Security problems in ISDN equipment authentication

From: David Schwartz (davidsat_private)
Date: Wed Feb 10 1999 - 15:08:50 PST

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    	A security flaw is probably still present in Ascend's multilink PPP
    implementation over ISDN. Due to its fundamental nature, it's probably in
    other ISDN hardware as well.
    
    	Ascend determines whether to bond a new incoming PPP connection with a
    previous connection based upon the 'endpoint identifier'. As I recall, they
    claimed that they had to do this because they had to decide whether to bond
    or not _before_ they received any other authentication information.
    
    	Most ISDN routers use their Ethernet hardware address as their endpoint
    identifier. I'm not sure what modems and T/As use. However, since the
    endpoint identifier is specified by the other end, it is fundamentally
    insecure to rely upon it for a security decision, such as whether to bond to
    an existing PPP connection.
    
    	The way we discovered this was during WebRamp beta testing, when the
    firmware had an interesting bug. It seems that every WebRamp sent the same
    endpoint identifier! Sure enough, if two WebRamps ever connected to the same
    Max or TNT, they'd get bonded to each other and both would fail to send any
    (futher) data reliably.
    
    	Ascend insisted that the bug was in the WebRamp (it was sending an invalied
    endpoint ID). We responded that while there was a bug in the WebRamp, it was
    exploiting a security flaw in the Ascend. Anyone can, in principle, specify
    any endpoint identifier that they wish. Ascend simply got WebRamp to fix the
    flaw, and to my knowledge, this weakness still exists. Anyone who knows your
    endpoint identifier can bond to your PPP link. Anyone who you have ever
    connected to with your ISDN equipment knows your endpoint identifier, and
    you cannot easily change it.
    
    	To an extent, the problem is fundamental. If you aren't using PAP or CHAP,
    but instead use a text 'sign on' form of authentication, but are bonding
    multiple connections, what means does the other end have to determine
    whether to bond to an existing connection when it receives a new one? But we
    had this problem even with PAP or CHAP enabled -- I'm not entirely sure why.
    
    	DS
    



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