Regarding the reported DOS against the internal interface of a

From: WatchGuard Rapid Response (RapidResponseat_private)
Date: Wed Nov 04 1998 - 13:14:28 PST

  • Next message: Ernst Jan Plugge: "Secure-linux patch"

    Last Friday ( Oct 30,  1998 ) a message was posted to Bugtraq describing
    a Denial of Service Attack against the WatchGuard FireBox II. The
    poster, Sr. Matias Ruiz, described how he had caused a FireBox II to
    crash during a "Pepsi" attack launched against the trusted interface
    from the trusted network.  When the WatchGuard Rapid Response Team saw
    the post,  we began trying to contact Sr. Ruiz and to duplicate the
    exploit.
    To date,  we have been unsucessful contacting Sr. Ruiz.  We have
    completed our testing of the Firebox II and have been unsuccessful in
    duplicating the results that Sr. Ruiz has described in his post.  We
    believe that the Firebox II running the currently shipping version of
    the software is not vulnerable to the attack as it was described.
    
    To more fully understand the ramifications of this class of attack
    against the WatchGuard Security System  we extended the parameters of
    our testing to include simultaneous Pepsi, New-Pep and Ping-flooding
    from multiple sources on both a 100 MB Ethernet segment and a 10 MB
    Ethernet segment.  These attacks were run against the trusted interface
    from the trusted network on both the Firebox II, and the Firebox 100.
    Our results are as follows:
    
    1) The FB II running the currently shipping version of the software,
    (Version 3.1) operated normally during the test on both the 10 and 100
    MB segments
    
    2) The FB 100 running the currently shipping version of the software,
    (Version 3.0 Rev.A)  operated normally during the test on the 10 MB
    segment
    
    3) The FB 100 running the currently shipping version of the software,
    (Version 3.0 Rev.A) did suffer a gradual degradation of performance on a
    100MB segment leading to a reboot after 30 Min. of continuous flooding.
    At no time was the test platform "disarmed".
    
    As a practical matter, the behavior observed in test case 3 (above)  is
    a highly anomalous and easily traceable traffic pattern,  the impact of
    which can be mitigated by a few simple configuration changes.  Contact
    WatchGuard Technical Support if you have any questions.
    
    In the absence of any further information from Sr. Ruiz, we believe that
    his report of a vulnerability in the FireBox II is in error.
    
    
    WatchGuard Rapid Response Team
    



    This archive was generated by hypermail 2b30 : Fri Apr 13 2001 - 14:22:12 PDT