Re: Why you should avoid world-writable directories

From: Rich Burroughs (richat_private)
Date: Tue Dec 22 1998 - 18:16:29 PST

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    Just an FYI, Wietse has issued a few patches to Postfix since this
    discussion began. The maildrop directory is no longer world readable, and
    I believe that mailq no longer returns the file names of queue files. The
    maildrop is still world writable.
    
    The patches are available via:
    
    ftp://ftp.porcupine.org/mirrors/postfix-release
    
    He also posted a more extended message to the Postfix mailing lists (which
    he said was sent to Bugtraq, too, though I haven't seen it here)
    discussing the design decisions he had made, and the reasons for them.
    
    "I see two directions for Postfix evolution: 1) maintain the present
    world-writable maildrop and unprivileged posting agent and 2) use
    a protected directory and a set-gid posting agent (set-uid seems
    to have no obvious advantage here). Is it feasible to keep maildrop
    queue file names secret, and are the other attacks indeed mere
    annoyances? Is it feasible to write secure set-gid programs that
    are not only secure today, but that will be secure on tomorrow's
    UNIX systems as well?
    
    Your feedback is appreciated."
    
    I think it's important to note that Postfix is still in beta, and is an
    evolving piece of software. People should keep that in mind when
    implementing it. I highly encourage people who are either using or
    considering the use of Postfix to subscribe to the mailing lists and
    follow the discussion there.
    
    
    Rich
    



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