Stefan Aeschbacher scribed: > Hi > here are some snort rules which could show the presence of a trin00 The nature of these attacks do not lend themselves to an easy defense; finding a master and retrieving its list of clients is currently one of the best, albeit proactive, countermeasures. By making rules to detect the master available for a free IDS, you greatly improve the chances of fighting the default configuration. Thank you. I have a few suggestions, if I may. > alert tcp any any -> 192.168.1.0/24 27665 (msg:"Trin00: Attacker to > Master (default startup pass detected!)"; content:"betaalmostdone";)) Trinoo uses crypt(3) to verify this password. Stock crypt(3) bases its one-way function on DES, which is limited to a 56-bit key. Passwords exceeding this length are truncated, making "betaalmo" sufficient to authenticate. > alert tcp any any -> 192.168.1.0/24 27665 (msg:"Trin00: Attacker to > Master (default r.i. pass detected!)"; content:"gOrave";)) The gOrave password is read via stdin during master startup, making its occurance on the control channel highly unlikely. (As gOrave is required for startup, it's verification takes place before the control port is listening.) I think this rule may be safely dropped. Thanks again, Jacob -- Jacob Langseth <jwlat_private>
This archive was generated by hypermail 2b30 : Fri Apr 13 2001 - 15:19:25 PDT