Re: [HERT] Advisory #002 Buffer overflow in lsof

From: Robert Watson (robertat_private)
Date: Fri Feb 19 1999 - 10:35:09 PST

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    On Fri, 19 Feb 1999, Mariusz Marcinkiewicz wrote:
    
    > On Thu, 18 Feb 1999, Don Lewis wrote:
    >
    > > ... or are there systems that give group kmem write privileges?  If so,
    > > I'd say that's a security hole.
    >
    > Yes, you are right... but... I saw that hole after installing new linx and
    > checked it's security. First I was suprised but not for a long time.
    > In a few mins I noticed all linux versions are chown .kmem; chmod g+s
    > lsof...  on linux /dev/kmem is +w for gid kmem, on bsd too (probably, I
    
    Sorry, no go.  FreeBSD 2.2-STABLE and 4.0-CURRENT, the two versions I
    have sitting around, have the following permissions on /dev/kmem:
    
    crw-r-----  1 root  kmem    2,   1 Mar  7  1998 /dev/kmem
    
    Please verify claims such as these before posting them.  FreeBSD also does
    not ship with lsof installed, although if the package/port is installed,
    it will be installed sgid kmem.
    
    > didn't checked that), so... all of std. distributions are vuln. without
    > ONE! the slackware, IMHO, it's the most secure distribution [ :))) i know:
    > slackware doesn't has lsof;))) but by tahat way that distr. is secure ;P ]
    
    Write access to /dev/kmem would certainly be fairly nasty--you might as
    well give the user kernel privileges outright (to be distinguished, btw,
    from root access, due to securelevels).  As has been pointed out, even
    read access to /dev/kmem can be sufficient to gain root access, it just
    requires a little more skill and patience, however.  I do not know of a
    way, however, to gain kernel privileges using only read access to
    /dev/kmem, when securelevels are in use (correctly).
    
    I haven't given that particular problem much thought, and discouraging
    kmem access both in and out of securelevel is probably a good idea for
    other reasons (such as IPsec keying material privacy, passwords, etc).
    
      Robert N Watson
    
    robertat_private              http://www.watson.org/~robert/
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    Carnegie Mellon University            http://www.cmu.edu/
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