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______________________________________________________________________________
Silicon Graphics Inc. Security Advisory
Title: Vulnerability in IRIX autofsd
Title: RSI.0010.10-02-98.IRIX.AUTOFSD
Number: 19981005-01-PX
Date: November 23 ,1998
______________________________________________________________________________
Silicon Graphics provides this information freely to the SGI user community
for its consideration, interpretation, implementation and use. Silicon
Graphics recommends that this information be acted upon as soon as possible.
Silicon Graphics provides the information in this Security Advisory on
an "AS-IS" basis only, and disclaims all warranties with respect thereto,
express, implied or otherwise, including, without limitation, any warranty
of merchantability or fitness for a particular purpose. In no event shall
Silicon Graphics be liable for any loss of profits, loss of business, loss
of data or for any indirect, special, exemplary, incidental or consequential
damages of any kind arising from your use of, failure to use or improper
use of any of the instructions or information in this Security Advisory.
______________________________________________________________________________
- -----------------------
- --- Issue Specifics ---
- -----------------------
The autofsd(1M) daemon is used to automatically mount remote file systems.
The Repent Security, Inc (RSI) group has publicly reported a vulnerability in
the IRIX autofsd daemon which can lead to a root compromise.
Silicon Graphics Inc. has investigated the issue and recommends the
following steps for neutralizing the exposure. It is HIGHLY RECOMMENDED
that these measures be implemented on ALL vulnerable SGI systems.
This issue has been corrected in future releases of IRIX.
- --------------
- --- Impact ---
- --------------
The autofsd(1M) daemon is installed by default on IRIX.
A local user account on the vulnerable system is not required in order to
exploit the autofsd(1M) daemon.
The vulnerability can be exploited remotely by using carefully crafted network
packets that are sent to the autofsd(1M) daemon.
The vulnerability can lead to a root compromise.
This vulnerability was reported by RSI.0010.10-02-98.IRIX.AUTOFSD:
http://www.repsec.com/advisory/0010.html
This vulnerability has been publicly discussed in Usenet newsgroups
and mailing lists.
- --------------------------
- --- Temporary Solution ---
- --------------------------
Although patches are available for this issue, it is realized that
there may be situations where installing the patches immediately may
not be possible.
The steps below can be used to disable the autofs(1M) daemon thereby
removing the vulnerability until patches can be installed.
=================
**** WARNING ****
=================
Disabling autofs(1M) daemon will prevent users from automatically
mounting remote file systems. The automount(1M) daemon can be used
as a temporary workaround. See the ONC3/NFS Administrator's Guide
which is available online from the insight program or via the web:
http://techpubs.sgi.com/library/
1) Become the root user on the system.
% /bin/su -
Password:
#
2) Verify autofs(1M) daemon is enabled.
# chkconfig
Flag State
==== =====
autofs on
3) Disable autofs(1M) daemon.
# chkconfig autofs off
4) Verify autofs(1M) daemon has been disabled.
# chkconfig
Flag State
==== =====
autofs off
5) Reboot the system
# reboot
- ----------------
- --- Solution ---
- ----------------
OS Version Vulnerable? Patch # Other Actions
---------- ----------- ------- -------------
IRIX 3.x no Note 1
IRIX 4.x no Note 1
IRIX 5.0.x no Note 1
IRIX 5.1.x no Note 1
IRIX 5.2 no Note 1
IRIX 5.3 no Note 2
IRIX 6.0.x no Note 1
IRIX 6.1 no Note 1
IRIX 6.2 yes 3392 Note 2 & 3
IRIX 6.3 yes 3391 Note 2 & 3
IRIX 6.4 yes 3250 Note 2 & 3
IRIX 6.5 yes 6.5.2 Note 3 & 4
IRIX 6.5.1 yes 6.5.2 Note 3 & 4
IRIX 6.5.2 no Note 5
NOTES
1) Upgrade to currently supported IRIX operating system. See
http://support.sgi.com/news/irix2.html for more information.
2) This version of the IRIX operating system is in maintenance mode
and patches will no longer be produced when it retires. See
http://support.sgi.com/news/irix1.html for more information.
3) See "Temporary Solution" section.
4) IRIX 6.5.2 needs to be installed to remove this vulnerability.
5) If you have not received an IRIX 6.5.2 CD for IRIX 6.5, contact your
SGI Support Provider or download the IRIX 6.5.2 Maintenance Release
Stream from http://support.sgi.com/ or
ftp://patches.sgi.com/support/relstream/
Information about installing IRIX 6.5.2 can be found at:
http://support.sgi.com/6.5/installing.html
Patches are available via anonymous FTP and your service/support provider.
The primary SGI anonymous FTP site for security information and patches
is sgigate.sgi.com (204.94.209.1). Security information and patches can be
found in the ~ftp/security and ~ftp/patches directories, respectively.
For security and patch management reasons, ftp.sgi.com (mirror of sgigate) lags
behind and does not do a real-time update of ~ftp/security and ~ftp/patches
##### Patch File Checksums ####
The actual patch will be a tar file containing the following files:
Filename: README.patch.3250
Algorithm #1 (sum -r): 07800 10 README.patch.3250
Algorithm #2 (sum): 1865 10 README.patch.3250
MD5 checksum: DC08AA3C9BE672E23BA7B98511A8AE64
Filename: patchSG0003250
Algorithm #1 (sum -r): 29714 4 patchSG0003250
Algorithm #2 (sum): 46399 4 patchSG0003250
MD5 checksum: 7CCCD06F9F9287FABB4C1F089540AB65
Filename: patchSG0003250.eoe_sw
Algorithm #1 (sum -r): 26654 25 patchSG0003250.eoe_sw
Algorithm #2 (sum): 54236 25 patchSG0003250.eoe_sw
MD5 checksum: 27672AF486D3789560E33AE368C244A1
Filename: patchSG0003250.idb
Algorithm #1 (sum -r): 29537 3 patchSG0003250.idb
Algorithm #2 (sum): 19316 3 patchSG0003250.idb
MD5 checksum: C8380CE292B058545E101A9C80F0EFC5
Filename: patchSG0003250.nfs_man
Algorithm #1 (sum -r): 15127 26 patchSG0003250.nfs_man
Algorithm #2 (sum): 4624 26 patchSG0003250.nfs_man
MD5 checksum: 03DBA9D1E4F287CE4282172355849234
Filename: patchSG0003250.nfs_sw
Algorithm #1 (sum -r): 45181 141 patchSG0003250.nfs_sw
Algorithm #2 (sum): 56554 141 patchSG0003250.nfs_sw
MD5 checksum: C52C4A858EB87C788DB53D6DDC37E9CC
Filename: README.patch.3391
Algorithm #1 (sum -r): 63933 11 README.patch.3391
Algorithm #2 (sum): 22537 11 README.patch.3391
MD5 checksum: 768EB3E6B5797DF1D7DB4506FDBCD1F0
Filename: patchSG0003391
Algorithm #1 (sum -r): 00828 5 patchSG0003391
Algorithm #2 (sum): 19000 5 patchSG0003391
MD5 checksum: 8BDF1FE22C2E52B93BD3A2D1199F7A0A
Filename: patchSG0003391.eoe_sw
Algorithm #1 (sum -r): 30886 31 patchSG0003391.eoe_sw
Algorithm #2 (sum): 45572 31 patchSG0003391.eoe_sw
MD5 checksum: CAB0A7DDCB89BD2547DA9A8A033A6BF3
Filename: patchSG0003391.idb
Algorithm #1 (sum -r): 49029 2 patchSG0003391.idb
Algorithm #2 (sum): 4863 2 patchSG0003391.idb
MD5 checksum: 58A03CEE1B17FAFCDBFBA27D8C5A5BA9
Filename: patchSG0003391.onc3_eoe_man
Algorithm #1 (sum -r): 54375 6 patchSG0003391.onc3_eoe_man
Algorithm #2 (sum): 55561 6 patchSG0003391.onc3_eoe_man
MD5 checksum: C884D4375D6B96502628ABC2253E5CB0
Filename: patchSG0003391.onc3_eoe_sw
Algorithm #1 (sum -r): 10211 129 patchSG0003391.onc3_eoe_sw
Algorithm #2 (sum): 11471 129 patchSG0003391.onc3_eoe_sw
MD5 checksum: 27714AED52EF96FAF1691760BF05E5C3
Filename: README.patch.3392
Algorithm #1 (sum -r): 31068 12 README.patch.3392
Algorithm #2 (sum): 10078 12 README.patch.3392
MD5 checksum: B120B48BD7DF8D681BC9A27FD01C65D0
Filename: patchSG0003392
Algorithm #1 (sum -r): 19916 6 patchSG0003392
Algorithm #2 (sum): 7998 6 patchSG0003392
MD5 checksum: 091E12D3B0EC7462CBFAD9BAA37AC7AE
Filename: patchSG0003392.eoe_sw
Algorithm #1 (sum -r): 41641 23 patchSG0003392.eoe_sw
Algorithm #2 (sum): 61503 23 patchSG0003392.eoe_sw
MD5 checksum: 0884FA51E7569BD1BD2B39D324322B87
Filename: patchSG0003392.idb
Algorithm #1 (sum -r): 33117 2 patchSG0003392.idb
Algorithm #2 (sum): 8644 2 patchSG0003392.idb
MD5 checksum: 54918E34BF30280A91F2731E328791AC
Filename: patchSG0003392.onc3_eoe_man
Algorithm #1 (sum -r): 63737 6 patchSG0003392.onc3_eoe_man
Algorithm #2 (sum): 55562 6 patchSG0003392.onc3_eoe_man
MD5 checksum: 041653A0488E9B543ACD105CC4F20CF3
Filename: patchSG0003392.onc3_eoe_sw
Algorithm #1 (sum -r): 42469 137 patchSG0003392.onc3_eoe_sw
Algorithm #2 (sum): 22631 137 patchSG0003392.onc3_eoe_sw
MD5 checksum: 1F61453E0E31C8117A2AA03C0F2662D6
- -----------------------
- --- Acknowledgments ---
- -----------------------
Silicon Graphics wishes to thank the users of the Internet Community at
large for their assistance in this matter.
- -----------------------------------------------------------
- --- Silicon Graphics Inc. Security Information/Contacts ---
- -----------------------------------------------------------
If there are questions about this document, email can be sent to
cse-security-alertat_private
------oOo------
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respectively. The Silicon Graphics Security Headquarters Web page is
accessible at the URL http://www.sgi.com/Support/security/security.html.
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------oOo------
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------oOo------
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------oOo------
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______________________________________________________________________________
This information is provided freely to all interested parties and may
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includes its valid PGP signature.
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