Re: [Fwd: Truth about ssh 1.2.27 vulnerabiltiy]

From: Dan Astoorian (djastat_private)
Date: Wed Sep 29 1999 - 14:39:52 PDT

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    On Wed, 29 Sep 1999 16:59:48 EDT, Sylvain Robitaille writes:
    > I don't promise the most impressive code, but it has been tested (on
    > Digital Unix) and I believe it works correctly. Comments are of course
    > welcome...
    
    I have a couple of serious concerns about this patch.
    
    1) It leaves behind a race condition; a symlink created between the
       lstat() and the bind() will still get happily followed.  The race
       condition could be minimized by moving the lstat() and the bind()
       closer together, but it can't be eliminated this way.  This is why
       it's important for the check to be made in the kernel, where it can
       be done atomically.
    
    2) Using popen() within a privileged process is somewhat reckless; it
       potentially opens up the usual risks of shell-mischief, although I
       haven't gone digging for any specific holes you've opened up.  What's
       wrong with using syslog?
    
    3) This isn't a vulnerability, but as a matter of principle, I don't
       trust any code that could wind up containing this line:
    
    +   if (dirname[strlen(dirname)] == '/') dirname[strlen(dirname)] = 0;
    
       (Trust me: dirname[strlen(dirname)] != '/'.  Presumably a "- 1" was
       intended someplace or two?)
    
    The race condition is a hard problem; if bind() follows symlinks, it is
    *impossible* to safely use it in a directory writable by anyone other
    than geteuid().
    
    I haven't looked into what would be involved in creating a proper patch,
    but appropriate ways to fix the problem *might* include:
    
    - changing the process's effective userid/groupid/credentials to match
      the target user before doing the bind(), so that directories not
      writable by the user are also not writable by the code doing the
      bind(); or
    
    - using a different location for the Unix domain socket--one which
      is verifiably manipulable only by root.
    
    [As long as I'm here: it's been pointed out to me that my test program
    was missing a semicolon after "close(fd)".  This was, of course, a
    cut-and-paste error; my apologies.]
    
    Cheers,
    
    --                          People shouldn't think that it's better to have
    Dan Astoorian               loved and lost than never loved at all.  It's
    Sysadmin, CS Lab            not, it's better to have loved and won.  All
    djastat_private        the other options really suck.    --Dan Redican
    



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