Re: FTP denial of service attack

From: bert hubert (ahuat_private)
Date: Tue Dec 07 1999 - 13:40:09 PST

  • Next message: Darren Reed: "Re: FTP denial of service attack"

    On Tue, Dec 07, 1999 at 11:29:56PM +1100, Darren Reed wrote:
    
    > Who has more free file descriptors & network ports, you or the ftp server ?
    
    On a general note, and I am thankful that this is relatively unknown as yet,
    almost any TCP/IP based service is vulnerable to simple DoS tricks. It is
    very easy to create many ''TCP/IP Connections'' which do take resources at
    the server end, but very little at the client end.
    
    With the abundance of cracked boxes about, the malicious user may well be
    untraceable.
    
    All the malicious user needs to do is send lots of hand crafted SYNs and ACKs
    without involving the local OS in any way. The remote server tries to handle
    thousands of very real connections which all need to timeout before the
    connection is closed and the resources are freed. A PalmPilot could disable
    an entire server farm this way.
    
    Current operating systems aren't very well equiped to handle this. Programs
    are forced to accept() a connection and have no way to prevent the kernel
    from ACKing the connection and allocating resources.
    
    The free unixes these days mostly come with packet filtering available by
    default, these might be best off. One could imagine a 'libfilter' which
    would easily allow daemons with the right permissions/capabilities to
    instruct the kernel to not accept connections anymore from a certain host.
    
    Periodically, the daemon should clear old filters. It should also do this
    when instructed and on startup. I think it has merit to investigate this
    idea further and implement it portably. Most modern unixes support some form
    of packet filtering, libfilter could be a means to provide them to daemons.
    
    There are ways to protect servers against such an attack with dedicated
    hardware but such measures are not widely implemented today and may also
    'protect' indiscriminately against normal traffic in case of false
    positives. A daemon can be more specific in its measures.
    
    Regards,
    
    
    bert hubert.
    
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