are encouraged to create a system administrator
    group and to only allow Administrators execute permission on PATROL Agent.
    This temporary fix may help contain the vulnerability until a patch is made
    available.
    
    Description:
    
    PATROL Agent is installed setuid root with world-execute permissions.  When
    PATROL Agent is executed, it creates temporary files on the system.  These
    files are opened and written to in an insecure manner.  This allows local users to
    create a symbolic link to a privileged file.  This link is then followed upon
    the initialization of PATROL Agent.  Attackers may use this vulnerability to
    overwrite any file or create a new file that is owned by root.  Attackers
    commonly use this method to indirectly compromise root access.
    
    Temporary files that follow symbolic links are a common source of
    vulnerabilities in setuid root executables.  Administrators should remove or
    restrict access to suid executables if possible.
    
    Developers of setuid programs need to take special precautions to protect
    their programs from creating new vulnerabilities on the systems on which
    they are installed.  The ISS X-Force recommends that all Unix developers
    become familiar with Matt Bishop's secure programming tutorials available at:
    http://olympus.cs.ucdavis.edu/~bishop/secprog.html
    
    - ----------
    
    Copyright (c) 1998 by Internet Security Systems, Inc.
    
    Permission is hereby granted for the redistribution of this alert
    electronically.  It is not to be edited in any way without express consent
    of X-Force.  If you wish to reprint the whole or any part of this alert in
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    for permission.
    
    Disclaimer
    The information within this paper may change without notice. Use of this
    information constitutes acceptance for use in an AS IS condition. There are
    NO warranties with regard to this information. In no event shall the author
    be liable for any damages whatsoever arising out of or in connection with
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    the user's own risk.
    
    X-Force PGP Key available at: http://www.iss.net/xforce/sensitive.html as
    well as on MIT's PGP key server and PGP.com's key server.
    
    X-Force Vulnerability and Threat Database: http://www.iss.net/xforce
    
    Please send suggestions, updates, and comments to:
    X-Force <xforceat_private> of Internet Security Systems, Inc.
    
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