Oracle Security Followup, patch and FAQ: setuid on oratclsh

From: John Ritchie (ritchiejat_private)
Date: Thu May 06 1999 - 16:01:17 PDT

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    Content-Type: TEXT/ENRICHED; CHARSET=iso-8859-1
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    Content-ID: <Pine.GSO.3.96.990506153645.26965Gat_private>
    
    All,
    
    The following message and patch was sent to us from Oracle regarding the
    oratclsh setuid vulnerability.  If you're an Oracle Metalink member you
    can get this patch off their website; if not then here it is.
    
    Note that this removes oratclsh completely, and removes setuid bits from a
    whole bunch of other executables.  I see this is a good sign: maybe Oracle
    is starting to get as nervous about weak setuid protections as we all are.
    :^)=20
    
    I've removed all the HTML formatting from  the following FAQ.
    
    John Ritchie
    Systems Software Analyst
    Oregon University System
    
    ---------- Forwarded message ----------
    [Oracle contact names removed to protect the innocent]
    
    This e-mail is in response to your concern expressed in your e-mail
    entitled:  "*Huge* security hole in Oracle 8.0.5 with Intellegent agent".=
    =20
    
    
    The Oracle Security Development team, along with the Oracle Worldwide
    Support group have looked into this issue.  We've done research and found
    the setuid issue extended a bit beyond the oratclsh file.=20
    
    
    So, attached is a patch in the form of a shell script which we are
    issuing today to our customers via our Worldwide Customer Support web
    page (MetaLink).  Also below this message is the FAQ about this patch,
    which is also being posted to MetaLink.=20
    
    [more Oracle Support name info deleted]
    
    -----=20
    
    
    Q: I've heard about a setuid security issue with the Oracle database?=20
    What is this all about?=20
    
    A: On Unix platforms, some executable files have the setuid bit on.  It
    may be possible for a very knowledgeable user to use these executables to
    bypass your system security by elevating their operating system privileges
    to that of the Oracle user.=20
    
    Q: I've also heard about a security issue with the Intelligent Agent?=20
    What is this all about?
    
    A: It=92s basically the same problem as above, but specifically applies to =
    a
    utility executable called oratclsh which is included in your Intelligent
    Agent installation.  It is a separate program that is not used by the
    Intelligent Agent.
    
    Q: Which releases are affected by this problem?
    
    A: This problem affects Oracle data server releases 8.03, 8.0.4, 8.0.5,
    and 8.1.5 on UNIX=99 platforms only.
    
    Q: Can I correct this problem or do I need a patch?
    
    A: This problem can easily be corrected.  The customer can download the
    patch from the Oracle MetaLink webpages at
    <<http://www.oracle.com/support/elec_sup>http://www.oracle.com/support/elec=
    _sup.=20
    The patch is a UNIX=99 shell script.  This shell script should be run
    <italic>immediately</italic>, and also run <italic>after each
    relink</italic> of Oracle.
    
    Q: Is the Oracle Intelligent Agent secure?
    
    A: Yes, the Oracle Intelligent Agent is secure.  All tasks performed by
    the Intelligent Agent require username/password authentication.  The
    Intelligent Agent can only perform a task for which appropriate
    credentials -- for the operating system and/or database -- have been
    provided.
    
    Q:  What is Oracle doing to fix this problem?
    
    A: Effective immediately, Oracle will provide the patch on Oracle=92s
    Worldwide Support Web pages.  Oracle will ensure the patches are
    incorporated into future releases of Oracle8<italic>i</italic> (8.1.6) and
    Oracle8.0 (8.0.6)=20
    
    Q: What is Oracle doing to notify users about this problem now?
    
    A: Oracle is notifying all supported customers, via the Oracle Worldwide
    Support Web pages, of this issue so they can address it as required.
    
    
    --=====================_926048157==_
    Content-Type: TEXT/PLAIN; CHARSET=us-ascii
    Content-ID: <Pine.GSO.3.96.990506153645.26965Hat_private>
    Content-Description: setuid_patch.sh
    
    #!/bin/sh
    #
    #    NAME
    #	setuid_patch.sh
    #
    #    DESCRIPTION
    #	Provided as a patch to 8.0.X and 8.1.5 to fix bugs 701297, 714293.
    #	These bugs introduce a security hole by changing the permissions
    #	to affect the effective user id for executables which should not
    #	be set this way.
    #
    #    PRECONDITIONS
    #       if ORACLE_HOME is not set, doesn't exist, or points to an
    #       invalid location, script exits.
    #
    #    HOW TO USE
    #	This script must be run as the oracle user who installed the 8.0.3
    #	8.0.4, 8.0.5 or 8.1.5 software.
    #
    #       To run, change directories into the the directory that contains this
    #       file.
    #       % cd <patch_location_directory>
    #
    #       Add execute permission to the patch.
    #       % chmod 744 setuid_patch.sh
    #
    #       Then, invoke the script.
    #       % ./setuid_patch.sh
    #
    #   MODIFIED   (MM/DD/YY)
    #	menash	5/3/99	Initial creation
    
    ##---------------------
    ## VARIABLE DEFINITIONS
    
    #-----------------------------
    # potentially platform specific variables
    
    CHMOD="/bin/chmod"
    FIND="/bin/find"
    CHMOD_S="$CHMOD -s"   # remove set id bit
    RM_F="/bin/rm -f"
    LS_L="/bin/ls -l"
    LS_N="/bin/ls -n"     # gives uid number for owner
    SED="/bin/sed"
    AWK="/bin/awk"
    GREP="/bin/grep"
    GREP_C="$GREP -c"
    GREP_V="$GREP -v"
    MV="/bin/mv"
    TMP_DIR="/tmp"
    
    EXECS_TO_UNSET="lsnrctl oemevent onrsd osslogin tnslsnr tnsping trcasst trcroute cmctl cmadmin cmgw names namesctl otrccref otrcfmt otrcrep otrccol oracleO"
    EXECS_NOT_TO_UNSET="oracle dbsnmp"
    EXECS_TO_REMOVE="oratclsh osh"
    LIKELY_SUFFIXES="0 O"
    ROOT_SH_815="$ORACLE_HOME/root.sh"
    ROOT_SH_805="$ORACLE_HOME/orainst/root.sh"
    
    
    if [ x${ORACLE_HOME} = x ] -o [ ${ORACLE_HOME} = "" ] ; then
    	echo "ORACLE_HOME is either unset or empty."
    	echo "Exiting ..."
    	exit 1
    fi
    
    #--------------
    # usage message
    
    SCRIPTNAME=setuid_patch.sh
    USAGE="Usage: $SCRIPTNAME [-h]"
    if [ $# -gt 1 ] ; then
      echo
      echo $USAGE
      exit 2
    fi
    
    
    ##-----------#
    ## FUNCTIONS #
    ##-----------#
    
    # ----------
    # setuid_off
    
    # Assumes executable is in $ORACLE_HOME/bin
    #
    # Usage: setuid_off <executable>
    #------------
    
    setuid_off () {
    
    	exe=$1
    	full_path_exe=$ORACLE_HOME/bin/$exe
    	if [ -r $full_path_exe ] ; then
    	  perm=`$LS_L $full_path_exe | $SED 's;r-.*;;'`
    	  if [ $perm = "-rws" ] ; then
    	     $CHMOD_S $full_path_exe
    	     echo "  removing set-ID from $full_path_exe"
    	  fi
    	fi
    }
    
    #-----------
    # remove_exe
    # Assumes executable is in $ORACLE_HOME/bin
    # Removes if owned by root, otherwise, calls setuid_off
    
    # Usage: remove_exe <executable>
    remove_exe () {
    
    	full_path_exe=$ORACLE_HOME/bin/$1
    	if [ -r $full_path_exe ] ; then
    	  owner=`$LS_N $full_path_exe | $AWK '{print $3}'`
    	  if [ $owner = "0" ] ; then
    	     $RM_F $full_path_exe
    	     echo "   removing $full_path_exe..."
    	  else
    	     setuid_off $1
    	  fi
    	fi
    }
    
    #-----------
    # search_for_others
    #
    # Finds other executables n $ORACLE_HOME/bin which have 4000, 6000,
    # or 2000 permissions except for those we expects, and warns the
    # user that they should be removed manually
    
    # Usage: search_for_others
    
    search_for_others () {
    
    	all_others="`$FIND $ORACLE_HOME/bin -perm -2000`"
    	others=""	
    	if [ x"${all_others}" != x ] ; then
    	  for other in $all_others; do
     	     match="false"
    	     for exe in $EXECS_NOT_TO_UNSET; do
    	 	 if [ $other = $ORACLE_HOME/bin/$exe ] ; then
    		    match="true"		
    		 fi 	
    	     done
    	     if [ $match = "false" ] ; then
    		 others="$others $other"
    	     fi	
              done	
    	  if [ x"${others}" != x ] ; then
    	     echo "The following executables remain with set-ID."
    	     echo "You may need to change the permissions manually:"
    	     for executable in $others; do
    		 echo "  $executable"
    	     done	
    	  fi
    	fi
    
    }
    
    #--------
    # remove_from_root_sh
    
    # For each parameter it is passed, remove_from_root_sh removes all
    # lines with references to that string.
    
    # Usage: remove_from_root_sh [ string1, string2, etc. ]
    
    remove_from_root_sh () {
    
    	strings=$*
    	tmp_file="root.sh.$$"	
    	$RM_F $TMP_DIR/$tmp_file
    	for string in $strings; do
    	  if [ `$GREP_C $string $ROOT_SH` != "0" ] ; then
    	    echo "  removing $string from $ROOT_SH"
    	  fi
    	  $GREP_V $string $ROOT_SH > $TMP_DIR/$tmp_file
    	  $MV $TMP_DIR/$tmp_file $ROOT_SH
    	done
    	
    }
    
    ################
    # MAIN EXECUTION
    ################
    
    # Turn setuid bit off for the appropriate executables and their
    # likely backups
    
    for exe in $EXECS_TO_UNSET; do
        setuid_off $exe
        for suf in $LIKELY_SUFFIXES; do
            setuid_off $exe$suf
        done
    done
    
    # Remove files entirely which should be removed
    
    for exe in $EXECS_TO_REMOVE; do
        remove_exe $exe
    done
    
    # Determine version -- 8.0.5 or 8.1.5
    # Backup existing root.sh into root.sh.old, removing references
    # to EXECS_TO_REMOVE
    if [ -r $ROOT_SH_805 ] ; then
        ROOT_SH=$ROOT_SH_805
    else
        if [ -r $ROOT_SH_815 ] ; then
            ROOT_SH=$ROOT_SH_815
        else
    	echo "No root.sh found in $ORACLE_HOME"
        fi
    fi
    
    if [ x${ROOT_SH} != x ] ; then
        remove_from_root_sh $EXECS_TO_REMOVE
    fi
    
    # Check one last time to see if any setuid executables are left
    
    search_for_others
    
    
    
    
    --=====================_926048157==_--
    



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