Re: Amanda multiple vendor local root compromises

From: Alexandre Oliva (olivaat_private)
Date: Tue Nov 02 1999 - 03:35:43 PST

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    On Nov  1, 1999, Rob <capvegat_private> wrote:
    
    >> Amanda's "runtar" program, suid root by default on FreeBSD 3.3, calls
    >> /usr/bin/tar and passes all args given to runtar to this program. Tar is
    
    > FWIW, runtar does not need to be suid root if the amanda user (defaults to
    > user "amanda") has read access to the raw disks.
    
    Nope, that's true in the case of `rundump', that is only enabled on
    platforms whose dumb `dump' programs must be run as root.  But in the
    case of `runtar', it needs root permissions because it runs tar and
    `tar' reads files, not raw disk devices.
    
    Most of the issues raised for `runtar' also apply to `rundump', except
    that `rundump' can't usually be used to create files, only to back
    them up.  But both programs are installed so that only the Amanda
    group (specified at configure time) can run them, with chmod g+x/chgrp
    permissions, and only the Amanda user (also specified at configure
    time) can tell it to actually run tar (getuid() is checked at program
    start-up).
    
    --
    Alexandre Oliva http://www.ic.unicamp.br/~oliva IC-Unicamp, Bra[sz]il
    oliva@{lsd.ic.unicamp.br,guarana.{org,com}} aoliva@{acm,computer}.org
    oliva@{gnu.org,kaffe.org,{egcs,sourceware}.cygnus.com,samba.org}
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