Ehrm, I was really tired when I wrote the first message, ok..? :-) I did not only forgot to mention that the system was Solaris 2.6, but also made a small error.. The bug may be used to _create_ files that is owned by root, but writeable by your group, but not to overwrite any existing ones. ----- Forwarded message from Joel Eriksson <jenat_private> ----- Date: Mon, 9 Aug 1999 01:04:51 +0200 From: Joel Eriksson <jenat_private> To: BUGTRAQat_private Subject: sdtcm_convert X-Mailer: Mutt 0.95.4i X-PGP-Key: http://www.ettnet.se/~jen/pgpkeys/pubkey5.asc X-PGP-ID: 1024/0x8A15DE20 1999-04-07 Joel Eriksson <jenat_private> X-PGP-Fingerprint: F715 687D 6B1C 0726 B9F4 EF26 BF82 C749 8A15 DE20 X-Phone: +46-704-428007 Hello Bugtraq readers. There have been security holes in sdtcm_convert before, as with most CDE programs it seem. Studying some truss-output I think I found yet another one. If one of the following files does not exist and sdtcm_convert is SUID you are probably vulnerable (I say probably since I haven't tested exploiting the bug): /usr/spool/calendar/.lock.convert.<hostname> /usr/spool/calendar/.lock.<hostname> They are opened with O_WRONLY|O_CREAT and mode 0660, EUID = 0. This means that a symbolic link from them to anywhere would either create or overwrite the destination file when sdtcm_convert is run, the file would be owned by root, but by YOUR group. Since it is also writeable by group (0660) the user exploiting this vulnerability also have write access to the file.. It does not take much imagination to gain root with this.. -- Joel Eriksson jenat_private Security Consultant ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Mvh Joel Eriksson
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