Re: ISS Internet Scanner Cannot be relied upon for conclusive

From: der Mouse (mouseat_private)
Date: Wed Feb 10 1999 - 07:47:40 PST

  • Next message: David LeBlanc: "Re: ISS Internet Scanner Cannot be relied upon for conclusive"

    >> Surely this is a bit of a no-brainer - why not just try the exploit
    >> and see if it works?  That's certainly what an attacker will do.
    > Let me hit you with another suggestion: if you know something about a
    > box which suggests that an attack won't work, why try it ?
    
    Because the suggestion can be wrong.
    
    > For example, if I do a port scan and cannot connect to the smtp port
    > and later amongst the list of things to check are various sendmail
    > bugs, should I still try them ?
    
    If you have some other access to sendmail, yes.  If not, then it's not
    just a "suggest[ion]" that the attack won't work; it's *certain* that
    the attack won't work.  If you have prior information that tells you it
    *can't possibly* work, don't bother.  If your prior information merely
    says it *probably won't* work, it's still worth trying.
    
    At least for a heavy scan.
    
    > The expectation is that if a service is meant to be available, that
    > it will at any time of a scan.  If a service is not available then
    > more than likely there is no point making further advanced checks.
    
    Right.  But the ioslogon bug does not depend on SNMP being available,
    so SNMP being unavailable should not be taken as an indication that the
    attack won't succeed.
    
    Now this particular bug is an interesting case, because (I gather) it
    is not possible to exploit it without doing damage.  Some attacks (for
    example, those which just get you a root shell) can be tried without
    doing damage; with such attacks, there is no reason ISS (or moral
    equivalent) shouldn't just try them.  In cases like this, it should be
    done only when specifically configured to do so, and when not so
    configured, it shouldn't make any claim either way.  (Here, if it can
    coax a software version number out of the box, it would be reasonable
    for it to spit out a "appears probably vulnerable" or "appears probably
    not vulnerable" indication, or "can't tell" if it can't.  This is not
    the same thing as a definite vulnerable/not.)
    
    					der Mouse
    
    			       mouseat_private
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